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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a comparative case study of Camp David (1979) and Camp David (2000), with a 
focus on the U.S. role as the main broker between Israel and Arabs. The study aims to 
understand what actually went wrong in the Camp David Summit of 2000, and it reveals the 
real factors behind such failure. It explains the reasons behind the different outcome of both 
summits, even though both were held under the patronage of the U.S. as the main mediator.    
 
The objective of this research is to examine how the Palestinians can build a better 
relationship with the U.S. and how they can learn more about how the United States works, in 
order to influence U.S. policy, so that it takes better account of the Palestinian perspective and 
Palestinian needs. Such a change in U.S. policy is necessary for Palestinians to gain trust in 
the United States as a mediator in the conflict and perhaps, at a later stage, as an arbiter, too.  
 
This study briefly discusses the main interest groups in the United States and their role in the 
creation of American policies that support Israel at the cost of the Palestinians. The study 
analyzes the nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship in comparison with the U.S.-Palestinian 
relationship. It also discusses the use of U.S. foreign financial aid policy as an instrument in 
resolving conflicts, and it discusses mediation as a commonly used approach in conflict 
resolution.  
 
The role of mediation has rapidly developed over the last four decades and has become a tool 
of increasing importance to resolve conflicts. The study analyzes the role of mediation in 
resolving disputes and explores whether mediation is sufficient for resolving complicated and 
very controversial cases, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Resolving such a conflict 
perhaps needs to shift at a later stage from mediation to arbitration. Palestinians and Israelis 
need outside help to overcome the conflict between them. The United States has the most 
potential as the mediator and as an arbiter. The study concludes that the U.S. has not acted as a 
professional and fair mediator, which has caused the Palestinians to feel that there is an 
absence of neutrality practiced by the U.S. Therefore, the chances of succeeding in brokering a 
final, just, and comprehensive peace agreement are very slim. The conclusion recommends 
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that Palestinians need to alter their approach to the United States in order to strengthen and 
improve relations; and ultimately moderate the role of the U.S. as a mediator in order to reach 
a just and permanent solution to the conflict with Israel.  
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Chapter One 
Study’s Background 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The Palestinians are one of the few nations occupied in recent history whose case has 
not yet found a just and permanent solution by the international community. The 
Palestinian case is not about a minority group fighting for their civil rights or self 
governance (Autonomy) nor is it about a majority suffering from the rule of the minority 
(Autocracy). The protracted struggle between the Palestinians and the Israelis is the result 
of social, political, geographical, historical, and cultural conflict; those factors have led to 
the continuation of the conflict and difficulty of its resolution. The conflict between both 
nations (Israelis and Palestinians) is about controlling the Palestinian land itself where both 
parties claim their “undisputed legitimate” rights and they demand that these rights be 
recognized and acknowledged by the international community. Many Israelis want all 
“Historic Palestine” suggesting that the Palestinians can leave the land and live abroad. 
David Ben-Gurion was very clear and precise about this issue when he said to the Jewish 
Agency Executive in June, 1938: “I am for compulsory transfer; I do not see anything 
immoral in it” (1). 
 
 The roots of the conflict originated in 1897 (Basel Conference) when Theodore Herzel 
opened the first Zionist Congress. The main purpose of the conference was to establish an 
organized process working towards free Jewish immigration to Palestine. Besides uniting 
Jews under Zionist leadership, the hidden paramount objective was establishing a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine (2).  
 
 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is interconnected to the constant instability and 
developments that take place throughout the rest of the world. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (USSR) in 1989, the international political system transformed from the 
politics of dual competing super powers into a sole super power system, with the United 
                                               
(1) Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, (Oxford: One World Publications Limited, 2006), p.IX. 
(2) For roots of the problem, see Noami W. Cohen. The Americanization of Zionism 1897 - 1948, (New 
England: Brandies University Press, 2003), p.165. 
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States becoming the only dominant power leading the rest of the world. The drastic change 
in the international power balance has led the U.S. to reconsider its previous policies; it 
started reorganizing its strategies of the foreign policies for the sake of protecting its long-
term national interests. Since the Middle East has always been a strategic region for the 
U.S., the American administration recently started to give the “Palestinian Case” more of 
its attention. The U.S. is being aware that the “Cause of Palestine” has a significant impact 
on the political systems in both the Arab and the Moslem worlds since the tragedy of the 
Palestinian people is a permanent source of crisis for the whole region.  
 
 Even though the U.S. has been keeping close diplomatic relations with the moderate 
Arab governments, it labels Arab regimes such as Syria as a country that belongs to the 
opposing camp. The U.S. has a tough stance against the “opposing camp” where it accuses 
countries in such a camp as evil countries since they harbor terrorist groups. In his book 
“Media Control” Noam Chomsky explains: 
 
“The war on terrorism was not declared on September 11; rather it was declared, using the same 
rhetoric as the first declaration twenty years earlier. The Reagan administration, as you know, 
I’m sure, came into office announcing that a war on terrorism would be the core of U.S. foreign 
policy….The main focus was state-supported international terrorism in the Islamic world and at 
that time also in Central America. International terrorism was described as a plague spread by 
“depraved opponents of civilization itself, in a return to barbarism in the modern age” (1). 
 
However, the Palestinian Authority realizes that only the U.S. can help in resolving the 
dilemma of their intractable and protracted injustice. The Palestinians are not in a position 
of equality vis a vis the Israelis in terms of military strength and economic power, so the 
Israelis are dictating their demands rather than negotiating them. In relation to this specific 
issue, Roger Fisher and William Ury raise two main questions: “Of what use is talking 
about interests, options, and standards if the other side has stronger bargaining position? 
What do you do if the other side is richer or better connected, or if they have a large staff 
or more powerful weapons?” (2). The Israelis have been dealing with the Palestinians based 
on the concept of “might is right”; therefore, the results have not been satisfying to the 
                                               
(1) Noam Chomsky. Media Control, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1991), pp.70-71. 
(2) Roger Fisher and William Ury. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In (New York: 
Penguin Group Inc, 1991), p. 95. 
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Palestinians. As long as this continues, the conflict will not be resolved with fairness and 
justice.  
 
The PLO expressed readiness for direct negotiations mediated by the U.S. and their 
leadership has appeared eager to engage Washington directly in their conflict with Israel. 
The PLO had to renounce violence which was a previous means used by them for more 
than four decades in order to end their conflict with the Israelis. In 1988, Yasser Arafat 
renounced terrorism publicly and clearly as George Shultz (former U.S.  Secretary of 
State) had demanded. The U.S. revived their diplomatic relations with PLO after a boycott 
that had lasted for 13 years (1975-1988). In other words, by renouncing violence, the 
Palestinians have expressed their desire for a genuine, neutral and objective involvement of 
the U.S. in resolving their conflict with the Israelis. This is why the current President of the 
Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas is persistent and very determined that 
Palestinians do not have any other choice but to attain the satisfaction and the blessings of 
the U.S. administrations. Many European countries such as Norway, France, Spain, and 
Britain had mediated between the Israelis and the Palestinians but ended with failure; the 
only mediator who can really help in resolving this long complicated conflict is the United 
States of America. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
The main goal is to evaluate the role of the U.S. as the primary mediator in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. It will compare between Camp David 1979 and Camp David 2000 as 
two case studies. The first (Camp David 1979) is considered as a good model of successful 
mediation, while the second “Camp David 2000” ended with terrible failure. The study 
will discuss the reasons behind the success of the first summit and the failure of the 
second.  
 
Another objective of this research is to study to what extent a change in the Palestinian 
perception of the U.S. people and U.S. foreign policy would improve the chances of peace 
in the region. As part of this objective, the study will explore how Palestinians can better 
explain their perspectives and their national aspirations. The researcher hopes to provide 
realistic and reasonable suggestions that would improve and enhance the Palestinian-
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American relationship. Earning the trust of the U.S. by Palestinians would inevitably lead 
to more hope in accepting the U.S. a successful mediator.  
 
1.3 Research Significance   
 
It is very important to study the policy of the U.S. in mediating between Israelis and the 
Palestinians. This super power with its enormous military and economic strength is the 
only country in the world that is capable of making, if not imposing, peace between the 
Israelis and the Arabs. When there is a deadlock in the negotiations, the U.S. can break the 
impasse by proposing its own creative solution. Even though the American positions are 
constantly biased in favor of the Israelis, the people of the region cannot exclude the U.S. 
role in imposing a just and lasting peace that helps in ending this long-running conflict. It 
is imperative to investigate the reasons behind the failure of the U.S. role in making peace 
and the factors that have influenced the U.S. foreign policy in dealing with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
 
It is hoped that this research will contribute to a better understanding of the past and the 
future U.S. role in conflict mediation in the Middle East. The importance of this research 
lies in investigating the role of mediation as a peaceful approach in conflict resolution. The 
value of studying this approach is to investigate the effectiveness and the appropriateness 
in present conflict management and future resolution. Also, this study should be very 
beneficial for the general negotiators involved in resolving other disputes. Understanding 
the nature of the Israeli-American relationship helps explain the policy practiced by the 
U.S.  
 
1.4 Research Problem 
 
This study attempts to analyze why the Camp David Summit of 2000 failed and what 
Palestinians can do more in order to improve their relations with the United States. It also 
attempts to analyze whether a mediated approach to conflict resolution is applicable in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It seeks answers to the following questions: 
 
1. What is the importance of a third party’s role in conflict resolution?  
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2. How was the U.S. role of mediation employed in both Camp David Summits of 1979 
and 2000 and why was it successful in the first but not in the second? 
3. What role did U.S. support for Israel at the expense of the Palestinians play in both 
summits? 
4. What are the main factors that have negatively influenced the U.S.-Palestinian 
relationship in the negotiations at the summit of Camp David 2000? 
5. What are the future prospects of the U.S. role in resolving the conflict as a third 
party? 
6. Is mediation when used as the sole approach in conflict resolution doomed to fail 
when employed in controversial cases such as the Israeli-Palestinian case? 
7. Will the chances of solving disputes in such a case be higher if the process shifts at a 
later stage from mediation to “mediation/arbitration” and the mediator himself becomes an 
arbiter? 
In general, the research studies if there has been an absence of neutrality and 
objectivity of the United States as the main mediator (broker) in the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict.  
 
1.5 Research Hypotheses 
    
The role of the mediator is very important; he is the main “administrator” who fosters 
communication and reconciliation between the disputing parties. If he does not maintain 
the trust of one of the parties, efforts will be exerted uselessly. His competence is a basic 
requirement for any successful mission; the mediator has to have all the skills required for 
this exhausting task. Above all, the objectivity of the mediator is what ultimately 
determines the direction and the final destination port of the sailing ship. The broker, who 
is involved as a mediator in the negotiations between the disputing parties, can be an 
important factor behind either the failure or the success of reaching a final agreement.  
 
Palestinians do not trust the U.S. to be a fair and an honest mediator in the light of the 
fact that the U.S. has long been perceived as pro-Israel. The U.S. has to be a fair broker in 
order to be a successful mediator. The Palestinians and their supporters are not well 
enough familiarized with what influences positively the U.S. State Department’s foreign 
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policies. If the U.S. passes the stage of trust building with Palestinians, it can move 
forward to arbitrate between both disputing parties of the conflict. 
 
As part of the hypothesis, the only possible way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict will be through adopting a “Mediation/Arbitration Approach”; the international 
community led by the U.S. will eventually have to impose a solution. This may function 
successfully as long as there is a mutual written consent in which both parties will abide by 
the outcome of the arbitration. The decision would be binding; it would be under the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the possibility of being 
transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for enforcement. This approach 
would succeed if it is accompanied with the belief of, specifically the Palestinians, in the 
neutrality and the straightforwardness of the U.S. as the main “Mediator/Arbiter”. The U.S. 
tries to gain support of Palestinians through foreign aid, but this aid must be combined with 
real change in U.S. policy that will gain the Palestinians’ trust. The U.S. may gain the trust 
of the Palestinians if it takes a tougher stance toward Israel.    
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
 
The research methodology applied is composed mainly of a qualitative analysis of 
historical documents and of secondary literature which has tackled similar research 
questions. The historical analysis aims to identify structural components of U.S. policy 
which can be traced by means of a descriptive approach underlying U.S. policy on 
Palestine and Israel since 1967 until today. A broad range of secondary literature is 
examined, in order to access the validity of the research hypotheses and explore the 
relevance of alternative approaches to mediation.  
 
1.7 Research Boundary 
 
The time boundary of the research is from the 1970’s till present. The geographic 
boundary in this study is the U.S., Egypt, Israel, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
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1.8 Research Limitations 
 
The research is limited by the lack of available access to research material. 
It has been only nine years since Camp David 2000 took place, so there are 
limited resources available on this topic in the libraries of Palestinian 
universities. The research depends on several Western sources, and journals 
which had interviewed people involved in the negotiation from both sides 
(Israeli and Palestinian). The researcher is also limited by the lack of available 
funding resources to conduct field research and interview the different parties 
involved in both summits under study. 
 
1.9 Research Outline 
 
This research comprises seven chapters. The first chapter deals with the general 
concepts of the study; it discusses the research significance, boundaries, limitations, and 
methodology. Finally, it outlines the main content of each chapter. The last chapter 
consists of the final conclusions: analysis, results, and recommendations. 
 
1.9.1 Chapter Two: 
 
Chapter two discusses the theoretical framework and reviews some earlier studies on 
the topic to indicate how this research adds to the knowledge of the subject. In the 
theoretical framework, the chapter identifies the peaceful approaches to conflict resolution, 
and explains their methodologies. It specifically discusses negotiation, conciliation, 
mediation, arbitration, and litigation. The main focus, however, is on mediation which is 
the most commonly used approach and as the core topic of this study. It focuses on the 
definition and the history of mediation as a peaceful approach to conflict resolution and 
investigates the range of its applicability in different regions among the world. Also, it 
discusses the shortcomings of such an approach and how sometimes it does not work 
efficiently if practiced by a biased mediator. The case of Qatar vs. Bahrain is used as a 
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relevant example that supports the hypothesis of combining mediation with arbitration as 
an effective approach in conflict resolution. 
 
The second section of this chapter deals with some earlier studies related to both 
summits but mainly the summit of 2000. This section will focus mainly on what went 
wrong by exposing the readers to comprehensive analysis had been made by several 
political analysts from both sides: Israelis and Palestinians.  
 
1.9.2 Chapter Three: 
 
Chapter Three studies the history of the U.S. mediation in the Middle East. In addition, 
it discusses Rogers Peace Plan and the role of the main foreign policy strategists in the last 
forty years. It also discusses U.S.’s   strategy in foreign assistance i.e. pressures and 
incentives, stick and carrots. It investigates and discusses USAID programs aiming to help 
the Palestinians. Furthermore, this chapter discusses both the American-Israeli relationship 
in comparison with American-Arab relationship. It also discusses whether the special 
American-Israeli relationship is strategic, or it is a result of pressure groups such as 
AIPAC.  
 
The focus of this chapter is to reveal how (mediation) was practiced by the U.S. in 
building their diplomatic relations with Palestine and Israel since the end of the Second 
World War. It discusses mainly the other alternative peaceful approach in conflict 
resolution (U.S. Foreign financial Aid) and provides a brief history of U.S. diplomacy, 
particularly, the concept of their financial aids and the “hidden-agenda” behind such a 
policy. Finally, this chapter explores how the U.S. uses mediation as one of its main 
approaches to international conflict resolution. 
 
1.9.3 Chapter Four: 
 
This chapter discusses Camp David 1979. It discusses the situation of both Egypt and 
Israel before 1979 and points out the main political events that prepared the political 
environment to be ripe for a solution. The Rogers plan, October War, Kilometer 101 
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Agreement, Geneva Convention, Disengagement and Separation of Forces in Sinai 
Agreement, Kissinger’s Step-by-Step approach, and Sadat Peace initiative.  
 
 
1.9.4 Chapter Five: 
 
Chapter five discusses the Camp David Summit of 2000. It outlines the main events 
that contributed to reaching advanced peaceful negotiations in the year of 2000 after a long 
period of violence and fighting between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The 1982 
Lebanon War, Arafat’s visit to Egypt in 1983, the 1988 declaration of independence and 
renouncing terrorism by Palestinians in Algeria Conference, the 1991 Gulf War, Madrid 
Peace Conference, and Oslo accords were main factors in transforming Palestinian 
attitudes toward reaching a negotiated solution. Consequently, this chapter which is based 
on the analysis of several political analysts and scholars reveals the reasons behind the 
failure of the summit of 2000 and who caused it.  
 
1.9.5 Chapter Six: 
 
Chapter six comprises the main results agreed upon by both sides (Egypt/ Israel) in 
Camp David 1979. Similarly, it presents the main points discussed at Camp David 2000. It 
recapitulates the major factors, including policy decisions, which have led to the failure of 
Camp David 2000 and the successes of Camp David 1979. A clear comparison between 
the competence and the behavior of the different administrations that handled the 
negotiations is identified. In short, both cases are examined as the main two case studies of 
this thesis.   
 
1.9.6 Chapter Seven: 
 
Chapter Seven shows the results of the research, and offers a set of relevant 
recommendations and suggestions for Arab and Palestinian policy makers, specifically for 
the Palestinian negotiating team, in addition to Palestinian scholars. 
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Chapter Two 
 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Conflict is a state of opposition. People deal with conflicts every day at work, home, in 
the car, and even within one’s own self. Conflict may occur at a very low level when one is 
at odds within himself, or among different nations in the international arena.  It may be 
transformed from a small trivial difference to a very big violent and aggressive conflict. In 
political terms, it refers to the feud or the state of ongoing hostility between two 
individuals, groups, communities, or states. When the two disputing parties who live in the 
same state or area are in a disagreement status where each party attempts to undermine the 
legitimacy of the others’ claims, demands or goals, it would be called domestic conflict.  
 
A regional conflict involves two states or more located in the same geographic area. 
International conflict involves many countries from different parts of the world such as the 
First and the Second World Wars. However, some political analysts define international 
conflict differently suggesting that international conflict is not always connoted with the 
disputes among different countries from different parts of the world; it may include other 
actors such as non-governmental organizations such as Al-Qaeda. Also, international 
conflict may apply to inter-group conflicts within the country itself where one ethnic group 
is fighting for civil rights, identity, or independence such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 As for the inter-group conflicts, they can be very destructive and the struggle may lead 
to either success, failure, or a stalemate and deadlock. Ronald J. Fisher wrote: 
 
“Groups in conflict tend to develop negative stereotypes of each other: over-simplified, 
inaccurate, rigid, and derogatory beliefs about the characteristics of the other group that are 
applied indiscriminately to all the individuals in that group……Mutual stereotyping leads in 
part to a mirror image, in which each group sees the other negatively (as aggressive, 
untrustworthy, manipulative) and itself positively (as peaceful, trustworthy, cooperative)” (1).  
 
                                               
(1) For more information see Ronald J. Fisher,”Intergroup Conflict” in: Morton Deutsch and Peter T. 
Coleman. The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and practice,(.San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons 
Inc. , 2000),  p. 171. 
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Finally, different factors may cause conflicts; most of the conflicts all over the world 
are caused by one of the following:  aggression, conflict profiteers and distribution of 
wealth, hate crimes, identity, extremism, nationalism, poverty and dehumanization.  
 
2.1.1. Violent vs. Peaceful Approaches of Conflict Resolution: 
 
Conflict resolution can be achieved through two main approaches. First, people can 
resolve their disputes through violence and coercion; by military attacks or waging wars. 
Second, the disputes can be resolved by peaceful approaches. Conflict resolution through 
peaceful approaches has become one of the top priorities on the international agenda in 
modern times. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, military confrontations 
whether local or international have erupted; several terrorist attacks took place in Spain, 
Britain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, and Jordan, and cultural clashes are spreading in 
different parts of the world. Also, the U.S. attacked and toppled the Taliban leadership in 
Afghanistan, and the Saddam regime in Iraq.  Many peace activists are deeply concerned 
with such escalation; they are exerting their best efforts to achieve a peaceful end to this 
“cancerous situation”. They believe that conflicts should not be resolved through violence 
since it simply breeds more violence. Therefore, the dire need for peaceful approaches has 
become the main concern of the people who join the peace camp.  
 
 On the other hand, conflicts do not always lead to confrontation or violence; they 
function as a stage where one can improve his bargaining position. Christopher W. Moore 
asserts that conflicts may lead to productive and positive changes or to the destruction and 
degradation of relationships. He suggests:  
 
“A significant variable in the outcome of a dispute is the means that the participants use to 
resolve their differences. Now, more than ever before, there is a need for dispute resolution 
procedures that assist parties in meeting their needs, satisfying their interests, and reaching 
voluntary agreements that minimize physical and psychological harm” (1).  
 
Beverly Potter asserts: “Conflict is not necessarily bad, and it doesn’t necessarily 
indicate a failed interaction. In fact, conflict can be a catalyst for creating interactions that 
                                               
(1) Christopher Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (San Francisco: 
John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2003), p.466. 
 
 
12 
are more satisfying. It can benefit people by pushing them to make needed change”(1). 
Conflicts may produce a better understanding of one’s self and more tolerance of the 
other’s needs and claims. For example, one of the primary events that created the pre-
conditions for mediation of the Israeli-Egyptian dispute was the Yom Kippur War in 1973. 
 
2.1.2. The Concept of Mediation: 
 
The mediator who is, in theory, a third neutral party assists the two parties (states, 
sides, couples) to negotiate an agreement. His role is to facilitate negotiation between the 
two disputed parties with intent to reach an agreeable solution that meets their interests. 
The competence of the mediator is a basic requirement. The way he presents himself, his 
behavior, style and the impression about his personality that he marks in the adversaries’ 
minds usually is the main factor in gaining their trust. 
 
 Building trust from both parties is considered a major step toward progress of the 
whole case. Mediation is one of the main six peaceful approaches according to article (33) 
in the United Nation Charter: negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, enquiry, and 
adjudication (litigation) (2). These approaches are all indirectly overlapped with each other. 
For instance; conciliation is the result of good mediation which will not be effective if the 
mediator is not a skillful negotiator.    
 
Mediation efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict has increased significantly in the 
aftermath of the 1967 June War. Moore writes that mediation has grown rapidly since the 
mid-1980; it has surpassed other methods of conflict resolution particularly arbitration as 
the method of choice. He stresses the importance of using a mediated approach while 
attempting to resolve conflicts. He adds: “Mediation must become more highly 
institutionalized and must be incorporated as a significant component of organizational 
dispute resolution systems at all levels of society” (3).  
 
                                               
(1) Dr. Beverly Potter, From Conflict to Cooperation: How to Mediate a Dispute (California: Ronin 
Publishing Inc. 1996), p.3. 
(2) The United nation Charter (1945). 
(3) Ibid., p. 467. 
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The American diplomat George Mitchell who successfully brokered the “Good Friday 
Agreement” can be considered as best model of a skillful mediator. His work with the 
Protestants and the Catholics in Northern Ireland can be used as an example of successful 
mediation. His charismatic personality and his ways of showing respect to others have 
helped him enormously in gaining respect and esteem. The Good Friday Agreement signed 
on April 10, 1998 in Belfast shows the effectiveness of the mediation approach practiced 
by a skilled and objective mediator.  
 
 Nevertheless, mediation has its own shortcomings; it has failed in several international 
disputes. For example, the long history of mediation by many Arab states between Qatar 
and Bahrain ended with failure (1). Also, before and after the Gulf war of 1991, many 
mediators tried to resolve the dispute between the two Arab states (Kuwait / Iraq). Many 
Arabs were moved to mediate extensively between both countries after the Iraqi civilians 
had suffered daily because of the harmful sanction that was imposed by the international 
community on Iraq. Arab mediators had hoped that the sanctions would be broken 
gradually had both countries conciliated their disputes. However, all the efforts exerted 
ended with failure and created the conditions for a second war. In relation to the Israeli-
Palestinian case, Camp David (2000) is another “recent” example of the shortcomings of 
the mediation approach used by the Clinton administration. 
 
Mediation is different from both negotiation and arbitration; it is an attempt by a third 
party to help the disputed parties in finding a solution to their problem. Concerned countries 
offer their services as mediators between two other states since they feel that the continuance 
of the dispute between these two states would harm the mediating country’s national interest. 
These types of mediators feel the dire need for intervening to help the disputing parties 
because they have invested interests (ulterior motives) in both states and they do not want to 
jeopardize their relationship with either one of them. When one of the disputed parties asks a 
third party to intervene, it explains its position and ideas about the disputes and expects the 
mediator to adopt these ideas when offering them to the adverse party. In other words, it is 
asking the mediator to understand their position while negotiating with the other side; this, 
however, cannot take place unless the mediator is convinced that these ideas can establish a 
common ground for launching the mediation process.  
                                               
(1) Qatar and Bahrain’s border dispute over the islands Hawar & zubra.   
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According to Saeb Erekat, in his book Al Hayat Mufawadat [Life is Negotiations], if 
both parties agree on mediation, the process should comprise the followings: First, the 
mediator should ask for a meeting in a neutral place where the mediator starts with a speech 
or leaflet that explains the goals, common interests, benefits, hopes, and the resulting 
incentives from reaching an agreement. Second, each party will be given time to present his 
case based on the rule that each party has the right to speak where the other party must listen 
to what is being said. Third, the mediator opens the discussion between the disputed parties 
while he has to remain wise, patient, and fair while he facilitates the discussion. In case of 
complications, the mediator has to intervene while he is remaining neutral between the 
parties. If it gets too complicated, the mediator has to see each party separately; he may offer 
some ideas in order to help each party overcoming the obstacles. This can be done by 
suggesting some methods or styles that will protect their demands without insulting or 
causing the other party to be angry. Fourth, the mediator must present what he thinks is 
suitable for a common agenda that both parties agree upon. After preparing this agenda that 
includes the points of agreements and differences, the disputed parties start suggesting ideas 
or giving alternative solutions. The work continues on a written agreement that may include 
the differences and the ways of resolving them, then the team of negotiation returns for 
consulting after agreeing on setting a date to meet again for continuing decisions. At this 
stage, the mediator goes back and forth between the parties until he feels the possibility of 
reaching an agreement and invites both parties for a joint meeting. In this meeting, ideas and 
positions are presented by both parties and they eventually reach a final agreement. Finally, 
both parties agree to set the date of announcing the agreement to the public (1). 
 
In sum, the main factor behind the success of the mediator is his ability to remain neutral, 
objective, and fair while dealing with the both parties. The mediator should be able to find 
solutions when negotiations are in deadlock and he has always to be careful from being 
misunderstood by one of the parties; misunderstanding leads automatically to misjudging. 
The most common reason behind the failure of any mediation is when one of the parties feels 
that the mediator is supporting one party’s position against the other. Jimmy Carter in Camp 
David 1979, and George Mitchell in the Good Friday Agreement, gave the impression to all 
involved disputing parties that they were not, in anyway, adopting one party’s position while 
                                               
(1) Saeb Erekat. Al Hayat Mufawadat [Life is Negotiations], (Palestine, Nablus: Jama’t al-Najah al-
Wataniyyeh, 2008), pp.47-51. 
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abandoning the other. Therefore, their mediations in these particular cases are considered 
elite examples of “successful mediation” in recent history. 
 
2.1.3. Third Party: 
 
Since the Oslo accords, the Palestinians have relied on a third party to mediate between 
them and the Israelis hoping that they will eventually resolve the conflict. This conflict has 
been handled by different mediators and as a matter of fact, it was a third party who had 
helped in creating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1). The Palestinians will always refer to 
the British government’s role in causing their catastrophe (Nakbah) in 1947-1948 by 
supporting the establishment of the state of Israel in Palestine or the failures of the United 
Nation to support them in ending the Israeli occupation. The biased role of the United 
States with Israel has created bitter feelings toward such third parties. Despite this fact, the 
Palestinian Authority remains hopeful that a third party, such as the U.S., will assume a 
balanced position and affect a change in the situation. 
 
The Palestinians started looking for a powerful country in order to establish a power 
balance with the Israelis, so they looked for support from former Soviet Union (USSR). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. became the sole super power, therefore; 
the Palestinians do not have any other alternative but to seek the U.S. and international 
public support to help in resolving their cause. In this conflict in which one of the disputed 
parties does not have much leverage, they seek for the fairness and the legality of their 
case, facing an adversarial party who is more powerful in both economic and military 
force, a third party mediator is the only mechanism to balance the course of negotiations, 
and help prevent the dictation of terms by the stronger party upon the weaker party. 
 
However, the ability of the U.S. to act as an impartial mediator is put to the test by the 
history of its friendly relations with Israel. The U.S. was the first country to acknowledge 
the State of Israel in 1948; it built a strong relationship with Israel as “a strategic ally”. In 
1975, the U.S. decided to boycott the PLO; it labeled the organization a “terrorist 
organization”. This boycott lasted till 1988 when the U.S. administration under Ronald 
Reagan administration decided to revive its stalled relationship with the PLO. The affects 
                                               
(1) British Government through announcing Balfour Declaration. 
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of this boycott still contribute to shaping a disfigured image of the Palestinians in which 
successive U.S. administrations have yet to move beyond this perception of the 
Palestinians while dealing with the conflict.  
 
2.2. Peaceful Approaches to Conflict Resolution 
 
Negotiation is an approach that is actually incorporated in all approaches to conflict 
resolution. The difference among the approaches listed in article 33 in the United Nation 
Charter is not always clear. For example, arbitration is known as a form of litigation where 
the mediating party is given power to impose judgment. The judgment is binding and 
therefore would be enforceable. In arbitration, the arbiter (arbitrator) mediates through 
negotiation to reach conciliation between the two parties, and after listening to both 
arguments, he will have to come up with a decision that is to be binding and irreversible. 
Once the parties agreed to submit the case to an arbitrator, his judgment will be 
enforceable. Even though the disagreeing party (losing party) to the judgment has the right 
to appeal, the appellate court does not usually revoke the arbiter’s judgment. In most cases, 
the higher court affirms the decision unless the arbiter has exceeded his limits or authority 
just as any judge who works at court of law. Furthermore, the arbiter is authorized to call 
witnesses or visit sites outside the hearing room.  
 
The main difference between arbitration and adjudication is that the later is slower, 
more expensive, and more adversarial. In short, the arbiter starts indirectly as a negotiator 
who tries to mediate between the two disputed parties in order to reach a conciliation phase 
between them, if he fails, he is entitled to give his final opinion to be considered as a legal 
judgment. Mediation coupled with arbitration became very popular; there are many courts 
all over the world using arbitration as a procedure to resolve legal disputes.  
 
 Conciliation is another alternative dispute resolution. Some regard conciliation as a 
specific type of mediation rather than being a whole separate approach. The mediator 
meets with the adversaries separately in an attempt to resolve their differences. The main 
goal is to conciliate by seeking concessions, and the conciliator, usually, tries to guide the 
discussion in a way that optimizes the parties’ needs. If the mediator succeeds in 
negotiation to reach an agreement or an understanding between the two parties, he will ask 
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for a written commitment signed by both parties at which it becomes a legally binding 
contract before the court of law. Conciliation helps to end fighting and transform the 
dispute into a lasting resolution; without conciliation, the fight can break out again as one 
can see what had happened in the tragic beginning of the second Intifada  (uprising). 
Despite the Oslo agreement, the parties made little progress toward achieving a stable 
peace and Palestinian frustration boiled over into a new and bloodier round of violence. 
There were no serious attempts of conciliation offered by the third party and that is why 
the region had the second Intifada.  
 
During the process of conciliating, the role of the conciliator is to assist each of the 
disputed parties to develop a list of their objectives and demands. The conciliator then asks 
each of the parties to prioritize their own list, from most to least important, and then 
encourages them to ignore  the least important while focusing on the most important for 
each party in turn. The disputed parties rarely have compatible priorities on all objectives 
(their list of objectives would be different or opposing). The conciliator should quickly 
build a string of success and help the parties in creating an atmosphere of trust which 
would be the task of the conciliator to continue developing. If he succeeds in gaining the 
trust of both parties, his next step would be to establish the trust between the disputed 
parties. This is the first stage in getting the parties closer to each other in which he may 
become able to convince them into making concessions on some of their important 
demands. Christopher Moore believes that the conciliator should have a positive 
psychological relationship with both disputing parties. He explained:  
 
“Conciliation is essentially an applied psychological tactic aimed at correcting perceptions, 
reducing unreasonable fears, and improving communication to an extent that permits reasonable 
fears and improving communication to an extent that permits reasonable discussion to take place 
and in fact makes rational bargaining possible….Conciliation is the psychological component of 
mediation, in which the third party attempts to create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation that 
promotes positive relationships and is conducive to productive negotiations” (1).  
 
Thus, conciliation cannot be separated from mediation as a completely independent 
approach. At the same time, mediation will not succeed and be practiced efficiently if the 
                                               
(1) Christopher Moore,  The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict,    (San 
Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 2003), p.166. 
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mediator is not being, at the beginning, a skillful conciliator. This is an example of the 
overlap between the different methods of third party conflict resolution.  
 
James Schellenberg separated the approaches to conflict resolution according to each 
one’s function; he has listed five approaches: 
 
“The forms of conflict resolution are as diverse as the forms of social conflict. At first glance, 
therefore, it may appear hopeless to generalize about the practice of conflict resolution. 
Nevertheless, we can identify a limited set of approaches usually applied to the resolution of 
conflicts. These may be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Coercion or forcing parties in conflict to a particular conclusion. 
2. Negotiation and bargaining, or involving the parties in the process of the discussion which 
seeks to bring them into voluntary agreement. 
3. Adjudication or using the power of the state and its legal system to provide an authoritative 
conclusion. 
4. Mediation or using a third party to help the conflicting parties come to mutually satisfactory 
agreement. 
5. Arbitration or using a third party to decide, through prior mutual consent, the issues in 
dispute. 
Although the possibilities of further variation in approaches to conflict resolution (including 
combinations of the above forms) are endless, most practitioners emphasize one or another of 
these five approaches” (1).  
 
As noted earlier, the main emphasis, in this study, will be on mediation, and at a later 
stage will be on mediation coupled with arbitration (Mediation/ Arbitration).    
 
2.2.1. Definition and History of Mediation: 
 
Mediation is an old method used by the ancient Geeks and advocated by almost all 
religions. According to Christopher W. Moore, mediation has a long history in almost all 
cultures of the world. The Christian, Islamic, Hindu, Jewish, Buddhist, and many other 
cultures have “exertive and effective traditions of mediation practice” (2). Moore explains 
                                               
(1) James A. Schellenberg, Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice, (New York: State 
University of New York press. 19996), p.13. 
(2) Christopher Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (San Francisco: 
John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2003), p.20. 
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that in biblical times, in Jewish communities both religious and political leaders practiced 
mediation to resolve civil and religious differences. This tradition was carried over to 
Christian communities who saw Christ as the supreme mediator. Similarly, Islam practiced 
mediation and it became very commonly used throughout the Moslem World. Moore states 
that Islamic cultures have a long tradition of mediation; many disputes were resolved 
through community meetings of elders in which participants discussed and debated and 
finally mediated to resolve the conflict. Moore explains: 
 
“In urban areas, local custom (‘urf) became codified into shari’a law, which was interpreted and 
applied by a specialized intermediary, or [quadi]. ….a [quadi] might interpret his role as that of 
a conciliator, attempting to preserve a social harmony by reaching an agreed upon solution to a 
dispute, rather than applying the strict letter of law” (1).  
 
As such mediation is not a new phenomenon and its modern application is supported 
by historical precedents. 
According to article 33 in the United Nation charter, mediation is one of the main 
approaches of conflict resolution:  
“1.The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.  
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their 
dispute by such means”. 
Even though mediation has originated in ancient cultures, and it has never been 
abandoned completely by some cultures, it has recently become widely used all over the 
world. As a matter of fact, the Arabs in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine think of it as 
an efficient method of settling disputes; they believe for example, that mediation is more 
objective and fair than litigation. Moore indicated that: 
“At a later stage, the Jewish community had their Rabbis playing a vital role in mediating or 
adjudicating disputes between members of their faith in Spain, North Africa, Italy, Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Turkish Empire, and the Middle East. Mediation also spread out to reach the 
Americans, Canadians, and the Chinese. Mediation also grew in the American and other 
                                               
(1) Ibid.,p.21. 
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colonies, and ultimately in the United States and Canada, where religious sects such as the 
Puritans and Quakers, and Chinese and Jewish ethnic groups developed alternative procedures 
for dispute resolution that were of an informal and voluntary nature” (1).  
 
He added that mediation is not confined to the Western culture; actually it may be used 
more widely in non-Western countries. It is used now, in Japan, Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Seri Lanka, India, Australia, New Zealand, Melanesia, Kenya, 
Somalia, South Africa, Western Europe, and Arabia. As for the mediation process in the 
Arab world, Moore explains: 
 
“A society in which conflicts are frequent must develop mechanisms for settling differences 
which, if allowed to get out of hand, can destroy the entire social fabric. In the Arab world, 
mediation on the tribal and the village level has for centuries been the traditional method of 
settling disputes, and the same method has in modern times, been adapted for settling political 
and military issues within and between Arab States” (2).     
 
In the Arab region, the mediator usually comes from a special well-regarded family with 
a high status; large and extended family elders or representatives usually are the mediators. 
They are well respected among their societies and known for being impartial even if they are 
related in some way to one of the disputed parties. In Palestine, the politicians often mediate 
in family and civil disputes. The late Faisal Husseini (a well known Palestinian politician) 
mediated in countless civil and family disputes within the Palestinian community. Some 
Palestinians in Jerusalem have labeled him the “Prince of Jerusalem” for the significant 
efforts he exerted in settling Jerusalemites’ civil and political differences.  
 
2.2.2. Mediator’s Competence: 
 
The competence of the mediator is a basic requirement for success. Many analysts have 
referred either the success or the failure of international reconciliation agreements to the 
competence of the mediator. The mediator plays an important role in encouraging or even 
pushing the parties, indirectly, to reach an agreement. This of course depends on the 
mediator’s skills, behavior and mainly on his neutrality. Bill Clinton was very frustrated 
when the negotiations at Camp David in 2000, in which he was actively involved as the main 
                                               
(1) Moore. Op.cit. p.23. 
(2) Ibid. p. 40. 
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mediator, failed. He was concerned that failure of the negotiations would be interpreted as a 
sign of his weakness as a mediator. Observers said that he genuinely tried to close a deal 
(peace agreement) between the Israelis and the Palestinians in his last few months in the 
White House. According to political analysts, Clinton was attempting to mark a personal 
position in history by solving the long-standing and complicated dispute. However, Clinton’s 
efforts failed and the situation in the region was exacerbated in which both sides engaged in 
very violent armed battles during the second Intifada. It is important to understand that failed 
mediation may have lasting implications beyond the immediate failure. Dr. Beverly Potter 
explained that if the conflict is poorly handled it will lead to more conflict: “Emotional 
outbursts and cutting remarks have a way of lingering in people’s minds. Dwelling on words 
said in anger, people are offended. Soon a new dispute has emerged which, if handled 
poorly, will probably generate more ill will” (1).   
 
 In discussing the nature of mediation, James Schellenberg defined the mediator as a 
third party who should help disputed parties to come to a mutually satisfactory resolution 
of their conflict. The followings are some of the characteristics of mediation listed by 
Schellenberg:   
 
“1. Mediation is assisted negotiation. The mediator’s role is to facilitate negotiation  between 
parties who have difficulty in resolving a conflict on their own. 
2. The mediator is a neutral third party. The mediator avoids taking sides in attempting to move 
the parties toward agreement. 
3. Mediation is voluntary. Although mediation is sometimes initiated by court orders (and thus 
not fully voluntary in this respect), continuing in mediation is voluntary for the parties, and no 
agreement is reached that is not mutually accepted. 
4. Disputants retain responsibility. The mediator may guide the negotiations, but responsibility 
for any decisions of substance always remains in the hands of the disputants. 
5. Mediation is private and confidential. What goes on in mediation sessions is not expected to 
be shared with others. Sessions are conducted in a private place, and there is no official record of 
what is discussed. 
6. There are no sanctions for failure to reach an agreement. If agreements are voluntary, it must 
be also acceptable not to agree. When agreement is not reached, no blame for this is cast upon 
either party” (2).  
 
                                               
(1) Dr. Beverly Potter,  From Conflict to Cooperation: How to Mediate a Dispute,(California: R  onin 
publishing Inc.,1996), p.5. 
(2) Schellenberg, op.cit. p.182. 
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There are limits and restrictions to the mediator’s authority: a mediator does not have 
the power of decision making as the judge in the court of law. He cannot enforce or impose 
his decision on the disputed parties. This is what distinguishes the mediator from the 
arbiter who is empowered to make a decision for the parties since he had attained a prior 
agreement by the disputants. As such a mediator’s role is different from or a judge who is 
empowered by the law to make a decision that would be enforceable upon the disputed 
parties. According to Christopher Moore: 
 
“The mediator on the other hand, works to reconcile the competing interest of the two parties. 
The mediator tasks are to assist the parties in examining their interests and needs, to help them 
negotiate an exchange of promises, and to redefine their relationship in a way that will be 
mutually satisfactory and will meet their standards of fairness” (1).   
 
Mediators may encounter difficult cases where it would be impossible for them to succeed. 
No matter how hard the mediator tries, sometimes he will not be able to broker an 
agreement. In this case, the mediator may decide to do nothing since he tried all possible 
means to get the disputed parties closer or to get them together on reaching an agreement. 
Mediators with some authority however, may be able to succeed but they need to be very 
careful while making a judgment:  
 
“When you are the person in authority, you might issue a directive. Issuing a directive under 
these conditions is generally the most likely alternative. But you must make sure you don’t jump 
the gun. After several failed attempts to get the disputants to agree on a plan, you may have to 
take on the role of King Solomon and decide on a solution yourself. In some cases, when you do 
give a directive and thereby become King Solomon, you must be very wise and very observant 
because it is your responsibility to figure out how to resolve or lessen this dispute. The key is to 
issue a directive that will cause a change” (2).  
 
Kenneth Kersey described how it is difficult for the mediator to speculate what actually 
goes on the disputants’ minds. He said: 
 
                                               
(1) Christopher Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, (San Francisco: 
John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2003), p.18. 
(2) Dr. Beverly Potter, From Conflict to Cooperation: How to Mediate a Dispute. (California: Ronin 
publishing Inc., 1996), p.146. 
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“It is impossible to give a universally accurate account of what transpires in mediation since the 
process occurs across so many domains of conflict and since mediators often strive for quite 
contrasting goals, ranging from settling the substantive issue narrowly defined to accomplishing 
broad relational, psychological, or social objectives” (1).  
 
William Ury illustrated methods of conflict resolution based upon the basic human 
needs, stating: 
 
“In searching for the basic interests behind a declared position, look particularly for those 
bedrock concerns which motivate all people. If you can take care of such basic needs, you 
increase the chance both of reaching agreement and, if an agreement is reached, of the other 
side’s keeping to it. Basic human needs include: Security, economic well-being, a sense of 
belonging, recognition, and control over one’s life” (2). 
 
Moore has also given some instruction for the mediators to take into consideration 
while dealing with disputed parties. He listed several responsibilities that mediators should 
carry: 
 
“Among the responsibilities that the intermediary has to the parties are:  
1. An obligation to remain impartial and maintain freedom from “favoritism or bias either by 
word or by action, and a commitment to serve all parties as opposed to a single party”. 
2. Assurance of informed consent to guarantee the participants understand “the nature of the 
process, the procedures, the particular role of the neutral, and the parties’ relationship to the 
neutral”  
3. Disclosure of the limits, if any, of confidentiality, and commitment to hold conferences once 
given. 
4. Avoidance of conflict of interest or its appearance. 
5. Implementation of the process in a timely manner. 
6. Assistance in conducting a process and a settlement that they will hold as their own, and in 
which the neutral “has no vested interest” (3).  
 
 
 
                                               
(1) For more information see: Mediation by Kenneth Kressel in Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman, The 
Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and practice, ( San Francisco: John Wily & Sons Inc.,2000), p. 
528.  
(2) William Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation to Cooperation. (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1993) , p.48. 
(3) Christopher Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict. (San Francisco: 
John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2003), pp.448-449. 
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2.2.3. Behavior and Style: 
 
In discussing the mediator’s skills, behavior, and personality, many scholars and 
analysts have stressed on the fact that neutrality is a basic and important characteristic in 
which mediators should maintain. Being a biased mediator is a roadmap that leads to 
failure. The main requirement for gaining the disputed parties’ trust is through convincing 
both of his neutrality. Gaining their trust is a major step toward succeeding in advancing 
the negotiations. If one of the parties is doubtful of the straightforwardness and the honesty 
of the mediator, the whole negotiation process would be very exhausting and useless for all 
participants. 
 
The process of mediation can transform into a dangerous situation where it empowers 
the strong party at the expense of the weak. Because of the informality of mediation and 
the seeking of conciliation between the opposite point of views, and because of the absence 
of the procedural rules and regulations, mediation as a process may open the chance for 
coercion and manipulation by the stronger party. By comparing mediation with other 
lawful procedures, one can find that mediation has produced many unfair results. The 
mediators were biased in favor of the strong party without any reasonable justification. 
Since the process gives mediators a strategic authority in controlling the negotiations, it 
gives them the opportunity to be biased. This kind of impartiality may control and limit the 
choices of the weak party to determine his demands and lower his expectations of attaining 
a just and fair settlement (1).    
 
George Mitchell, a former Senate Minority leader from Maine, who, as mentioned 
earlier, successfully brokered the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, is a good 
example that supports the hypothesis concerning the importance of the role of the 
mediator. Mitchell possessed the personal and professional skills necessary to mediate an 
agreement. Besides being neutral, he very well commanded the skill of listening. Patience 
was another characteristic that Mitchell exhibited while working with both parties in 
Northern Ireland. Connie McDougall, in her article “Leadership That Unites” wrote:   
 
                                               
(1) Robert A. Bush and Joseph P. Folger, The promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict through 
Empowerment and Recognition, (San Francisco: Jossy-Bass Publishers, 1994). 
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“George Mitchell did the impossible. As chairman of the peace negotiations, he made the 1998 
Good Friday Peace Agreement in Northern Ireland a reality, a feat that has been recognized by 
his nomination for the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize. …. 
George Mitchell is someone who exhibits both qualities. He is a master at bringing together 
people of diverse points of view and finding a solution to conflict. We desperately need leaders 
like Mitchell, leaders who bring the hope that comes with unity….. Certainly chairing the 
Northern Ireland peace negotiations was tough, and serving 15 years in the U.S. Senate, finally 
as majority leader, posed its own challenges. Mitchell explains his determination this way: It's 
simple. I have a desire to be of help when I can be. …He found that the ability to listen was a 
great advantage in the talks. "We don't often truly listen to each other. It takes concentration," 
Mitchell says. "I also tried to encourage them to see each other as I saw them: as fellow human 
beings with the same aspirations” (1).  
 
Mitchell  currently serves in the administration of President Barak Obama as a Special 
Envoy to the Middle East; he is currently working to “jump start” the peace process in 
order to revive stalled peace talks. Mitchell is not new to serving as an official 
envoy/mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He was previously dispatched by the 
former U.S. President George W. Bush in 2001 to serve as an official mediator between 
Palestine and Israel after the outbreak of the second intifada. His famous report (Mitchell 
Report) investigated the reasons behind the intifada  and what steps should be taken to end 
the violence. The report included recommendations for confidence-building measures for 
each side.  
 
The Palestinians often get disappointed with the biased positions taken by the U.S. 
during mediation between them and the Israelis, however; they did not feel the same after 
reading the results of Mitchell Report. They have expressed some satisfaction with the 
objectivity that Mitchell had practiced during the investigation. They are hoping that 
Mitchell’s new involvement will end up with a fair comparison and will give President 
Obama a clearer image about the Palestinians and their position toward ending the conflict.  
 
2.2.4. Successful Model (Qatar vs. Bahrain): 
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague has resolved the long lasting 
dispute between Qatar and Bahrain over their borders (the Borders Dispute). It is 
interesting that both parties were pleased with the decision; not accusing the court of being 
                                               
(1) http://www.spu.edu/uc/Response/spr2K/leadership.html . Leadership that Unites, February 09, 2007. 
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biased or unfair. They both agreed previously to take their case to ICJ for arbitration; 
therefore, they both felt that their case was settled fairly through arbitration where it would 
not have the same reaction had it come through litigation: 
 
“The court itself characterized the case of Qatar v. Bahrain as the longest case in its history. So       
far it is the only case of a Gulf boundary dispute which has been resolved through the ICJ rather 
than through mediation, arbitration, or negotiation……But decide the case it did, in the process 
drawing a maritime boundary ( as requested by the parties) and settling, apparently, all the 
outstanding territorial issues. Almost immediately Qatar and Bahrain both began praising the 
decision, though in each case some territorial claim it had long characterized as non-negotiable 
had been overridden ( Bahrain,s claim to Zubara, Qatar’s to the Hawars). As noted in the 
introduction, there appeared to be an almost visible sense of relief on the two sides, for the court 
had cut the Gordian knot which has long been the main point of contention between the two 
Gulf neighbors. Although Bahrain quickly invited foreign companies to begin oil exploration in 
the Hawar Islands, there was none of the protest from Qatar which would have been expected a 
few weeks earlier from the same announcement” (1). 
 
Unfortunately, these methods of resolving disputes were not followed in the Iraqi-
Kuwaiti dispute. The Iraqi regime chose completely a different approach (military attack 
and occupation) and it has led the Iraqi nation to a real disaster. The Iraq vs. Kuwait 
borders’ dispute is not as complicated as was the case of Qatar vs. Bahrain but more 
violent. Besides, there was no enough time in the Iraq-Kuwait case, allotted for mediators, 
conciliators or arbitrators to contribute in resolving the conflict. Ultimately, none of these 
conflict resolution procedures function effectively if one of the disputed parties takes a 
very firm position, or insists that the issue is closed as in the Israeli position toward the 
status of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Refugees issue.  
 
2.3 Literature Review   
 
The mediator’s styles, behavior, and neutrality, play a very important role in either 
reaching a settlement or failing while sponsoring the negotiations. It is almost impossible 
for the mediator to be absolutely impartial or direct and straightforward. Jimmy Carter, 
who is known for his excellent abilities in brokering successful agreements between 
                                               
(1) For full text on The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute,see: The World Court Decision (part 1 &2) at 
http://www.theestimate.com/public/040601.html . 
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disputing parties, had to sometimes be manipulative in dealing with both Anwar Sadat and 
Menahem Begin at Camp David in1979. Israelis accused Carter of not being neutral 
because he had a better personal relationship with Sadat than with Begin. Even though this 
close relationship with Sadat was confirmed by Carter on more than one occasion, Carter 
admitted that he had manipulated Sadat at some stages during the negotiation: 
 
“Carter admits to a bit of manipulation in order to help confirm an early agreement: The only 
serious problem was his desire to delete the entire paragraph on Jerusalem. I knew that the 
Israelis wanted the same thing, but I confess that I did not tell Sadat. I reserved this concession 
just in case I needed some bargaining points later on” (1).  
 
Trusting the mediator and believing in his neutrality, as mentioned earlier, is a very 
essential need. According to Noam Chomsky the U.S. has failed to play this role. He 
accused the U.S. administration (the mediator in Camp David 1979 and Camp David 2000) 
of being a “Leading terrorist State”. He gave a list of examples supporting his claim such 
as: the U.S. role in drawing Russia into “Afghan trap”, the Nicaragua case, U.S. support 
for Turkey’s crushing of its own Kurdish population, the destruction of the Al-Shifa 
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, and the contrasting U.S. policies toward Iraq and Israel’s 
military occupation. If Chomsky’s analysis is true, it would be impossible to have a 
“comprehensive and just” peaceful political settlement between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians with the U.S. as a mediator (2).     
 
Many scholars and political analysts reacted to the failure of Camp David 2000, 
however their explanation and analysis were different; the narrative of the Israeli 
accompanied with the Americans was very different from the Palestinian version of telling 
the story of what exactly took place in the negotiations at Camp David 2000. Itmar 
Rabonivich summarized these different narratives into four main types. He explained in his 
paper (The Failure of Camp David: Four Narratives) that these different narratives can be 
grouped into four categories that reflect the mindset embedded in each group’s thinking. 
Rabonivich divided these categories as follows: First, the orthodox “represented by the 
pronouncements made by President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak, Shlomo Ben Ami and 
Deniss Ross. These are the most distinctive representations of what I call the 
                                               
(1) James A. Schellenberg, Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice, (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 19996), p.180. 
(2) Noam Chomsky, 9-11. (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002), pp: 39-54.  
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Israeli/American orthodoxy” (1). The second category is a revisionist counterclaim 
represented by Robert Mally and Hussein Agha who generally denied most of the main 
points made up by the orthodox narrative. The third category is the deterministic narrative 
that argues that there was no need for negotiations since the summit was bound to collapse 
anyway. This group is made of a mixture of the community of academics, experts and 
former officials led by Henry Kissinger. Kissinger claimed that no attempt to settle the 
disputes between the Israelis and the Arabs can succeed. Kissinger explained that the 
“minimum Arab demands have never met the minimum Israeli demands. There is a gap 
there that cannot be breached, unless one wishes to compromise Israel’s security and 
future. Therefore, there is no point in trying” (2). The fourth narrative is called by 
Rabinovich an “eclectic in nature”. According to Rabonivich, this group appears in books 
and statements describing:  
 
“The events of Camp David in a way that does not present a specific clear-cut thesis. One 
example of a narrative of this type is the book by Gilaed Sher , Within Touching Distance, Sher 
….does not seek to be overly critical. He presents an informative, detailed description of how 
the talks evolved and how they collapsed, but in his narrative there is no finger-pointing or over-
arching themes” (3). 
 
As for finger-pointing and playing the “Blaming Game”, Muhammed S. Dajani 
explained that all involved parties in the negotiations (Israelis, Palestinians, and 
Americans) blamed each other for the failure of the summit. Dajani explains that Israelis 
claim their government offered the Palestinians maximum concessions but were rejected. 
Palestinians were offered: 
 
“96% of the West Bank; complete withdrawal from the Gaza strip; establishment of a 
Palestinian state, creation of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, some kind of sovereignty 
over Haram al-Sharif; sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem’s Old City; the dismantling of part of 
the settlements; the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees to the state of Palestine; and some 
territorial waters in the Dead Sea” (4). 
 
                                               
(1) Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, The Camp David Summit-What Went Wrong?, (Great 
Britain: Sussex Acadimic Press, 2005), p.15.   
(2) Ibid., p.16. 
(3) Ibid., p.17. 
(4) Ibid., p.86. 
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On the other hand, The Palestinians justified their refusal to what Israel had offered by 
accusing both Israelis and Americans of not being genuine in settling the dispute fairly.  
 
“The Palestinian counter version was that the Israelis offer at Camp David fell short of matching 
the Palestinian historic concession of recognizing the State of Israel writhen 78% of the territory 
of Mandatory Palestine…. Palestinians could not accept an arrangement that divided Palestinian 
territories into four cantons separated by Israeli areas and hindering Palestinian passage” (1).  
 
Dajani added that the mediator himself joined the “Blaming Game” since President 
Clinton put most of the blame on Arafat even though he promised Arafat not to do so, had 
the summit failed. Clinton considered Arafat in particular to be the main factor behind the 
failure of the summit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
(1) Ibid., p.86. 
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Chapter Three 
U.S. Role in the Middle East 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The United States is considered as one of the most powerful countries in economic, 
military, and technological strength. It has been and continues to compete with Russia, 
China, and sometimes with Europe in leading the world politically and morally. It has 
adopted a foreign policy that will enable the increase of its power while attempting to 
weaken the power of its competitors (1).    
    
What makes the study of this chapter significant, is discussing the Arab failure in 
influencing the direction of the U.S. policy especially when compared with the success of 
Israel’s influence on the formation of the U.S. foreign policy. In this section, the U.S. 
perception of the Arab and Moslem states and the main factors that lie behind this biased 
position of the U.S. against the Arab countries, in general, and the Palestinians in particular 
are identified.  
 
This chapter deals also with the United States foreign policy and the U.S. use of 
foreign financial aid, as a pillar of its foreign strategy. The U.S uses donations and 
endowments as a peaceful approach to strengthen allegiances and induce compliance to 
other U.S. policies. Several studies have been made investigating the U.S. international 
relations especially on the nature of its foreign financial aid; and its discrete purposes 
(hidden agenda). This chapter provides a definition of U.S. diplomacy in general and 
international financial aid in particular. The different types of U.S. foreign policy strategies 
are discussed, and this chapter has a brief comparison between the different foreign policy 
strategists in the U.S. administrations. President James Monroe, President Woodrow 
Wilson, President Eisenhower, President Nixon, Kissinger, and Dr. Brzezinski’s strategies 
are used as relevant examples. 
 
 
                                               
(1) For more information see: Marshall Plan. 
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3.2 History of American Diplomacy 
 
The fifth American President James Monroe (1758-1831) initiated the idea of 
intervening in international disputes. Monroe's Doctrine became the new United States' 
foreign policy toward the new political order which was developing on both continents. 
Approximately one hundred years after James Monroe, President Woodrow Wilson made 
it clear in his famous Fourteen Points (January 8, 1918) that the U.S. wanted to establish a 
world order in which people can live peacefully and where all nations have the right to 
determine their own institutions (self-determination).  
 
Wilson stressed that all ordinary people like to live in peace and harmony, enjoying a 
democratic ruling system. He outlined the principle of justice to all peoples and 
nationalities; people, whether they are strong or weak have the right to live on equal terms 
and safety with one another. Katheleen Christison described Wilson as one of the few 
American presidents who will be always referred to as the true strategists in the history of 
U.S. foreign policy. Many political leaders in the Middle East refer to his famous term 
(self-determination) when discussing the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Christison further 
asserted that “Wilson will always be best remembered for his doctrine of (self-
determination) as part of his fourteen points in 1918”1. Also, the famous term (Wilsonian), 
set by President Woodrow Wilson, became a guiding principle to be followed in the 
institution of American foreign policy. In relation to the main hypothesis of this thesis, it is 
interesting to know that the first academic Jew was appointed to the faculty by Wilson 
when he was the president of Princeton University. Also, the first Jewish judge was 
appointed in New Jersey Supreme Court when Wilson was the governor of New Jersey 
(1910-1912). Finally the first Jewish U.S. Supreme Court justice (Louis Brandeis) was 
appointed in (1916) by Wilson when he was the president of the U.S. (1913- 1921). In 
short, Woodrow Wilson formed the true legacy of the American foreign policy and its 
foreign national interest (2).  
 
 
 
                                               
(1) Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on Middle East Policy, (California: 
University of California press. 1999), pp: 26-27. 
(2) For more information see: Appendix. 
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3.3 U.S. Mediation between Israel and the Arabs 
 
In 1947, the Palestinian case became the core conflict that influenced negatively the 
U.S.-Arab relations. American President Harry S. Truman acknowledged and recognized 
the Israeli state within minutes after the declaration of its establishment on May15, 1948. 
Truman supported his position by claiming that he was always sympathetic with the 
suffering of the Jews in Europe, and the Balfour declaration was compatible with the 
“noble policy” of Woodrow Wilson, especially in relation to the right of self 
determination. According to the diaries of Colonel William Eddy (commissioner in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia), President Truman was very interested in giving in to the Zionist demands in 
Palestine. Colonel Eddy tried to warn him of the Arabs outraged reaction, but President 
Truman replied that he is running for a second term for presidency and he was not aware of 
the Arabs influential voting power compared to that of the Jews (1).    
 
In short, Harry Truman marked the first public announcement of the U.S. biased 
position. He needed the support of the Jewish vote for the second term election; therefore, 
he had to be very supportive of the establishment of the Israeli state. When challenged by 
some members of the State Department, he replied: “I’m sorry gentlemen, but I have to 
answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have 
hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents” (2).    
 
The American President Dwight D. Eisenhower had some frictions with the Egyptian 
president Nasser in 1956, but he differed slightly from Truman when dealing with the 
Israel-Arab conflict. The friction between the U.S. and Israel started when Israel joined 
Britain and France in conquering Sinai on October 29, 1956 because Egyptian President 
Nasser took control of the Suez Canal zone away from the British and French companies 
which owned it.  This war against Egypt had angered the Eisenhower administration; the 
U.S. condemned the aggression and worked extensively on insuring the withdrawal of all 
foreign forces from the Egyptian territories.  Israel, led by Ben-Gurion, ignored the U.S. 
outraged reaction and refused to withdraw his military forces. The U.S. was worried about 
                                               
(1) Nizam Sharabi.  Amirika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin 
[America And The Arabs: American Policy and the Arab World]  (London: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-
Nashr. 1990). 
(2) Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crises: The Presidency of Harry Truman, 1945-1948. (New York: W. 
Norton,1977), p.322. 
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widening the political gap between them and the Arabs since there was an alternative 
hostile competitor (USSR) seeking the containment of the Arab countries.  The USSR 
threatened that it would support Egypt by using its military force which succeeded in 
worrying the U.S. engaging in a wider war; the last thing President Eisenhower wanted 
was a wider war over Suez. Also, the U.S. attempted to eliminate entirely the French and 
British historical super power in the Middle East; therefore, Eisenhower tried to maintain 
an organized peaceful world order pursued by the U.S. Finally, President Eisenhower 
pressured Britain, France and Israel into agreeing to a cease-fire and eventual withdrawal 
from Egypt. 
 
As for the Israeli-U.S. relationship in that period, it was marked as the first serious 
friction taking place between the two countries. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. represented 
by its Secretary of State John Foster Dulles condemned Israel harshly in his speech at the 
United Nations Assembly accusing the Israeli government of committing a huge error by 
breaching the United Nations Charter. The U.S. threatened to suspend the military and 
economic aid for Israel until it would have obeyed the international laws set by the United 
Nation Resolutions; Eisenhower threatened Israel with severe boycotts if Israel did not 
respect such international resolutions. It was not a new position taken by Eisenhower 
against Israel; he also suspended the American aid when Israel, in 1953, attempted to 
convert the Jordanian water into Israeli water. Israel committed to the requests of the 
United Nations. This Israeli commitment became a precedent in the history of the U.S.-
Israeli relationship. 
 
After the 1967 War, and during the Nixon administration, the relationship with the 
Arabs was limited due to the lack of knowledge about the Palestinian situation. The 
Palestinians had not tried enough to make a positive impression; on the contrary, they 
adopted international terrorism such as: hijacking TWA airplanes and the civil war (in the 
early 1970s) with Jordan ruled by King Hussein (Royal Hashemite Family is a good friend 
of U.S.). These violent acts very much worsened the Palestinians’ position, and the 
international community’s negative perception of the Palestinians was exacerbated. In 
addition, Henry Kissinger, similar to Nixon, was uninformed about the Palestinians and 
their cause. The Arabs and the Palestinians themselves harmed their position with the 
rhetoric they were using in that era. Christison explained: 
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“Disregard of all the Arabs, including the Palestinians, was inevitable in the atmosphere 
prevailing after the 1967 war. The fiery rhetoric of militant Arabs and their lurid threats against 
Israel had cast them as pariahs, as had the belligerent declaration of the Arab heads of state 
shortly after the war that there would be no recognition of Israel, no negotiation, and no peace 
agreement. The fact that six Arab states broke off diplomatic relations with the United States 
during the war, as well as their increasing their alliance with Soviet Union, the cold war enemy, 
increased the Arabs' isolation from Americans and the sense they were all alien. The 
Palestinians' resort to terrorism in the late 1960's added greatly to this alienation. At a time when 
popular support for Israel was exploding, the Arabs had clearly, in the minds of Americans, 
placed themselves on the wrong side” (1). 
 
In short, Nixon and Kissinger focused on their foreign policy (foreign national interest) 
towards the Soviet Union and how they could check their influence. The United States did 
not care about the Middle East except when it was related to the U.S. advantage; they 
viewed some of the main Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria as pro-Soviets who 
adopted a strategic policy in the region which called for the destruction of Israel. The 
Nixon administration, for example, declared its position clearly in the October War; it did 
not pretend to be neutral during this war. Four war ships, including the aircraft carrier 
(Independence), were ordered to move from Athens to the eastern Mediterranean in order 
to help Israel if needed. When the Israeli losses were heavier than what Israel and the U.S. 
had expected, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger (U.S. Secretary of State) sprang to 
rescue Israel. They supported Israel by mounting an air lift of jets and electronic gear that 
helped Israel to continue the fight with the indication that it may win the war against the 
Arabs. Kissinger had no difficulty winning the backing of Nixon in directing the American 
policy toward the Middle East and specifically towards the unequivocal support for the 
Israelis (2). 
 
Another important U.S. foreign policy strategist who contributed effectively in shaping 
the U.S. biased position against the Palestinians is Zbigniew Brzezinski. President Carter 
selected Brzezinski, who is originally from Poland and became a U.S. citizen in 1958, for 
the position of the National Security Advisor (NSA) because he wanted an assertive 
intellectual at his side to provide him with day-to-day advice and guidance on foreign 
policy decisions.  He is known, among politicians, to be one of the most skilled people in 
                                               
(1) Christison,op.cit., p.124. 
(2) Frank C. Sakran, Palestine, Still a Dilemm, (Pennsylvania:  Whitmore Pub. Co. 1976), pp: 94-95. 
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predicting the political future of several countries; he predicted the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union. 
 
Brzezinski has been given much credit for helping Jimmy Carter in brokering the 
successful agreement between Israel and Egypt (1979).  The negotiations ended up with 
signing and ratifying of the Camp David Treaty in (1981). Since this agreement was 
signed, there has not been one single aggressive action, worth mentioning, that had 
occurred to violate the agreement from the Egyptian side. Israel attacked Lebanon, heavily, 
twice (1982, 2006) without any violent reaction from Egypt. These two incursions to 
Lebanon by Israel were considered as the real tests of the commitments by the Egyptians 
towards their peaceful agreement with Israel. Israeli heavy attack and the killing of many 
civilians in Gaza in January, 2009, and the controversial position that was taken by Egypt 
towards this war is another example of the fruits of Camp David (1979). Both Brzezinski 
and Carter are proud of this achievement. There are more U.S. foreign national interest 
strategists such as James Baker and others, but those, mentioned above, are to be 
considered most important ones in the recent history of the U.S. foreign policy. 
 
3.4 U.S. National interest in the Region 
 
The correlation between strengthening Israel and serving the U.S. national interest in 
the Middle East was quite high from the perspective of several U.S. policy strategists 
(Kissinger and others). The understanding is basically simple; having Israel as a strong ally 
in the region would protect U.S. interests from the danger of the former Soviet Union. The 
United States traditionally defined its national interest in the Middle East by the 
containment of the Soviet Union expansion and the continuous flow of oil to the West. The 
containment principle was followed as a means of preventing the change of the super 
powers' balance, guaranteeing the freedom and the security for the West reaching the oil 
region, securing the arrival of  "American Made" products to the region's markets, and 
establishing the opportunities for more U.S. investments. Therefore, it would have been 
unwise not to support Israel especially for the sake of keeping it as an alert guard who 
would protect U.S. regional interests. In other words, Israel would be the strategic power 
source for the United States. 
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 Most of the American Presidents, from the second half of the twentieth century till 
present (2010), have frequently stressed on the rhetoric that Israel is the stable and the 
eternal ally of the U.S., and that U.S. will exert its best efforts to keep this strong bond 
from being broken. Nevertheless, several disputes have arisen between both countries 
especially during the period of Ronald Reagan’s presidency term (1981-1989).  Reagan 
was not pleased with the policies of Israel and found out that Israel had breached, more 
than once, the agreement with U.S. concerning the Palestinian cause and its neighboring 
Arab countries such as Lebanon. The dispute between Israel and Reagan Administration 
arose over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; Israel promised that its mission in 
Lebanon would be very limited (crossing only 25 miles in the Lebanese territories for the 
sake of protecting the Galilee area), but ended up in areas next to Beirut (capital). The 
American politicians were trying to strengthen their relations with the Lebanese 
government at that time because they were concerned with the undesired fact that Lebanon 
would become a country dominated by the Syrians who were under the influence of the 
Soviet Union. The 1980s were the worst period for both countries in terms of 
compromising on their interests. U.S.-Israeli relations deteriorated in those years to the 
lowest point since the establishment of the state of Israel. Israel was not abiding and 
complying with U.S. demands and the U.S. was concerned about its own interests in the 
region. The primary concern of the U.S was not to lose the loyalty of friendly Arab 
countries considering that the other Super Power (former Soviet Union) was interested in 
establishing stronger relationships with the Middle East (1).     
 
The U.S. has had eleven presidents since the establishment of the State of Israel till 
present (Barack Obama’s current presidency). History has shown that every president has 
unequivocally supported Israel, and was unfair towards the Palestinians. Shimon Peres 
(current President of Israel) said in one of his speeches, that even President Abraham 
Lincoln once promised his Jewish doctor, Isachar Zacharie, to support the establishment of 
a Jewish state. Although this fact is disputed, it is widely accepted that one of Lincoln's 
acquaintances did indeed tell him about an idea to establish a state for the Jews in the 
“Land of Israel”, and Lincoln replied that the option was worthy of consideration. He 
added incidentally that he had respect for the Jews; his podiatrist was Jewish (2). 
                                               
(1) Christison, op.cit. pp: 280-283.    
(2)  Haaretz: Article by Tom Segev, Did Abraham Lincoln Support the Creation of a Jewish State? Last 
update-02/27/2009. 
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Continually, American Presidents have exhibited high levels of support toward Israel, 
which has led many political analysts and researchers to tackle this controversial question, 
who controls whom? The main unresolved issue is whether the special U.S.-Israeli relation 
was the result of pressure imposed on the U.S. by interest groups or a U.S. foreign policy 
strategy. Some argue that U.S. foreign policy is controlled by internal pressure groups such 
as AIPAC, while others think it is matter of strategic economic interest. Chomsky for 
example, had pointed out that the role of AIPAC has been exaggerated for being 
considered as the main power that controls the American politicians. James Petras agreed 
with Noam Chomsky’s on this particular issue:  
 
“1. The pro-Israel Lobby is just like any other lobby; it has no special   influence or place in US 
politics.   
2. The power of the groups backing the Israel Lobby is no more powerful than other influential 
pressure groups.              
 3. The Lobby's agenda succeeds because it coincides with the interests of the US state.         
 4. The Lobby's weakness is demonstrated by the fact that Israel is “merely a tool" of US empire-
building to be used when needed and otherwise marginalized.             
5. The major forces shaping US Middle policy are "big oil" and the "military –industrial 
complex", neither of which is connected to the pro Israel- Lobby.           
6. The interests of the US generally coincide with the interests of Israel” (1).      
 
The discussion of the Israeli-U.S. special relationship will be, in this section, about two 
main points: 
1. Is it a strategic U.S. interest? 
2. Is it the result of the influence of the pressure groups spear-headed by AIPAC? 
 
The United States support of Israel is excessive; the size of the U.S. supports, political, 
economic, military, and diplomatically, exceeds any normal support established between 
two traditional political systems. It is usually known that any super power supports its ally 
in order to keep it strong, so the supported country will do its part in protecting the donor 
country's interests. The U.S. has offered unlimited support for Israel, but Israel was 
involved, several times, in operations that contradict and were harmful to the U.S. interests 
in the region .This kind of a relation hindered the U.S. from the containment of the 
                                               
(1) James Petras, The Power of Israel in the United States. (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2006), p.169. 
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Soviets’ influence and did not allow them to access Middle East markets effectively. In 
reference to the nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship, Jimmy Carter  explained that, 
according to the law, Israel violated legally the agreement between the two countries; he 
said that the “use of American weapons violated a legal requirement that armaments sold 
by us be used only for Israeli defense against an attack” (1).  
 
It has been said by several U.S. political leaders that Israel and the U.S. share many 
ethical, cultural, and moral values; they resemble each other when it comes to their 
democratic and political systems. However, there are several indications that this 
hypothesis is not accurate. For instance, the U.S. constitution states clearly the equity 
before the law (nobody is above the law) and equal opportunities for all (pursuit of 
happiness), pluralism, and that citizenry in the United States is not based on religion, race, 
or political orientation. Israel, however, does not have a constitution yet, and its general 
concept is mainly based on the understanding that it will be a Jewish state that follows 
Jewish religious values and instructions while applying the social rules on its citizenry.  
 
Freedom of speech for Palestinians is highly controlled, and freedom of the press is 
limited.  King Hussein of Jordan criticized U.S. political leaders including American 
Senator Edward Kennedy when he said that Israel is the only democratic country in the 
Middle East region. King Hussein wondered how Israel can be considered a democratic 
state when it sends its armed troopers to shoot Palestinian students inside their schools or 
colleges simply because they demonstrated against the Occupation. The Israeli army has 
more than once attacked Palestinian universities and arrested many of the students because 
of their peaceful demonstrations. Most of Palestinian universities were frequently closed 
by the Israeli government and many houses were demolished after ordering their owners to 
leave without taking their belongings. This democratic state takes a child from his Jewish 
mother simply because she was married to a Palestinian person!! (2). 
 
The Israeli scholar Avi Shlaim who served in the Israeli Army in the mid-1960s raised 
his concern about the legitimacy of Israel as a democratic state. Because of his critical and 
bold views about the Israeli occupation, he is considered one of the “new historians” who 
                                               
(1) Jimmy Carter, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid, (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc. 2006), p.44. 
(2) Nizam Sharabi, Amerika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin 
[America and the Arabs: American Policy and the Arab World in the Twentieth Century], (London: Riyad al-
Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr. 1990), pp: 642-643. 
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is frequently labeled as “anti-Zionist” as well as the rest of the scholars who dare to 
criticize the practices of the Israeli governments such as: Noam Chomsky, Ilan Pappe, 
Benny Morris, and Uri Milstein. In his article “How Israel brought Gaza to the brink of 
humanitarian catastrophe”, Avi Shlaim came to the conclusion after the assault by Israel on 
Gaza in December2008-January 2009 that Israel has never tried to promote democracy on 
the Arab side. He wrote: 
 
“Israel likes to portray itself as an island of democracy in a sea of authoritarianism. Yet Israel 
has never in its entire history done anything to promote democracy on the Arab side and has 
done a great deal to undermine it. Israel has a long history of secret collaboration with 
reactionary Arab regimes to suppress Palestinian nationalism. Despite all the handicaps, the 
Palestinian people succeeded in building the only genuine democracy in the Arab world with the 
possible exception of Lebanon. In January 2006, free and fair elections for the Legislative 
Council of the Palestinian Authority brought to power a Hamas-led government. Israel, 
however, refused to recognize the democratically elected government, claiming that Hamas is 
purely and simply a terrorist organization” (1). 
 
In general, many political analysts refer this special kind of relations to different 
reason; mainly to the role of “pressure groups” in the U.S. such as the American Israel 
Public Committee (AIPAC). Initially, these pressure groups succeeded in worrying the 
U.S. people about the constant threat and the danger of the Soviets, thus presenting Israel 
as a necessary ally. The role of AIPAC and other interested groups have served to forward 
Israel interests in the U.S. at the expense of an accurate perception of Arab states and 
Palestinian people.  
 
AIPAC is very active in trying to dominate student activities at American universities 
since they are increasingly worried about the direct contact between the Americans and 
Palestinian and other Arab students. In the 1980s they established “student leadership 
committees”, whose main role was to formulate an obstacle to any activity that might harm 
Israel’s image on American university campuses. AIPAC’s main argument is that what 
benefits the Israelis will automatically benefit the Americans. They have always stressed on 
the idea of “What is good for Israel will be good for the U.S. national interest”, and they 
                                               
(1) For more information see:  How Israel brought Gaza to the brink of humanitarian catastrophe by Avi 
Shlaim at http://www.guardian.co.uk:80/world/2009/jan/07/gaza-israel-palestine. Accessed on: January, 8, 
2009. 
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have succeeded in transforming these ideas into the main principles of the U.S. Policy 
towards the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. AIPAC is registered as a 
domestic organization and not as a foreign one even though there was enough evidence in 
1963 (Fulbright Case Hearing) that would indict it as a foreign diplomatic agency. There 
have been many incidents in the U.S. where AIPAC has played an important role in 
directing the U.S. foreign policy. There were several trials held in U.S. courts concerning the 
suspicious role of AIPAC in cooperating illegally with the Israeli Intelligence Agency (1). 
 
The strongest weapon that AIPAC employs, as mentioned earlier, is the use of the 
Anti-Semitism rhetoric by accusing whoever criticizes Israel of being Anti-Semitic. Such a 
tactic has worked efficiently for them as most of American people attempt to avoid such 
an accusation. Since many have strong sympathy and sad feelings toward the Holocaust, 
they worry about this particular type of accusation more than worrying about not being 
supported financially by AIPAC.The election system process in the U.S. is another leading 
factor that helps AIPAC in playing a very important role in determining the results of the 
American political elections. For example the percentages of the American people who are 
eligible to vote are 70 %( 70 persons of each hundred). Only 60% percent of the 70% are 
registered to vote (42 persons), however; the people who actually participate in voting are 
about 50% (21 persons). It just needs 11 persons (Half + 1) to win the election. So, even 
though the Jewish community is only about 3% of the American people , the results of 
their participation in the American election is about the same of the African-Americans’ 
election  results who form around  11 percent of the American public (2).   
 
 AIPAC controls the American "democratic elections" through the financial support for 
some American nominees and the extensive attendance and participation in the 
preliminary elections. The participation of the Jewish vote is carefully planned and 
effectively contributes in choosing the right candidate for them and for Israel; the Jewish 
community is basically known for their active participation in the voting and they take this 
matter very seriously.  Both Republicans and Democrats try their best to attain the Jewish 
votes, and to achieve this, they must promise to support Israel. Some American journalists 
have considered AIPAC as the main force that influences the American foreign policy in 
                                               
(1) Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, (Illinois: University of Illinois Press. 
1989), pp: 320-322. 
(2) Janice Terry, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, (London: Pluto Press. 2005), p.21 
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the Middle East. For example, the New York Times, one of the main newspapers in U.S., 
described AIPAC as a major force in shaping United States policy in the Middle East:  
 
“The article stated that: the organization has gained power to influence a presidential candidate's 
choice of staff, to block practically any arms sale to an Arab country, and to serve as a catalyst 
for intimate military relations between the Pentagon and the Israeli army. Its leading officials are 
consulted by State Department and White House policy makers, by senators and generals"" the 
organization has gained power to influence a presidential candidate's choice of staff , to block 
practically any arms sale to an Arab country, and to serve as a catalyst” (1).    
 
As for the U.S.-Arab relations, Arabs, in general, and Palestinians in particular, wonder 
why and how the U.S. has been adopting such a Middle East foreign policy. The traditional 
U.S. policy strongly favors meeting the Israeli needs and interests while it constantly 
obstructs the Palestinians from exercising their fundamental rights such as democracy, and 
social and economic development. In other words, people in the Middle East do not 
understand the contradiction of the United States which always presents the image of itself 
as a nation that promotes freedom, democracy, and human rights while it is practicing the 
opposite when dealing with the Arabs.    
 
Sharabi explained that  many American leaders believe that Israel forms a strategic 
military base on all three levels (ground, sea, & air).This, of course, would strengthen the 
American dominance over the Middle East, and Israel would  be used by the Americans as 
the safe guard of their national interests (2). Many other researchers do agree with Sharabi 
on this assumption such as Rubenberg (1989), Janice Terry (2005), and Kathleen 
Christison who said that: “Arabs essentially played no part, in which they were politically 
invisible, patronized, disdained or ignored altogether” (3).  
 
 When the U.S. Middle East policy started after WWI, the number of Arabs in the 
United States was limited, and they had not formed any influential interest group to 
advance their interests among U.S. policy makers. In contrast, the Zionist lobby was 
                                               
(1) For more information see: AIPAC: A Major Force in Washington, by: Shipler, David K. (New York 
Times, July 06, 1987). 
(2) Nizam Sharabi. Amirika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin 
America And The Arabs: American Policy and the Arab World in the Twentieth Century], (London: Riyad al-
Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr, 1990), p.740. 
(3) Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on Middle East Policy, (California: 
University of California press, 1999), p.26. 
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growing rapidly by taking advantage of both the predominant orientalist mind-set of the 
U.S. public and policy makers and the growing Jewish constituency in the United States. In 
general, most of the analysts drew the same conclusion that Israel is the undisputed 
strategic ally for the Americans in the region. The general impression taken by the 
American politicians is based on previous political positions given by some Arab leaders 
and the shallow information provided by some pro-Israel White House staff. Janice Terry 
has concluded that many of the American presidents rely so much on the information about 
the Arab rulers given by the White House staff. Anwar Sadat, for example, was introduced 
to Jimmy Carter who knew more information about Sadat’s attachment to his smoking pipe 
than about his political positions (at the beginning of their acquaintance). In comparison 
with the way the Israeli leaders are described and introduced to the American presidents, 
one can find that the Arabs are far away from understanding the “political game”.  
 
Most of the Arab-American relations were controlled by the individual interest of each 
country and not by presenting their case as one united and collective demand. For example, 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt were and still are very loyal to the U.S. regardless of the 
hostile treatment of the Palestinians. According to Janice Terry, even though Saudi Arabia 
was known for its high rank religious position among the Arab-Moslem world, it was the 
only Arab country that was dealing with Israeli experts and companies during the boycott 
period (1970s) (1). Egypt is the second country in the world, after Israel, in receiving the 
American financial aid Jordan has been and is still considered as one of the devoted allies 
to the U.S among the rest of the Arab states. Kuwait is very grateful to the U.S because of 
the military support that Kuwait received during the Gulf War;  Iraq occupied Kuwait in 
1990, but the occupation did not last long after U.S. military intervention.   
 
On the other hand, those analysts, themselves, suggest that it is not impossible for other 
Arab countries to change this negative attitude which was being taken by the U.S. against 
them for a very long time. The organized efforts, which the Arabs didn’t have, will be the 
main “magic recipe” for this goal to be achieved. The Arab community in the U.S. has 
tried to establish cultural and social associations but has avoided establishing economical 
and political ones. After 1967 war, most Arab-Americans felt the dire need to establish 
some political organizations, especially since their perception of the ugly defeat deepened 
                                               
(1) Janice Terry, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, (London: Pluto Press. 2005). 
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their feeling of isolation (being different from the majority of the Americans who were 
happy about the defeat of the Arabs). Therefore, some Arab intellectuals met and decided 
to establish the Arab American Universities Graduates (AAUG) as an educational, cultural 
and charity association (1).  
 
 In the beginning of the 1970s, the National Arab American Association (NAAA) was 
established as an Arab lobby concentrated on defending the Arab cause before both the 
U.S. Congress and their political officials. More Arab associations were later established, 
such as the American-Arab Anti Discrimination committee (AAADC, 1980), and the 
Arab-American Institute (AAI, 1985) in order to defend the civil rights of the Arabs and to 
educate the Arab-Americans about the significance of their contribution in the U.S. 
elections. After more than twenty five years of work, those associations have not harvested 
tangible achievements and this is due to the following factors: First, most of the Arab-
American community stayed far away from being involved in American politics. Second, 
the Arab community in the U.S. is not educated enough about the importance of donations 
for political causes, and they have always failed in establishing or choosing a skillful 
political committee to represent them efficiently in the political arena and in U.S. election 
campaigns. Third, the civil war in Lebanon and the Arabs ignorance of the importance of 
uniting on one political position towards the U.S. has weakened their position. Fourth, 
some Arab countries that were interested in political work in the U.S. hired  Americans 
over Arab-Americans .Arab states  have not supported Arab-Americans and they ignored 
the fact that those Arab-Americans can be of a better use for them than the completely 
strangers to their culture and needs. In other words, those Arab countries have neglected 
the educated, cultured, and skilled Arab-Americans in particular. Finally, the Arab 
countries have neglected their U.S. political supporters (sympathizers) and did not 
encourage them to continue in fighting for the Arab rights and interests (2).  
In addition, Arab diplomacy is very traditional and classical when contacting the 
American officials; they cannot establish some pressure channels outside the official frame 
in which they can influence effectively U.S. decision making. Saudi Arabia has tried 
establishing some connections outside the frame of its embassy (among the American-
Saudi oil companies), but this was a very small effort in comparison with the enormous 
                                               
(1) Muhammed A. Rabie, Sunu’ el-Siyasa al-Amriekiyyeh wal-Arab[ The Making of the American Policy 
and  Arabs],(Amman: Manshourat Dar el-Kaemel-Samed 1990), p.224. 
(2) Ibid. 
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achievements of the other lobbies such as AIPAC, which has worked against the will and 
the desire of the Arabs. Egypt has tried to create a civil relationship with the Americans but 
its efforts stayed very limited. The Arab League tried also to present the Palestinian-Israeli 
case but it remained ineffective; it relied on one single person (former ambassador Dr. 
Clovis Maksoud) to argue the case using his own personal experience and judgment 
instead of referring to an organized plan issued by the League.      
 
The question is what the Arabs should do in order to change this weak and 
unsatisfactory position. It is not a secret that Arabs have not had a significant role in the 
decision- making of the U.S. foreign policy. This, however, does not mean that they cannot 
have an important role in the future since the nature of American society and its leaders are 
open to new constructive ideas and relationships.  
 
3.5 Foreign Assistance: Incentives and pressures 
 
The U.S. has spent billions of dollars on financial assistance to foreign countries. 
Helping poorer countries has become one of the permanent pillars of the U.S. foreign 
policy. It donated to Palestine $ 550 million U.S. dollars at the international conference 
held in Paris (December, 2007) and $ 900 million at the international conference held in 
Egypt (February, 2009). These donations were given mainly for the sake of helping the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). Countries that have benefited from U.S. foreign aid vary in 
their race, religion, and political views. Most Arab countries that benefit from foreign 
financial aid are very loyal to the U.S. However, many Arabs think of such governments as 
puppet regimes since they witness the extreme bias toward Israel e.g. Gaza War (2009), 
but always endorse the U.S. role as the only fair mediator. This type of foreign policy 
towards Arab states is doomed to failure because of the dissatisfaction with such a 
discriminating policy. Therefore, the Foreign Financial Aid approach by U.S. does not 
always function successfully; in complicated situations such as in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, the issue of helping the Palestinian community is definitely questionable by many 
Palestinians. Furthermore, the U.S. considers itself as a nation that respects the values of 
freedom, democracy, and human rights while its policy towards the Palestinian cause 
undermines the credibility of these “American values”. Since the end of WWII, the U.S. 
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position has been clearly viewed, not only by some Arab states, but also by many other 
countries such as Russia or China, as pro-Israel and against the “Arab-Moslem world”.   
 
 Providing foreign aid supports U.S. strategic interests and offers many veiled benefits 
of U.S. policy. For example, it is a little known fact that 80% of U.S. foreign assistance is 
spent in the United States. Many Americans (farmers, truckers, assembly line workers, 
software developers) depend on U.S. foreign assistance and benefit from this kind of 
assistance; if the U.S. administration cuts foreign financial assistance off, it would be 
cutting off the jobs of millions of their people  (1). U.S. economic strategists believe that the 
continuation of helping foreign countries is necessary to ensure U.S prosperity. As 
mentioned above, a significant portion of foreign aids is reinvested into the American 
economy, creating both U.S. domestic jobs, and foreign dependency not only on U.S. aid, 
but on U.S. manufactured products (2).  
 
 As for the foreign financial aid policy, the U.S. is determined to continue this policy as 
a way of approaching diplomatically other countries. Because of the dissatisfaction about 
the foreign assistance structures that had been applied since the days of Marshal Plan, there 
was a dire need to reorganize these unsuccessful programs. Even though there was a big 
success in improving the American foreign relations with the European countries, it was 
not enough, according to American strategists, and such a policy has still not achieved its 
final goals. Therefore, the U.S. attempted to improve its methods of aiding financially 
other poorer countries: 
 
“On September 4, 1961, the Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act, which reorganized the 
U.S. foreign assistance programs; including separating military and non-military 
aid…………….on November 3, 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID). USAID become the first U.S. foreign assistance 
organization whose primary emphasis was on long-range economic and social development 
assistance efforts. Freed from political and military functions that plagued its predecessor 
organization, USAID was able to offer direct support to the developing nations of the world” (3).     
 
                                               
(1) See: Protecting America's Future: The Role of Foreign Assistance, (March, 2000). 
(2) For more information about the role of U.S. foreign aid in the American economy, see The Congressional 
Report Service, (2008). 
(3) See: USAID Boycott of Target at: www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0205aidboycott_body.html. 
(December, 23, 2008). 
 
 
46 
The publicly announced goals of USAID program in the Palestinian Occupied Territories 
are to promote stability in the region and to help establishing the ground work for a final and 
“just” peaceful settlement. This settlement will lead to a two state solution (Israel and 
Palestine) living side by side as good neighbors. The other claimed objective is to improve 
the living conditions of the Palestinians. This can be done, according to USAID, by 
addressing the basic needs such as food, health, water and waste purification, education, and 
economy. In addition, USAID is designed to assist Palestinian political development and 
“Democratic Reform”, focusing on the rule of law, and their ruined infrastructure. According 
to the report in “For the Record”, USAID has focused extensively on its activities in 
Palestine after the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993. 
“Prior to the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles by Israel and the Palestinians, 
USAID’s program in the Occupied Territories focused on community service work. After the 
Oslo process began, this program expanded “considerably” from $10 or $15 million a year to 
$75 million a year. USAID has tried to “support some of the specific provisions outlined in the 
[Oslo] Accords” by, for example, providing assistance to the 1996 Palestinian elections and 
offering job training and housing. USAID began implementing a five year strategy in 1996, 
focusing on three key areas: 1) economic development, with the primary goal of 
“strengthen[ing] private structures”;  “democratic governance,” such as supporting the elections, 
the Palestinian Legislative Council, civil society organizations, and so forth; and 3) water and 
waste purification. This last area has been the largest “by far,” contended Garber. In Gaza, 
USAID has helped develop a waste water treatment plant and build infrastructure for water 
distribution. In the West Bank, it has assisted Palestinian development of the Eastern Aquifer 
and the creation of major water reservoirs in Bethlehem and Hal Hul” (1).  
However, many Palestinians think of USAID as the extended arm of the CIA; their 
perception of this organization is that it is being more harmful than useful to them. But the 
extensive efforts made by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in promoting the Tenet 
Plan proposed by George Tenet (former Head of the CIA) have indicated that some 
Palestinians are comfortable with the “American intervention” in their internal affairs. 
People who are comfortable with USAID programs justify their satisfaction by suggesting 
that the average Palestinian needs the financial aid in order to improve living conditions. 
They do not envisage any harm in getting the aid as long as it does not jeopardize their 
national aspiration. They compare their acceptance of the financial aids from Saudi Arabia 
or Jordan where they do not believe that those countries have helped in facilitating the 
                                               
(1) For more information see: Assisting Palestinian Development: Current Challenges by: Larry Garber at 
http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/pubs/20010222ftr.html  (November 09, 2008). 
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Palestinian struggle more than what U.S.A. has done. As a matter of fact, Syria with Tel Al 
Zater, Jordan with Black September, Egypt with Camp David 1979, is a clear indicator that 
U.S.A. is no different from any other Arab country in their relations with the Palestinians.    
 
The U.S. has offered a generous program for the sake of developing the economy and 
the living status of the Palestinians. The followings are some USAID Program Budget 
Analysis (1993-2002): 
“Following the signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993, the U.S. government provided 
$375 million between 1993 and 1998 through USAID to implement a program of development 
in the West Bank and Gaza. In 1999, the regular USAID operating year budget was maintained 
at $75 million and in 2000 its level increased to $85 million. In 2000, the U.S. Congress 
appropriated an additional $400 million to USAID West Bank and Gaza to facilitate the 
implementation of the Wye River Accords. In 2001, USAID West Bank/Gaza's operating year 
budget remained at approximately $85 million. USAID funding for the West Bank and Gaza 
between 1993 and 2001 totals approximately $1 billion. Of this amount, $540 million had been 
obligated through September 2000 and approximately $460 million will be obligated by 
September 30, 2002.Using the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation's (MOPIC) comparative data, the U.S. is, by far, the highest disbursing bilateral 
donor in the West Bank and Gaza” (1). 
Yet many Palestinians still question the actual reasons behind USAID programs in their 
region, and there is a growing trend toward boycotting these American programs. 
Palestinians who were promised of financial aid by the U.S. government were deprived of 
such assistance under Hamas leadership. Even though the Hamas led- government was 
elected democratically and under the supervision of Europeans and some Americans 
(Jimmy Carter), all American aid projects were frozen. Hundreds of millions of dollars 
were held from the Palestinian Authority which is responsible for the development of the 
infrastructure and the public sector (teachers, nurses, and public sector workers). There 
was an international sanction of the Hamas led-government, led by the Americans, which 
caused very critical conditions for the Palestinians. The halt aid led to enormous 
deterioration in the areas of sanitation, environment, water, health, education, and 
“Democracy Building”. The U.S. Congress claimed that the aim of the freeze was to 
ensure that no money goes to “terrorists”; USAID is controlled and limited by the U.S. 
                                               
(1) see: United States Aid to the Palestinians at www.usaidgov/wbg/budget 
(November14, 2008). 
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Congress. According to Gershon Baskin, “The U.S. Congress: prohibits funding anything 
in the Palestinian territories that might benefit Hamas or members of Hamas, or people 
affiliated with Hamas, or anyone who looks like Hamas” (1).    
 
The term “Democracy”, unfortunately, is defined differently by the U.S. from its 
“traditional definition” when applying the same to Arab regimes; its determination whether 
one Arab state is practicing democracy or not is based on which Arab political party wins 
the election. What happened in Algeria in 1990 (2), and what took place in the last 
Palestinian parliament election (3) verifies the incongruity of how the Americans define the 
term "Democracy". As a result, some Arabs such as the Saudis, Sudanese, Syrians, 
Palestinians, and the Egyptians, consider the use of slogans of “Sovereignty of the law and 
human rights violation” as inconsistent to U.S. active policy.  
 
3.6 Analysis 
 
The transfer of the foreign policy role from the Congress to the American presidents 
started under Nixon’s Presidency in 1970s where his Secretary of State (Henry Kissinger) 
became one of the prominent key players in shaping the American foreign policy. 
Kissinger was known for his bias with Israel, while he had a hostile attitude towards the 
Arabs. Similarly, when Jimmy Carter was the President, he relied mainly on his national 
security advisor Zbingniew Brzezinski (his previous mentor) who was also known for 
being pro-Israel. Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, 
George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush were not, with some slight 
variation, familiar with the details of the conflict in the Middle East. Those presidents, 
except may be for Jimmy Carter,   were acting as managers when dealing with the crises in 
the Middle East and they relied mostly on their advisors and foreign policy strategists who 
were pro-Israel for doing “the job”.   
 
 U.S. foreign policy supports democratic governments abroad and they have been 
trying for, the last five decades, to apply this policy in the Arab World. Brzezinski, for 
                                               
(1) For more information see: US sanctions on Palestinian Territories taking their toll, (Correspondents 
Report http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2006/s1764725 ,October 15, 2006). 
(2) The Algerian Islamic movement made its mark in 1990 election(gaining control of some 800 local 
government offices across the country). It carries the name: Islamic Salvation front( I.S.F.). 
(3)  (Hamas movement winning a surprise victory in parliamentary election on   Jan.25, 2006). 
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example, believes that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the core of international conflict 
and the reason behind the instability of political systems in many parts of the world. He 
claims that if Arab governments in general, and the Palestinians, in particular, become 
“democratic countries”, the conflict with the Israelis would have a better chance to be 
resolved. According to U.S. strategists, democratic systems usually do not believe in 
violence as the only approach to solving disputes or resolving conflicts. Democratic 
governments only resort to violence after exhausting all peaceful efforts. Further, a 
democratic country would become naturally, at least, a friend of the United States if not 
one of its allies. 
 
 It may become difficult sometimes for the United States to promote democracy in all 
Arab states since some parties abuse the democratic system by participating in it for only 
one purpose; that is to get to the power of ruling. What happened in Algeria in the early 
1990s led the United States to reconsider their perspective of "democratic elections" and its 
universal applicability. Where and how it should be applied became the main concern of 
the U.S. foreign policy strategists; when one political party wants to change the legislations 
in order to maintain power for itself (monopoly), the whole purpose of exporting 
democracy will be defeated. This explains the "strong relationship" that the United States 
has with several Arab states which do not adopt democratic methods in their ruling system. 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are to be considered as 
strong allies of the U.S. According to Haaretz newspaper, Hillary Clinton proposed that: 
“The American nuclear umbrella [is] extended to other countries in the region, like Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf States, if they agree to relinquish their own nuclear ambitions”  (1).     
 
 Palestinians, have been harmed severely by the negative positions the U.S. has taken 
against them in resolving the Palestinian- Israeli conflict. Understanding the special 
relationship between the U.S. and the Israelis, and the power of the American Jewish 
Lobby with its influence on the U.S. foreign policy makes the Palestinians suspicious 
about any help they may get from the United States. George Mitchell, the current U.S. 
envoy has stressed: 
 “Striking economic peace between Israel and the Palestinians, without diplomatic efforts, would 
not succeed, explaining that diplomatic and economic efforts "must be parallel, not sequential. 
                                               
(1) Haaretz: an Article about Hillary Clinton.  December 11, 2008 Kislev 14, 5769. 
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You can’t have economic development when you’re shutting the door in the face of any 
diplomatic development” (1).  
 
Some Palestinians do not even agree with the U.S. definition of the term "Democracy". 
They accuse U.S. administrations of hypocrisy and contradiction while dealing with the 
terms of "democracy, human rights and justice". If the U.S. does not balance its financial 
aid and fair role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, its value will simply disappear because it 
will have outlived its usefulness (2).  
 
There should not be a high expectation for a change in the U.S. foreign policy towards 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the near future.  Both former presidential candidates 
Republican John McCain and Democratic Hilary Clinton in and President Barack Obama 
have all made very similar statements concerning the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Hilary Clinton threatened that she would defend the security of Israel and would 
harm any party who might think of fighting Israel.  Barack Obama announced his absolute 
support for Israel and did not distinguish between resistance vs. terrorism, and John 
McCain announced that Jerusalem would be the eternal united capital for Israel. The new 
political appointments by Barack Obama such as Hillary Clinton and Ram Emanuel are 
another sign of the very strong (unbreakable) bond between Israel and the U.S. Barak 
Obama has chosen Hillary Clinton who is pro-Israel to be his Secretary of State in his 
current administration. This position is the highest rank in the U.S. foreign policy and 
would be the most important position that deals with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 
The role of AIPAC in influencing American foreign policy is a serious matter that 
needs to be taken into consideration when analyzing such a policy. The ignorance of Arab 
diplomats and the original hate towards the Arab and the Moslem world in general helps 
AIPAC in convincing the Americans that Israel is a "democratic country", and that it is the 
only reliable ally for the U.S. in the Middle East. The financial support provided to 
American politicians by AIPAC and the constant interference in the work of the 
committees in the American Congress leads to the conclusion that U.S. foreign policy is 
influenced by internal pressure groups. It would be unreasonable to ignore the power of 
                                               
(1) Natasha Mozogoyaya. George Mitchell. Israel: Haaretz Newspaper. February 19, 2009. 
(2) Noam Chomsky. Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy. (New York: 
Metropolitan books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC. 2006). 
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AIPAC in the United States and the important role of AIPAC in influencing the decision-
makers of the American foreign policy. As an example: 
 
“In 1992, AIPAC President David Steiner had to resign when he was tape recorded boasting 
about his political influence in obtaining aid for Israel. Steiner claimed that he had met with (the 
Bush U.S. secretary of State) Jim Baker and I cut a deal with him. I got, besides the $ 3 billion, 
you know they're looking for the Jewish votes, and I'll tell him whatever he wants to 
hear…Besides the $ 10 billion in loan guarantees which was a fabulous thing, $ 3 billion in 
foreign, in military aid, and I got almost a billion dollars in other goodies that the people don't 
even know about. Steiner also claimed to be "negotiating" with the incoming Clinton 
administration over who Clinton would appoint as a Secretary of State and Secretary of the 
National Security Agency. Steiner stated that AIPAC had a dozen people in [the Clinton] 
campaign, in the headquarters ….and they're all going to get big jobs” (1). 
 
Nonetheless, recognizing the importance of the role of AIPAC does not necessarily 
mean that it completely controls U.S. foreign policy. Israel is being used merely as a tool 
serving the U.S. national interests. In the mid- 1980’s Israel and its supporters in the 
United States were hoping that the Reagan’s administration would not sell the AWAX 
aircraft planes to Saudi Arabia but they failed in doing so; the Saudis have finally bought 
those planes. In 1991, President George H. Bush put enormous pressure on the Israelis to 
attend the Madrid Peace Conference against their desire; they could not refuse and they 
were forced to come to the peace conference. In the same era, the U.S. threatened to stall 
the $ 10 billion dollars loans that was set to be offered for Israel if it did not freeze 
settlements; Israel agreed to this demand because it direly needed the loan. In the years 
2000 and 2005, the U.S. forced Israel not to go through with the arms deal that Israel had 
prepared with China. Further, Israel has been asking for a long time for the release of its 
agent who was convicted of spying on the U.S. for Israel but has faced a constant U.S. 
refusal. Therefore, it would not be rational to determine that the role of AIPAC is the only 
reason behind the hostile U.S. attitude towards the Arabs or the Palestinians. Noam 
Chomsky has stressed several times; the whole issue is because of the "Big Oil" (2). So, it is 
a mixture of several different factors that influence the U.S. foreign policy and not a sole 
                                               
(1) For more information see: Washington Report on Middle East Affair, December/January, 1992/1993, 
p.69. 
(2) Noam Chomsky, Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy, (New York: 
Metropolitan books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC., 2006) . 
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one. It would be inaccurate to determine that only one of the mentioned above is the real or 
major factor; it is very important to be familiar with the real U.S. political environment.  
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Chapter Four 
Case Study 1: Camp David Summit (1979) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss the 1979 summit by investigating several variables that 
influenced the process of the negotiations. It will analyze those variables in terms of the 
circumstances, the environment, the regional dynamic, and the nature of the mediators’ 
character. The chapter will focus on the main factors that influenced the outcomes of this 
summit. The prior agreements to the convention had played a very important role in 
preparing both sides to negotiate peacefully their demands and needs. Thus, the first 
section of this chapter will discuss the main agreements that took place before the final 
summit is held. 
 
4.2. Rogers Plan 
 
Three years after the 1967 war, which ended with overwhelming victory of Israel 
against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the U.S. exerted extensive efforts by to resolve the 
Israeli-Arab conflict. The Rogers Plan was an American peace plan for the Middle East 
proposed by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers. The plan called for frame work to 
achieve an end to hostilities in the region caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict. This proposal 
was originally proposed on December 9, 1969 in a speech at an Adult Education 
conference, but was formally announced on June 19, 1970. The plan arose after the failure 
of Jarring Mission that was set to negotiate plan to implement UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 (1). The UN had previously failed to arbitrate the tensions between Egypt 
and Israel, so the Soviet Union approached the U.S. administration ( President Nixon) 
proposing a peaceful settlement in the Middle East with the two countries (U.S. & Soviets) 
as mediators. The U.S. would seek Israel’s support while the former Soviet Union would 
work with Egypt. The plan had 10 points and it included several principles: an Israeli 
withdrawal to the international borders with Egypt, removing Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh 
                                               
(1) Swedish Ambassador Gunnar Jarring had tried in the past to promote a peace process between Israel and 
Egypt. Jarring suggested renewing the ceasefire between the two countries. Israel rejected the plan while 
Egypt agreed to negotiations. 
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from Israeli sovereignty, securing safe passage for Israeli ships through Suez Canal and the 
Gulf of Aqaba, and maintaining Jerusalem as a unified city run by the three main religions. 
These principles were to be implemented through negotiations between Egypt and Israel. 
So the main point was calling for an agreement signed by both sides (Israel and Egypt) 
ending the state of war; prohibiting any act that may jeopardize the state of peace between 
them, and demilitarizing the areas which were to be negotiated upon (1).  
 As for Egypt, it had gained respite to consolidate its missile defense after a huge 
damage from the war, and Nasser had hoped to open a line of communications with the 
U.S. to avoid the annoying growing Egyptian reliance on the former Soviet Union. The 
State Department was concerned about the interference of their competitor (the former 
Soviet Union) and was trying to degrade the Russians role in the conflict. Henry Kissinger 
had some differences with Rogers since he did not want to involve the Soviets or their 
Arab friendly countries hoped that the U.S. would become the sole mediator and the main 
resource for resolving this conflict. The third Rogers plan, which was proposed for an 
interim agreement across the Canal, was rejected by Israel within hours after it was 
submitted for approval. Israel’s main concern was that the plan lacked any reference to 
future possibilities of conducting a peace agreement. Egypt’s willingness to accept the plan 
helped to bring more American pressure on Israel. President Richard Nixon assured the 
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, that the agreement would not harm Israel’s 
characteristic as a Jewish state, and the U.S. would guarantee the sovereignty and the 
security of Israel, as well as the current balance of power. The Israeli government gave its 
basic consent to the plan; according to many researchers, this consent was an indication of 
setting the future opportunity for peaceful negotiations and reaching a final agreement. 
Aaron Miller, in his book “The Too Much Promised Land”  explained that Henry Kissinger  
supported the idea of Israel negotiating peace with the Arabs: “Kissinger saw little merit in 
trying to impose a settlement only to convince the Arabs that America was best dealt with 
extortion. Kissinger recalled that the prerequisite to effective Middle East diplomacy was 
to reduce the Soviet influence so that progress could not be ascribed to its pressures” (2). 
                                               
(1)  For more information see: Rogers Plan, at: 
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_rogers_1969.php . April 22, 2008. 
(2) Aaron Miller, The Too Much Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, (New 
York; Bantam dell, a division of Random House Inc., 2008), p.133. 
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 Rogers’s efforts were continually countered by the opposite efforts from Kissinger 
who played a major role in causing the Rogers Plan to fail. According to Rubenberg, even 
though the U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers was officially in charge of the Middle 
East affairs, Henry Kissinger was always causing Rogers and his staff’s initiatives to fail. 
There were two opposite positions in that period in the U.S. concerning the conflict in the 
Middle East. Even though Rogers’s position was supported by the agreement of the 
international community, Kissinger was able to dominate Middle East affairs in that 
period; his policy trend continued to represent the U.S. foreign policy towards the conflict 
till present days with some adjustments after the 1973War(1). 
The dispute between William Rogers and Henry Kissinger was one of the main 
characteristics of President Nixon’s term. Kissinger, who was of Jewish descent, was in 
agreement with Richard Nixon about his perspective towards the world system and the 
case of the Soviets. He supported Nixon by declaring that the U.S. must be the strongest 
nation in order to be successful in diplomacy. Kissinger succeeded in having the 
President’s approval to handle foreign affairs policy. He followed a clearly biased policy 
against the Arabs, justifying it by claiming that Arabs are pro-Soviet while Israel is the 
only democratic country in the region and it is the strongest and the closest ally for the 
U.S. in the Middle East. Therefore, he opposed strongly Rogers Plan that was based on 
Resolution 242 which called for applying the principle of “lands for peace” (2). 
 As mentioned earlier, Kissinger used the pretext of containing the former Soviet 
Union’s role in the region to hinder the progress of the peaceful negotiation between Israel 
and Egypt. Thus, Rogers declared the failure of the plan in 1970. President Nixon did not 
have any pro-Arab internal pressure then, so he had more room to be partial and not 
objective as an American President who was mediating the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
Kissinger was naturally supported by the pro-Israel interest groups who were accused any 
American administration that tried to be more balanced of “selling out Israel for having the 
Arab oil”(3). Even though the Rogers plan failed in that era, its provisions were adopted by 
the Egyptians and Anwar Sadat stood by these principles in his negotiations with the 
                                               
(1) Cheryl Rubenberg,  Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination,  (Illinois: 
University of Illinois Press., 1989), p.134. 
(2) For more information see: Roger Plan at:  http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_rogers_1969. 
php .  April 22, 2008. 
(3) Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: U.S.A.; Israel, and the Palestinians. (Boston MA: South End Press. 
1999). 
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Israelis under the patronage of the United States.   In general, Rogers Plan definitely paved 
the way to Camp David in 1979, since it got both Israelis and Egyptians used to seeking 
peaceful solutions. 
4.3. October War (Yom Kippur War) 
The fourth Arab-Israeli war started on October 6, 1973 on Yom Kippur (the holiest day 
of the Jewish calendar), when the Syrian and the Egyptian armies, supported by some other 
Arab states (troops and finance), jointly attacked Israeli military locations along with the 
Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. Israel was caught off guard; therefore, it suffered 
severe losses. The goals of the Egyptians from the war were limited; they wanted to regain 
some of the lands occupied by the Israelis in 1967 and to send a statement to both the 
Israelis and the Americans that the 1967 status quo was not longer tolerable. The war 
lasted for 18 days until the Israelis abided by the third cease fire agreement that was 
declared by the United Nations. Even though the Egyptians and the Syrians were defeated 
in the field (Israel held an additional 165 square miles from Syria, and had encircled the 
Egyptian Third Army on the west bank of the Suez Canal), it was still a symbolic victory 
for the Arabs. They succeeded in surprising the Israeli forces and they managed to change 
the previous portrayed image of the Arabs and   their terrible military defeat in 1967. 
Further, the war was important for the Arabs in general since the oil embargo was used by 
the Arab states for the first time as a political weapon (Saudi Arabia led the Arab world in 
an oil embargo against the Western nations especially the United States). This powerful 
and unprecedented position of the Arabs enabled Egypt to negotiate a peace treaty with 
Israel. According to Jimmy Carter, “The 1973 war introduced major changes in the 
character of the Middle East. The effective performance of the Egyptian and the Syrian 
armies increased the stature of both President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt and President 
Hafez al-Assad of Syria” (1).    
 
The Israeli Army leadership encouraged confidence among the Israelis that it would be 
almost impossible for their defense line to be penetrated by any army. However, its quick 
collapse in the1973 War changed the balance of the Israeli power and transformed their 
perspective about the ability of keeping occupied lands under their control. In other words, 
it is true that Israel managed to occupy lands quickly, but the capability of keeping these 
                                               
(1) Jimmy Carter, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid. (New York: Simon & Schuster ,Inc., 2006), p.37 
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lands became the hard fact that Israel had to face. Hence, the Israeli public became more 
psychologically prepared to abandon Egypt’s occupied Sinai. According to William 
Zartman, this is a necessary phase for parties to make concessions and look for peaceful 
solutions  (1). 
 
4.4 Kilometer 101 Agreement (1973) 
The kilometer 101 agreement was marked as the first agreement after the war between 
the Israelis and the Egyptians in 1973; it was signed on November 11, 1973 by Egypt's 
Major General Mohamed Abdel Ghani el Gamasi and Israel’s Major General Aharon 
Yariv, in the presence of the commander of the U.N. forces, Major General Ensio Siilasvuo 
of Finland. It was the first official agreement between Israel and an Arab country since the 
signature of the 1949 armistice agreements. The negotiators from both sides met at the 
United Nations checkpoint “Kilometer 101” in an effort to work out the details of the Suez 
ceasefire. The agreement with its six points formed the basis for the Sinai agreement that 
was signed in 1974. The negotiations continued between the Egyptians and the Israelis 
military officers about the implementation of these six points (2). 
 U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was the mastermind of this agreement; his 
marathon trips, referred to as “shuttle diplomacy”, to Israel and Egypt from the 5th to the 
11th of November, 1973, were made in the hopes that his efforts would consummate the 
agreement; the agreement was eventually signed. Five of the six points in Kissinger's 
ceasefire package had already been achieved. Nonetheless, the agreement failed because 
Sadat asked to drop the point in which Israel asked for both armies to withdraw to the lines 
of the ceasefire set on October 22, 1973.The ambiguous Kissinger plan left the issue of the 
“disengagement and separation of forces” unsettled; the Egyptians were worried that 
withdrawing their forces based on the Israeli demands would mean that they gained 
nothing in the October war. In other words, the Egyptians did not want to lose the new 
territory and the prestige that had been regained in the war. Therefore, the Egyptians 
insisted that the Israeli forces withdraw to the position held on October 22 before they 
surrounded the city of Suez and trapped the Egyptian Third Army. Kissinger, after not 
being able to succeed in keeping this agreement effective, and further because of Russian 
                                               
(1) William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
(2) For more information see: Kilometer 101, at: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908222,00.html . April 08,2009. 
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pressure, he stressed on holding the Geneva Convention according to the U.N. resolution 
338. 
 Immediately following the war, Israel signed two separate agreements with the 
Egyptians and the Syrians. These two agreements were considered important for U.S. 
foreign policy decision makers since they believed such agreements would eventually lead 
to resolution of the conflict in the region. More importantly, signing of the agreements 
improved the chances of having a broader peaceful settlement between the Egyptians and 
Israelis. Henry Kissinger assumed that such a peaceful settlement would serve the U.S. 
national interest by providing stability in the region and would contain the spread of 
Russian influence in the Middle East; it would leave the U.S. as the only dominant power 
in the region (1). 
 
4.5 Geneva Convention 
 
 Based on the request of the former Soviet Union, the Middle East conference opened 
in Geneva. The Geneva Conference hosted by the United Nations but under the 
sponsorship of the Soviets and the U.S. was initially supposed to be held on December 18, 
1973. Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Israel were asked to participate in the conference. Henry 
Kissinger was aware that the conference would not resolve the main problems, but he 
thought that such a conference would give him enough time to practice his diplomacy 
indirectly. He also believed that it was important, psychologically, that the Arabs and the 
Israelis meet together to establish a tangible precedent of negotiation. Egypt was the only 
country among the other Arab states that preferred to attend but Israel firmly opposed such 
a conference. Israel required several conditions to be met before it would participate in 
such a conference; the main concern of Israel was not to expand the list of the participants 
to include the PLO. The U.S. had to reaffirm that it would use its veto power in case the 
PLO attempted to attend; this left the Arabs with mixed feelings (anger and dissatisfaction) 
about the role of the U.S. in making such concessions to the Israelis since the Palestinian 
case is very central to the Arab-Israeli conflict. All Arab states believed that the Palestinian 
problem was the crux of the Middle East conflict; no genuine and lasting peace can be 
established without solving the Palestinian problem.      
                                               
(1) Ibid. 
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 At the Geneva Conference, Israel refused to sit in the same room with the Syrians, 
because Syria had refused to provide the Red Cross with a list of captured Israeli soldiers. 
On the other hand, Syria, too, refused to attend the conference; this refusal helped 
Kissinger by not having the responsibility of discussing the Israeli conditions with the 
Syrians. Syria was demanding a disengagement and separation of forces plan as a prior 
demand to sit with the Israelis. The Syrians were not satisfied with the separate agreement 
that took place between the Egyptians and the Israelis on the Egyptian front leaving the 
Syrian front without a similar agreement. This was a serious threat for the Egyptian-Syrian 
alliance and to the Syrian interests especially due to the fact that President Assad became 
suspicious about the secret arrangements that may have been made between Henry 
Kissinger and Anwar Sadat.  Kissinger successfully managed to plant this seed of 
suspicion and ill intentions between these two Arab countries in this critical period, and he 
left no excuse for Israeli refusal to attend the conference. Israel attended the conference; it 
was held on Oct.21, 1973; however, the conference ended with a failure. Kissinger, 
however, succeeded in removing the Palestinian case from all political forums and was 
able to prevent the PLO from participating in the diplomatic process (1). This Conference 
may not be a model for successful negotiations, but it had contributed in getting both Arabs 
and Israelis used to seek peaceful negotiations under the supervision of the United Nations 
rather than resorting to wars. 
 
4.6 Disengagement and Separation of Forces (Sinai Agreement) 
 
After the Geneva Convention, Kissinger was eager to move forward toward making 
further agreement between the Israelis and the Egyptians concerning the separation of their 
troops. Israel offered, after the reelection of Golda Meir, a plan that called for the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the west bank of the Suez Canal. On the other hand, 
Israel demanded for ending the war between the two countries, and the reopening of the 
Suez Canal for passage of Israeli ships and freight. Kissinger then directed his energies and 
efforts toward achieving bilateral rather than comprehensive agreements. After months of 
what has been called “shuttle diplomacy, he successfully coordinated troop disengagement 
agreement between Israel and Egypt. The Israeli-Egyptian agreement called for Israeli 
                                               
(1) Cheryl Rubenberg. Op.cit.pp:166-173. 
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withdrawal from parts of Sinai, exchange of prisoners of war, and an end to the Arab oil 
Embargo (1). 
 
The Sinai Agreement reflected that the Israelis and the Americans have common national 
interests. The agreement was basically an Israeli plan but adopted by the U.S. and agreed 
upon by the Egyptians. The Egyptians were not aware that this plan is actually an Israeli 
one. According to Sadat, the Egyptians viewed a transformation in U.S. foreign policy 
where it became more neutral toward the Middle East; Sadat publicly declared that the 
U.S. adopted a new policy showing objectivity as a third party (mediator). However; the 
Palestinians were frustrated with these results as they felt abandoned by some Arab 
countries. They felt that the Arab countries were willing to make peace with the Israelis in 
order to gain back their occupied territories at the cost of the Palestinians and their case (2). 
 
4.7 Step-by-Step Approach (Kissinger) 
 
The Step -by -Step approach failed in terms of the American national interest in the 
Middle East. It was set basically to avoid the pressure on Israel so it will be more 
cooperative in establishing a genuine peaceful settlement but resulted in a division within 
the Arab World. After the October War and several agreements about the separations of 
military forces, the U.S. felt that there was a strong opportunity to establish a peaceful 
settlement.  
 
President Nixon visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. These visits 
were made in an attempt to reflect the commitment of the U.S. toward finding a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict in the region. Henry Kissinger tried to avoid the collapse of his 
Step-by-Step approach especially after the Rabat Conference (3). He made five trips to the 
Middle East in order to promote his strategy; he was trying to prove that his approach to 
diplomacy was more fruitful than the reconvention in Geneva (4). He explained that armies 
                                               
   (1) Annual Report 2001: 
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/publications/aidco_2001_annual_report_en.pdf  
(2) Ibid. 
(3) The 7th Arab summit which recognized, for the first time, the P.L.O. as the sole and legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian People. It was held on October 26, 1974. 
(4) Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko concluded a Middle East tour of his own to press the Russian 
preference to return to Geneva. 
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had been pulled apart where the United Nation forces were stationed and some Israeli-
occupied territory has been returned to Arab sovereignty.  Kissinger’s visits to the 
mentioned above countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel) were 
considered as the last chance to succeed in defeating the Russian efforts through the Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andri Gromyko, who was pressing for a multinational peace conference 
in Geneva. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had hoped that Kissinger might achieve 
further progress; nonetheless, after his meeting with Gromyko, he agreed on the 
resumption of the Geneva conference. Even some members of Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitshak Rabin’s government, who preferred to negotiate with the Arabs through Kissinger, 
said that they would go to Geneva (1).  
 
In the late 1970s, Israel witnessed internal political changes where the Labor party, 
which had dominated the Israeli governments since the establishment of Israel, lost in the 
elections to the Likud Party. This new change in the governing political party influenced 
the nature of the Israeli policy; Menachem Begin, who was considered one of the hawks in 
the extreme right wing of Israeli Likud party, became the Prime Minister of Israel. The 
concept of the “Undefeatable Army” that had been established after the overwhelming 
Israeli victory over the Arab armies in the Six-Day War (2), started to be shaken among 
Israelis because of the quick  collapse of the Israeli Defense line ( Bar Lev Line ) during 
the “ Yom Kippur” War of 1973.  
 
 Egypt also experienced an internal political shift, since Anwar Sadat who became 
Egypt’s President after Jamal Abdel Nasser, differed completely in his views with his 
predecessor about the nature of the country’s coalitions and allies. President Nasser was 
well-known for his nationalist policies (Pan-Arabism or Nasserism). He advocated the 
concept of Arab unity based on their nationality, so he was able to touch the feelings and 
emotions of the entire Arab World. Nasser counted on the support of the former Soviets 
(USSR) and had very poor diplomatic relations with the U.S. He tried to cooperate with the 
U.S. through implementing the Rogers Plan, but the process was difficult, so he decided to 
be an exclusive ally to the former Soviet Union. As a result, Egyptian relations with the 
U.S. deteriorated. When Sadat came to power; he ignored the concept of Arab nationalism. 
                                               
(1) Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination. (Illinois: 
University of Illinois Press., 1989). 
(2) Israel captured West Bank & Gaza, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula all the way up to Suez Canal, and roughly 
half of Syria's Golan Heights within six days with light casualties in the Israeli Army.  
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Egypt was suffering from a very poor economy, so beside Sadat’s recognition of the 
uselessness of the U.N. resolution 338 due to lack of agreement with the Syrian President 
(Hafez Assad) and the hope of building better relations with the U.S., he decided to accept 
the idea of sitting directly with the Israelis at the negotiating table (1). 
 
In other words, Anwar Sadat finally decided to prioritize the Egyptian national interests 
over the pan-Arab national interests. Sadat was convinced that he would be able to market 
such an idea among the Egyptian public. He concentrated on convincing Egyptian people 
that their national interest would be protected. He further advocated the idea of benefiting 
from the circumstances since the U.S. promised to provide more financial aid which would 
directly contribute to enhancing the weak-economy of Egypt. Finally, Sadat was able to 
win the agreement of the Egyptian public majority in pursuing his peaceful efforts. The 
approval of the public opinion was a major step for the Egyptian leader to go forward in 
making peace with the Israelis. According to Richard Hass, this is a major factor in 
influencing the leaders’ decisions (2). 
 
4.8 Sadat Peace Initiative (NO More War) 
 
In his historic visit to Israel in November, 1977, President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat 
spoke at the Israeli Kenesset. He spoke with strength, but he acknowledged Israel’s right to 
exist. Very few Israelis were expecting such an acknowledgement from an Arab leader. He 
and Menachem Begin had made a mutual pledge “No More War”, except that Sadat made 
his promise conditional, that there would be no more war if Israel accepted a peace 
agreement that included the return of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. The 
Israelis needed to respond creatively to Sadat’s gesture; they needed to decide on what 
lands to return and what to keep; this was the first tough diplomatic challenge they had 
faced since 1967. However, according to recent history, one can say that the state of war 
between the two countries was ended with Sadat’s visit to Israel. Both countries agreed at 
the end of Sadat’s visit that they would continue discussing their disputes through dialogue 
and not through war. The continuation of the dialogue was hoped to pave the way towards 
                                               
(1) Nizam Sharabi,  Amirika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin 
[American and the Arabs: American Policy and the Arab World], (London: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-
Nashr. 1990). 
(2) Richard Hass, Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990). 
 
 
63 
successful negotiations in which they would lead to the signing of peace treaties with all 
the neighboring Arab States.  
 Both Israelis and Egyptians wanted to achieve serious direct dialogue about the ways 
of establishing peace in the Middle East. Sadat’s visit and his pledge of “no more war” 
opened the door to such a dialogue, but “continuity” of the peaceful dialogue was the key 
word. They both hoped that peace eventually would be the result of this dialogue. Peace 
and security were the main two issues that Sadat pressed during his visit. Sadat intended to 
remove the psychological barrier that had dominated both nations; he was hoping that after 
this momentum and this new spirit, both countries would commit to solving their disputes, 
regardless of their complexity, through talks not through wars. Sadat claimed that most of 
his people were surveyed and that they supported him. It seems that Sadat’s vision was 
compatible to what John Geer thought of this particular issue; Geer argues that public 
opinion surveys are critical factors in shaping the behavior of leaders and their foreign 
policy decision making (1).   
 
 4.9 Official Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty 
 
The official Camp David negotiations started on September 5, 1978. President Jimmy 
Carter prepared himself by studying the conflict’s main issues and the psychological 
analysis of both Sadat and Begin that was collected by experts from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). His study included comprehensive personal information about 
both of them: their history, their interests, their medical records, and how both of them 
became leaders of their people. It also contained information about their personal 
characteristics, political and religious beliefs, their relations with other countries’ leaders, 
their weaknesses, their reactions under pressure, and their position in relation to the 
American President himself  (2). 
 
Carter brought the Bible with him because he thought that he would need it when 
discussing important issues with Begin. It seems that Carter wanted to be fully prepared 
and not fail in addressing any surprising situations. He further hoped that he had gained the 
                                               
(1) John-G-Geer, From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls; A Theory of Democratic Leadership, (New York: 
Columbia University Press. 1996). 
(2)  Nizam Sharabi, Amirika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin 
[American and the Arabs: American Policy and the Arab World], (London: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-
Nashr. 1990).  
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trust of Sadat; he actually was able to do so since Sadat from the beginning of the 
negotiations had put almost all his trust in Carter.Sadat was accompanied by the ministers 
Muhammad Kamel, Butrus Ghali, Usam El-Baz, and Hasan Tuhami. Prime Minister 
Menahim Begin was accompanied by the Israeli ministers Moshe Dayan, Eizer Weizmann, 
and the Israeli attorney general Aharon Barak. President Jimmy Carter had with him Cyrus 
Vance, Harold Saunders, Roy Atherton, and Brzezinski. The first joint communiqué issued 
was concentrated mainly on praying to God for bringing hope and peace to the Holy Land 
that had gone through four wars, but was still not enjoying the blessing of peace (1). 
 
 At the beginning of the negotiation, Carter prepared a list with the points and the 
questions that should be discussed and dealt; he mentioned some points that were agreed 
upon by the three parties in principle. The main points that were agreed upon were:  
1. Jerusalem would remain a united city where Christians, Muslims, and the Jews 
would be granted the freedom of practicing their prayer at their holy places. 
2. Egypt would end its economic embargo with Israel; Israeli ships would be allowed 
to pass freely through Suez Canal. 
3. Egypt would have full and undisputed sovereignty in Sinai. 
4. Jordan and the Palestinians were to be main participants in the negotiation.  
5. The implementation of the agreements would be done gradually in consecutive 
phases with well intentions (2). 
 
In contrast, there were some partially disputed points that were significantly important: 
U.N. Resolution 242 to be the basic reference for any peaceful settlement which Begin 
refused under the pretext that this solution would not be applicable in the West Bank. 
Having full diplomatic relations between the two countries was rejected by Sadat who 
refused this kind of relations with Israel. Sadat demanded that Israel end its military 
occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, but Begin did not commit himself to this 
condition. There were many difficult points which Carter had to face to achieve a solution: 
the removal of all Israeli settlements and airports from Sinai, freezing the building of new 
settlements in the West Bank, the implementation of all parts of U.N. Resolution 242 in the 
                                               
(1) Ibid. 
(2) Camp David 1979 Peace Agreements, Amman: Dar el-Jalil. (1984). 
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West Bank, the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, the Arabs rule of East Jerusalem, 
and what the nature of the final agreement would be (1). 
 
 In general, the negotiations resulted in two main agreements between Egypt and Israel: 
the first agreement, which was signed on September 17, 1978, functioned as a frame work 
agreement that was mainly concerned with peace in the Middle East according to UN 
resolutions 338 and 242. This framework agreement comprised the basics for peace not 
only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and other neighboring Arab 
countries. Each neighboring country could negotiate its concerns with Israel separately 
based on this agreement in order to achieve peace. The main points of this agreement 
concerning the West Bank and Gaza were: first, the transfer of authority from Israel to the 
Palestinians (Autonomy) in West Bank and Gaza should be arranged with the Israeli 
government and must be completed within five years. Second, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan 
would agree on the methods of establishing the authority of the elected autonomous 
government in the West Bank and Gaza; this would be followed by a joint committee from 
Egypt, Jordan, and some Palestinians from the occupied territories. Third, after the 
establishment of this authority, the transition period (five years) would begin and the 
negotiation for final status of the West Bank and Gaza starts in the third year. Jordan and 
Israel would sign a peaceful treaty at the end of the five year transitional period (2). 
 
 As for the relations between Egypt and Israel, they had agreed on several issues (3), but 
the main ones are: first, both countries pledge not to resort to violence in resolving any 
remaining disputed issues, but to adopt peaceful approaches in accordance with Article 33 
in the United Nation Charter. Second, both parties agree to negotiate with good will aiming 
at reaching a final agreement within three months from signing this framework agreement. 
Third, both countries would seek finding the chances to develop their economic situations 
for the sake of contributing in establishing the atmosphere of peace, cooperation, and 
friendship as their common goal. Fourth, the U.S. would be invited to participate in the 
negotiations concerning the issues of implementing and executing these agreements within 
a scheduled time frame. Finally, the Security Council would be asked to certify these 
agreements and would guarantee that none should violate their articles, and would ask both 
                                               
(1) Caroline Lazo, Jimmy Carter on the Road to Peace, (New Jersey: Dillon Press, 1996). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) There are more than 11 points (different issues) mentioned in this agreement. 
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countries to make their policies compatible with the conditions mentioned in the 
framework (1). 
 
 The second major agreement issued on March 26, 1979 in three languages (Hebrew, 
Arabic, and English), is the final agreement between both countries. The English version 
was to be the only reference for interpretation in case of a new dispute. This peace treaty 
has nine articles (2), but the main points are: first, no more war between the two countries 
and peace would be established after signing the agreement. Second, Israel should 
withdraw all its military forces and its civilians from Sinai where Egypt would have the 
full exercise of its sovereignty up to the internationally recognized borders between Egypt 
and mandated Palestine. Third, both parties should commit to resolve all future disputes in 
a peaceful manner and would not practice any use of force against the other either directly 
or indirectly. Also, each party is responsible for prohibiting any act of threatening or 
incitement by their people who may organize or help in acting violently against the other 
party in any place. Fourth, for the sake of providing for maximum security, Egypt was not 
allowed to keep more than one division of Egyptian armed forces who will be stationed 
within an area lying around 50 kilometers east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal. 
United Nation forces would be stationed there in order to monitor the situation (performing 
normal police functions) and none of the parties had the right to remove these forces unless 
they attain the full agreement from the United Nations with the approval of all five 
permanent members of the Security Council. Fifth, Israeli ships will have the right of free 
passage through the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal. The strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba 
are international waterways; they must be open to the whole international community 
beside the freedom of navigation and over flight (3). The success of Camp David Summit in 
1979 indicates clearly how the role of U.S. as a mediator can be a very important and 
effective. If it was not for the extensive efforts of the U.S. President and his political 
strategists, this summit would not have succeeded. The U.S. imposed, indirectly a solution 
on both sides, and the achieved results were satisfactory to both of them.   
 
                                               
(1)  For more information see: The Camp David Accords of 1979: 
http://www.jerusalemites.org/facts_documents/camp_david.htm . Accessed on: May 30, 2008. 
(2) The peace treaty has nine main articles but each article consists of three or more important points. The 
researcher recommends reading all the details of this agreement to have a comprehensive understanding. 
(3) For more information see: The Camp David Accords of 1979: 
http://www.jerusalemites.org/facts_documents/camp_david.htm . Accessed on: May 30, 2008. 
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4.10 Conclusion 
 
Israel and Egypt signed a peace agreement on March, 26, 1979, under the U.S. 
patronage as a mediator. Since this peace agreement was signed, many political analysts 
agree that this treaty has succeeded in spite of all the challenges and obstacles that have 
threatened its survival. It has become the corner stone for stability and order in the region 
even though it has failed to normalize relations between the Israeli and Egyptian peoples.  
Hosni Mubarak has refused officially to visit Israel since he became the Egyptian 
president, but several Israeli political leaders have visited Egypt and maintain relations 
with the Egyptian government. 
 
Israeli ministers, including defense and foreign affairs ministers, were happy and 
enthusiastic after holding meetings with President Mubarak in Cairo and some other places 
such as Sharm El Seikh and Alexandria. Egypt, which is the largest country in the Arab 
World, has an important role in granting the legitimacy of the political maneuvers of the 
regional players. Israel knows very well the political weight of Egypt and that is why it 
avoids any provocative statements or actions that might jeopardize the relationship 
between the two countries.  
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Chapter Five 
 Case Study 2: Camp David 2000 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Camp David Summit 2000 between Israelis and Palestinians is considered to be 
the first major negotiation between the two parties since the 1993 Oslo accords. It focused 
on negotiating the final status issues remained as real obstacles to a final agreement: final 
borders and Israel’s security concerns, Israeli settlements, the Right of Return for the 
Palestinian refugees, and the final status of Jerusalem. The Summit was ultimately 
unsuccessful; the results of Camp David 2000 and the reasons behind its failure have 
become one of the most controversial issues among researchers and political analysts.  
 
The Summit started on July 11 and ended on July 25, 2000 during which 
representatives of the three participant parties (Israel, USA, and Palestinians) exerted their 
best efforts to succeed, but unfortunately were unable to do so. Both Israelis and 
Palestinians mutually blamed each other for the failure of the talks which the Israelis 
claimed that they made a generous offer; the Palestinians responded that they were not 
offered enough. Because of the U.S. reaction to the failure and President Clintons’ own 
statements of blame aired on international news channels, most of the blame and criticisms 
for the failure of the summit were leveled at PA President Yasser Arafat. Nonetheless, a 
trilateral statement was issued that defined the agreed principles to guide future 
negotiations.  
 
This section will present the historic circumstances that provided the environment for 
peace talks, and will discuss the drastic transformation in PLO rhetoric towards dealing 
with Israel. Several major events took place in the last two decades which influenced 
Palestinian political culture. These political events became major factors in transforming 
the policies of the Palestinian leadership and rhetoric from violent to peaceful. Further, this 
section will discuss, separately, several important factors that caused the failure of the 
negotiations. 
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5.2 1982 Lebanon war  
 
The Lebanon War started in the first week of June, 1982, when Israel launched a full 
incursion (land, air, and sea) into Lebanese territories. Israel managed to occupy 
approximately one third of Lebanese territory ending up in areas next to Lebanon’s capital, 
Beirut. The original plan, coordinated with the U.S. administration, called for Israeli troops 
to undertake a 25 mile incursion to wipe out PLO positions in Southern Lebanon. Israel 
managed to harm the Syrian army by destroying many of its military air forces and the 
Syrian military installations in Bekaa Valley. Also, Israel managed to destroy the military 
bases of the PLO in the south. The war lasted approximately 80 days (the longest and most 
controversial war) (1), and after fierce battles in West Beirut, the PLO agreed to a 
withdrawal agreement, and its members moved on to Tunisia. The American Ambassador 
Philip Habib mediated a peaceful PLO force withdrawal from Lebanon and through his 
marathon diplomatic trips in the region; he managed to convince Israel to agree to permit 
the Palestinian forces to leave Beirut with only their personal weapons as a gesture of 
flexibility. However, this result was a major set-back for Yasser Arafat and his Fatah 
movement (the dominant party in the PLO) since it became obvious that the shadow of 
“Armed Struggle” against Israel adopted by Fatah started to fade away and vanish (2). 
 
 Arafat and his troops were evacuated mainly to Tunisia as well as some other Arab 
countries, for example Yemen. As a result, Arafat realized that PLO policy had to change. 
He felt that Arab and the Soviet support was not enough to carry on. Arafat returned in 
1983 to Tripoli (Lebanese city) in order to support the late Abu Jihad (second in charge in 
Fatah) who had not been expelled from Lebanon. On his way back to Tunisia he decided to 
stop by Egypt. He made a historical visit to the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Several 
Palestinian leaders were frustrated with Arafat’s visit to Egypt. They accused him of 
violating the rules of the Palestinian National Council (PNC). By visiting Egypt, Arafat 
broke the siege imposed on Egypt by the Arab countries since 1978, and allowed several 
moderate Arab states to revive their diplomatic relations with Egypt. Furthermore, this 
                                               
(1) There was, for the first tine, a widespread debate within Israel about the War in Lebanon due to the high 
number of civilian causalities. In March 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted unanimously for a full troop 
withdrawal from Lebanon by July 2000. 
(2) Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination, (Illinois: 
University of Illinois Press, 1989). 
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historic visit marked a transformation in the Palestinian rhetoric towards dealing with the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
 
5.3 Declaration of Independence Conference (Algiers Declaration) 1988 
 
The Declaration of Independence written on Nov.15, 1988 by the Palestinian poet 
Mahout Darwish (1), was an important event in the Palestinians’ political life since their 
leadership, for the first time in Palestinian history, clearly recognized Israel’s right to exists 
as a state in peace with the future independent Palestinian state. Furthermore, The 
Palestinian leadership rejected violence and terrorism by both Palestinians and those who 
attack Palestinians. They renounced terrorism as a means of fighting for their rights to 
solve the conflict. The PLO officially declared termination of their armed struggle and its 
goal of eliminating the State of Israel. They accepted the idea of living in a separate 
Palestinian state next to Israel rather than instead of it. The declaration recognized all 
United Nations resolutions related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically both UN 
Resolutions 242 and 338. Resolution 242 called on Israel to withdraw from territories it 
occupied in the 1967 Six Day War, and on Palestinians to recognize Israel. Resolution 338, 
initially a resolution calling for a cease-fire in October War, called for immediate 
negotiations and all sides to seek “a just and durable peace in the Middle East” (2). These 
resolutions formed the foundation of post declaration of independence PLO policy. 
 
 In April 1989, the Palestinian Central Council appointed Arafat to be the President 
“Palestine”. In May 1989 Arafat visited France to establish diplomatic relations with a 
western country; he announced, during this visit, that the provision related to the 
destruction of Israel in the Palestinian National Charter is null and void. The charter, which 
was formed and declared in 1964, and amended in 1968, had become an important symbol 
of Palestinian history. Thus, the cancellation of one of the main provisions (destruction of 
Israel) was a major step in transforming Palestinian political strategy. As for the U.S. role: 
were it not for the pressure applied by the Reagan administration on the Palestine 
                                               
(1) Mahmoud Darwish was a Palestinian poet, essayist and political activist whose voice was among the most 
powerful in late 20th century Arab literature. He spoke for two generations of Palestinians mostly abandoned 
by the Arab world, and oppressed by Israel. 
(2) For more information see: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, at: 
http://middleeast.about.com/od/arabisraeliconflict/f/me081115e.htm . October 17, 2008. 
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Liberation Organization, the Palestinian National Council would not have declared a 
cessation of the armed struggle against Israel and would not have adopted UN Resolution 
242 (1). 
 
 The Palestinian recognition of 242 Resolution opened the channel of communications 
between the U.S. and PLO after 13 years of a diplomatic impasse. As a result of this 
recognition, and primarily due to PLO renouncement of violence, the U.S. removed the 
PLO from the list of terrorist organizations. Although not officially recognizing the PLO as 
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the U.S. accepted the fact that 
the PLO represents the majority of the Palestinians. Therefore, the U.S. decided to 
communicate directly with the organization and exert pressure on Israel to start negotiating 
with the Palestinian leadership.  The Palestinian Declaration of Independence helped warm 
relation with the incoming Bush administration. It was used by Secretary of State James 
Baker to steer Israelis toward the Madrid Peace conference of 1991that took place few 
months after the Gulf War. 
 
5.4 Gulf War (1990-1991) 
 
The Gulf War (August 2, 1990-Febreuary 28, 1991), authorized by the United Nations, 
was launched to liberate Kuwait after Iraq’s occupation in August 1990. The United 
Nations approved the formation of a military coalition force from 34 different nations. The 
majority of the international military forces were from the United States, Saudi Arabia, 
Britain, and Egypt. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops was met with an immediate 
preparation for war by the U.S. and some allies such as Britain and Canada. The war 
against Iraq resulted in the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and was considered as a 
decisive victory for the coalition forces. In a move to destabilize the coalition by alienating 
the Arab members in the coalition, Iraq launched missiles against Israel in order to 
precipitate retaliation from Israel. Even though Israel had threatened to retaliate, it abided 
by the U.S. orders not to fall into the trap set by the Iraqis. 
The Palestinians publicly supported Iraq during its war against Kuwait and even after 
Iraq’s defeat. Several were seen on their rooftops cheering the Scud missiles launched by 
                                               
(1)  Ibid. 
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Iraq on Israel territories. Once the war began, the PLO Executive Committee reaffirmed its 
support for Iraq: "The Palestinian people stand firmly by Iraq's side." The following day, 
Arafat sent a message to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein hailing Iraq's struggle against 
"American dictatorship" and describing Iraq as "the defender of the Arab nation, of 
Muslims and of free men everywhere" (1).  
The PLO and Libya were the only members of the Arab League who opposed an Arab 
resolution calling for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Palestinian leadership in the West 
Bank and Gaza congratulated Saddam Hussein and referred to the occupation of Kuwait as 
the first step toward liberation from the Israeli occupation. Arafat was concerned about the 
mass U.S. troops heading to engage in a military conflict with Iraq. According to a 
Palestinian news paper, Arafat called this a “new crusade” that conveyed the gravest 
dangers and disasters for the Arab nation (2). 
 
 Media coverage of Palestinians declaring their support for Saddam caused a significant 
international and regional loss of support for the Palestinian case, particularly by Arab Gulf 
countries. The Saudis and other Gulf states cut off financial aid that was vital to the 
existence of PLO. Despite the downfall of PLO status, its main concern continued to focus 
on the attainment of independence. After the invasion of Iraq, and during his post-tour of 
the Middle East, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker expressed interest in receiving 
Palestinian political delegations. The PLO, earlier, presented a Step-by-Step strategy in 
order to achieve its nation’s main goal of independent statehood. It needed the UN-
protection and their role in safeguarding the Palestinian rights and lives. The 1987 intifada  
gained the support and the sympathy of the international community from its first day on 
December 9, 1987; it seemed that it became the most promising thing for the Palestinians 
to do (3). 
 The U.S. asked their Arab allies to aid the Palestinians in an effort to encourage them 
pursuing in the peace talks. Economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza seriously 
deteriorated since the Gulf War. The Saudis and a number of Arab governments, including 
the United Arab Emirates, Morocco and Egypt refused to pay taxes collected on 
Palestinian workers living in their borders to the PLO. Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, spokesperson 
                                               
(1) For more information see: Gulf War 1990-1991,  France-Press Agency, February 26, 1991. 
(2) East Jerusalem.: Sawt al-Sha'b Newspaper. September 4, 1990. 
(3) Ibid. 
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for the Palestinian delegation to the peace negotiations, confirmed then that the United 
States had to keep its promise in helping to get the funds flowing again. Dr. Ashrawi hinted 
that continued Palestinian participation could hinge on whether the payments are delivered 
“It’s at a very critical stage right now." Dr.Ashrawi said, referring to the aid pledge from 
Gulf States. "If it's not kept now, things could fall apart still" (1). 
 As for Israel, the Gulf War increased Israel's importance to the United States. Israel 
remained uninvolved, but had the American position become jeopardized, it would have 
had Israel as an ally. Israel also benefited from destroying the Iraqi’s military capability 
that was forming a direct threat to the Israelis. The U.S.-led coalition succeeded in 
weakening one of the major regional enemies of Israel, this subsequently changed the 
power balance between Israel and the “Arab Armies”. Israel became a stronger foe to the 
PLO, so the Palestinian leadership had to change its strategy by searching for more 
peaceful approaches to resolve their conflict. In 1990, Arafat announced that he was 
holding secret talks with the Israelis, and that they would attend the 1991 Madrid Peace 
Conference held under the patronage of both the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.  In 
addition, Secretary of State James Baker made several trips after the war to the Middle-
East; these trips succeeded in producing this Conference in October 1991. Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria as well as Palestinian delegations from the Occupied 
Territories participated in this conference. The war caused an increased Arab readiness to 
participate in such peaceful dialogue. By not retaliating against Iraq, Israel helped to bring 
these Arab countries to sit with the Israeli delegations at the same negotiating table. 
5.5 Madrid Peace Conference 1991 
 
On October 30, 1991, the Madrid Conference was hosted by Spain and lasted for three 
days. It was co-sponsored by the U.S. and USSR. This conference is considered by many 
researchers as the first serious attempt by the international community to start a peace 
process. It was, as mentioned earlier, the first time that Israelis and Palestinians started 
peaceful negotiations about the conflict. After the Gulf War, President George H.W.Bush 
and Secretary of State James Baker established the framework of objectives and, with the 
                                               
(1) See: U.S. Asked Saudis to Aid Palestinians, Steven A. Holmes. Published on: April 29, 1993 at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/29/world/us-asked-saudis-to-aid-palestinians.html. 
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approval of the former Soviet Union, sent a letter of invitation to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel, 
and the Palestinians. Due to Israeli objection, the Palestinian team was formed initially as a 
joint Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation, and the Palestinians had to be inhabitants of the West 
Bank and Gaza. This demand by Israel reflected the rejection of dealing with the PLO 
directly; however, the delegation was in constant communication with the PLO leadership in 
Tunisia. The Palestinian negotiating team was led by Dr. Haidar Abdel-Shafi, but counseled 
by an advisory committee that maintained contact with the PLO representatives. The PLO 
dispatched the Palestinian Jerusalemite resident Faisal Husseini to lead the unofficial 
“advisory delegation”. The main purpose of the conference was to serve as an opening forum 
for the participants. It had no power to impose solutions or making official agreements. 
However, according to Aaron Miller, the Madrid conference “was the first American-
brokered success in the Middle East in twelve years” (1). 
 
 Immediately after the last day of the conference, bilateral talks were held in Madrid 
between Israel and each of the Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations.  
Israel finally agreed to meet with the Palestinians separately from the Jordanians, and the 
multilateral talks commenced in 1992 in Moscow. The negotiations were important on a 
symbolic level even though there were not many practical results. There were several 
multilateral working groups that were convened to lay the ground work for cooperative 
regional projects such as arms control, water, environment, economic development, and 
the “intractable” conflict over Palestinian refugees. These bilateral talks were essentially 
halted by the surprising announcement of the Oslo Agreement in August 1993. 
 
5.6 Oslo Accords 1993 
 
After six months of secret talks in Oslo, both Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin signed in Washington the Oslo Accords. The Declaration of Principles (DOP) on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements issued on September 13, 1993 was a result of a 
long and complicated phase of secret negotiation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
The secret Channel started with Ahmad Qurei who received Mahmoud Abass’s approval in 
the early stages of the talks. After consulting with Arafat, Qurei attained the endorsement 
                                               
(1) Aaron Miller, The Too Much Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, ( New 
York; Bantam dell, a division of Random House inc. 2008)  p.195. 
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of Arafat who did not consider it a significant effort at the beginning. Arafat started to be 
more concerned about these secret talks after being informed that Rabin himself was aware 
of these efforts and was indirectly involved. Rabin was asking questions about the 
Palestinian position; this motivated Arafat to give the talks more significance (1).  
 
This agreement became a prominent transformational point in the history of the 
“Palestinian Case”. Palestinians were granted autonomy in Jericho and Gaza, in exchange 
for recognition the state of Israel.  The Norwegian government played the role of “the 
mediator” by sponsoring the negotiation process through hosting both parties, and 
attempting to facilitate between them. Norway tried to stay neutral, so it left the parties by 
themselves to negotiate their goals and demands, and it mainly did not interfere directly 
unless it was based on the parties’ request. The introduction of Oslo Accords states: 
 
“The government of the State of Israel and the PLO team ( in the Jordanian –Palestinian 
delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference), the“ Palestinian Delegation” representing the 
Palestinian people , agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, 
recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence 
and mutual dignity and security  and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement 
and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process” (2). 
 
Both parties have agreed in regard to the resolution of the disputes on the following: 
 
”1. Disputes arising out of the [application] or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles or 
any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be resolved by negotiations 
through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above. 
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of 
conciliation to be agreed upon by parties. 
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes to the interim period, which cannot be 
settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will 
establish an Arbitration Committee” (3).  
 
According to Galia Golan, the word “Oslo”, as a title, includes actually several 
agreements since those several various agreements formulate what is known as “The Oslo 
                                               
(1) Al Quds Newspaper : November, 26, 2008, p.21.  
(2) For more information see: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, at: 
http://www.historycentral.com/Israel/Documents/Oslo.html. Accessed on: January 17, 2007. 
(3) For more information see the Declaration of Principles Agreement. 
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Accords”. She summarized the agreements that made up what is called “The Oslo 
Accords” as follows: 
 
· “Letters of Mutual  Recognition  Between Israel and the PLO-9,10 September 1993 
· Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Agreement (“Oslo I”)-13 September 
1993 
· [Paris] Protocol on Economic Relations-29 April 1994 
· Agreement on Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area  (“Cairo Agreement”)-4 May 1994 
· Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities-29 August 1994  
(additional agreement 28 August 1995) 
· Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip(“Oslo II)-28 
September 1995 
·  Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron-15 January 1996 
· Wye River Memorandom-23 October 1998 
· Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandom-4 September 1999” (1).  
 
As a result of this agreement, many Palestinians returned to their homeland. This 
would not have happened if the Oslo negotiations had failed. After struggling against Israel 
for over a half century, the Oslo Accords at the time were perceived as the first step toward 
the Palestinian reclaiming of their home land and establishment of Palestinian statehood. 
The Oslo Accords basically aimed to set in motion a process that would end up gradually 
with a Permanent Status Agreement (PSA) between Israel and the PLO.  
 
According to Oslo Accords, all issues, especially those that are particularly sensitive 
and problematic, were to be placed on the negotiating table. The Oslo Agreement 
represents the link between the era of conflict and the era of peace. However, the 
agreement failed to address several difficult issues, such as freezing the construction of the 
settlements, the refugees’ right of return, and the final status of Jerusalem. The period of 
the implementation of the agreement and the results of the negotiations on permanent 
status were supposed to represent the foundation for a comprehensive and lasting peace 
agreement. However, Ron Pundak explained that it would be inaccurate to conclude that 
the Oslo process and the options it offered for a permanent status agreement “were faulty 
                                               
(1) Galia Golan, Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement, (New 
Jersey: Markus Weiner Publications, 2008), pp: 13-14. 
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by design”. The Oslo approach and its objective were not implemented as had been 
planned; therefore, Oslo Accords should not yet be discounted (1). 
 
In general, the Oslo process brought about an historical change in the Israeli-Arab 
conflict, including the peace agreement with Jordan and a process of recognizing Israel’s 
legitimacy by the Arab world. The process created an Israeli-Palestinian consensus on a 
two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and on a process of reconciliation founded on 
a fair agreement and common future interests.  
 
5.7 Wye River Memorandum of 1998 
 
The assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 represented the 
deterioration of Israeli peaceful policy. By Benjamin Netanyahu winning the election the 
following year, the right wing extremists in Israel who opposed the Oslo agreement 
became stronger. All negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians became 
difficult when the Israeli Likud Party rose to power in the Israeli government. Netanyahu 
was one of the primary Israeli opponents to “Oslo Agreement”. He considered it a disaster 
for Israel’s future. The new elected Israeli government led by Netanyahu expressed their 
perspective towards the peace process by demanding that the two sides should work on the 
principle of “Security of Israel for peace” instead of “land for peace”. They also pushed for 
the annulment of Oslo agreement, and the freeze of developing Palestinian autonomy. In 
short, Netanyahu adopted several “No’s”: 1. No Palestinian State. 2. No surrendering the 
Golan Heights. 3.  No division of Jerusalem (2). 
 
During the rule of the Likud party, the Israeli army killed and injured several 
Palestinians in 1996 (Jerusalem Intifada), delayed the redeployment of the Israeli armed 
forces from Hebron, and postponed the final status negotiations. After several belligerent 
actions by Netanyahu against the peace process, the U.S. had to intervene. Clinton invited 
both Arafat and Netanyahu for a meeting in order to resolve the dispute, but this small 
summit failed because of the Israeli refusal to commit to the implementation of the Oslo 
Agreement. The Hebron issue was resolved after several months of tough negotiations and 
                                               
(1) Dr. Ron Pundak., “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” Survival: Vol.43.No.3, (Autumn 2001). 
(2) Ahammed Qurie’, Mufawatdat Oslo 1993[Oslo Negotiations1993], (Beirut: Mu’assasat el-Derasat el- 
Falestieniyyeh, 2005). 
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extensive American efforts with the constant coordination of the Egyptian leadership. The 
Palestinians started to wonder about the objectivity of the U.S. as a mediator, since the 
nature and the details of the Hebron agreement reflected that Israel was dictating its 
demands to the U.S. who was accepting of the Israeli conditions. The U.S. abandoned the 
main principles of “Oslo Agreement” which was finalized under its patronage. Clinton 
declared, in a press conference, that the principle of land for peace is not accepted by Israel 
and the time had come to change it to the security of Israel for peace (1). 
 
 Netanyahu took advantage of the letter that was sent by Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher assuring him of the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel. He continued 
the building of the Israeli settlements and made several political statements against the 
peace process. The Palestinian leadership became very frustrated with the Israeli policies, 
and believed that the U.S. was not acting as genuine mediator. The PA announced that it 
would freeze all diplomatic relations with the Israeli government after the Israeli 
government allowed the building of 6500 new apartments at“Abu Ghnaim Mt.”  in 
Jerusalem. 
 
The U.S. leadership became embarrassed by Netanyahu and his government’s actions; 
Clinton became more assertive with Netanyahu and asked him to join Arafat in another 
meeting. Based on the invitation of President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat held a Middle East summit in Maryland on October 23, 
1998. Both sides signed a memorandum in a ceremony that was also attended by King 
Hussein of Jordan. This summit gave the impression that there would not be a full 
agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians on all the issues. Israel was concerned 
with security issues where the Palestinians were accused of allowing the use of illegal 
weapons while the PA was accusing Israel of not complying with the redeployment of its 
military forces in the occupied territories. Therefore, there was a need for a third party: the 
U.S. leadership asked the CIA to act as a monitor and arbiter on the security issues. The 
CIA was given the authority to report the contradictions between both sides about their 
interpretations of compliance. Both sides were accusing each other of not being in 
                                               
(1) Ahammed Qurie’, Mufawatdat Camp David (Taba and Stockholm) 1995-2000 [Camp David 
Negotiations], (Beirut: Mu’assasat el-Derasat el- Falestieniyyeh, 2007). 
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compliance with the timeline for implementation. Delays in implementation led to a new 
timetable implemented at the Sharm el-Sheikh conference in 1999 (1). 
 
5.8. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum in 1999 
 
The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum was signed on September 4, 1999 in Egypt by Yasser 
Arafat and the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak under the patronage of 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah of Jordan, and U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright. The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum reaffirmed the commitment of 
both sides to full implementation of all previous agreements set forth by Oslo Agreement 
in 1993. This summit was held in an attempt to resolve all outstanding issues set in the 
Wye River agreement. The goal was to build a bridge between the completion of the 
interim period and the permanent final status negotiations. 
 
 This summit discussed the obligations of both parties in order to put the timetable of Wye 
agreement back on track. The Israeli government again asked the PA to commit to its 
agreement on suppressing terrorist acts and to control other Palestinian groups. Israel 
claimed that the PA had been ignoring and constantly violating their security obligations. 
The PA asked that the Israeli government must release the Palestinian prisoners as had 
been agreed upon, it also asked for the redeployment of  the Israeli military forces which 
had been over due step according to the previous agreements. Both Wye River and Sharm 
el-Sheikh agreements were held based on the request of the third party (the mediator), 
which was the U.S. administration under Bill Clinton presidency. Clinton built a better 
understanding of the conflict during these consecutive summits and became more 
personally involved in the process. However, both summits were held as a result of the 
lack of a basic stage in conflict resolution that is “trust building”. Both sides lost the trust 
of each other and this is where the U.S. had to intervene frequently in an attempt to rebuild 
trust between the two parties. This deteriorating situation in the region raised Clinton’s 
concern about the stability and continuity of his diplomatic efforts that had led to Oslo 
Agreement. As the gap between Israelis and Palestinians widened, and Clinton’s 
                                               
(1) Ibid. 
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presidency neared its end, Clinton made a final and inevitable push to establish Israeli-
Palestinian peace (1).  
 
5.9 Negotiations at Camp David (July 11-25, 2000) 
 
Clinton planned, in consultation with the Israelis (2), to invite both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians to hold a major summit that would allow them to tackle the most problematic 
but core issues in order to end the conflict. Clinton informed Yasser Arafat of his intention 
to hold the summit. Arafat advised Clinton of not expediting the negotiation process by 
suggesting that both sides hold preliminary negotiations but Clinton rejected Arafat’s 
suggestion. Arafat warned and he reiterated his warning more than once that the time was 
not ripe to hold final and permanent status negotiation. Aaron Miller said that the U.S. 
administration faced a problem with Arafat in holding Camp David summit: 
 
“Arafat did not want to come to the summit. He genuinely feared that Ehud Barak would set a 
trap that would force him to make a decision. Worse, he did not wish to be put in a position in 
which he would have to say no to the president on a substantive issue such as Jerusalem or 
refugees. At the same time, he did not want to say no to Clinton on process by actually refusing 
to show up at the summit meeting” (3).  
  
However, Clinton ignored Arafat’s warnings and decided to officially invite the two 
sides to meet at Camp David; he announced his invitation to Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak 
on July 5, 2000. He informed Arafat that Barak had new initiatives and a surprising offer, 
which would be a rare opportunity for Palestinians. Even though the U.S. administration 
was well aware of the low level of the personal trust between Arafat and Barak, it insisted 
on holding the summit hoping that Barak would surprise the participants with his 
mysterious “generous offer” as he had promised (4). 
 
 The U.S. leadership actually believed that there was something new to be offered by 
Barak and that there was a golden opportunity to reach a final agreement. Arafat received 
                                               
(1) Ibid. 
(2) Clinton called for the summit after he had been informed by Barak that he had new initiatives.   
(3) Aaron Miller, The Too Much Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, (New 
York; Bantam , 2008) , p.69. 
(4) Ahammed Qurie’, Mufawatdat Camp David (Taba and Stockholm) 1995-2000 [Camp David Negotiations], 
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assurances from Clinton that no one in particular would be held responsible should the 
negotiations fail to reach an agreement. The U.S. also thought that the Palestinians’ anger 
over the procrastination by the Israelis would vanish after reaching a satisfactory final 
agreement. The U.S. leadership chose to pressure Israel to accelerate their efforts in 
tackling the core and final issues instead of dealing with temporary issues. Many “stories” 
were written about what had happened in Camp David 2000, and many concluded that the 
Palestinians would not abandon their famous habit of “seizing the opportunity to miss an 
opportunity”. The Israelis claim that they offered a historic, generous proposal, but “as 
usual” the Palestinian leadership turned it down. In short, only Arafat is to be blamed for 
the failure in reaching the final agreement at Camp David 2000 (1).    
 
 The negotiations at this summit concentrated mainly on the most complicated 
problematic issues that were very important for both sides. The borders of a Palestinian 
state as well as the fate of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees, and the Israeli security 
concerns were the core issues that the two sides had to tackle at Camp David 2000 
negotiations. Ahmad Qurei led the Palestinian committee that was formed to negotiate the 
issues of territory, security, and borders. The Palestinian delegations reaffirmed that the 
land and the borders issues do not actually need to be thoroughly discussed since UN 
resolutions 338 and 242 were very clear about these issues and they should form the basic 
common ground for both sides. Qurei pointed out that the only issues that needed to be 
discussed were the issues of the “possible” land swap and security measures. Besides, The 
Palestinian delegations were aware of the danger of keeping the Israeli settlements within 
their borders but under Israeli control (overlapped jurisdictions), so they demanded that 
any final settlement must guarantee that most of the Israeli settlements be within the 
borders of the state of Israel and not within the borders of the Palestinian state based on 
Resolution 242. The Israelis presented maps that require the annexation of more significant 
Palestinian lands without offering any land swap. Moreover, Israel asked to lease for a long 
term part of the lands that surround Jordan’s Valley to be used by the Israelis as a “security 
zone” (2). 
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In short, after refusing to transfer some of the lands, demanding to lease other parts, 
claiming the need of keeping some parts for security reasons (Control, Lease, and 
Annexation), and demanding to hold on to the four largest settlement blocks of Modi’in, 
Ma’ali Adumim, Ariel, and Etzion, it is clear that Israel asking for the annexation of 
approximately an extra 25% of the Palestinian Occupied Territories. This, of course, does 
not include the Jerusalem area that, according to the Israelis, is not part of the West Bank, 
but it is part of the “No Man’s Land” which was marked in the Armistice Agreements in 
1948-1949. When Qurei rejected the Israeli claims and maps, Bill Clinton accused him of 
not being a straight and honest negotiator, and threatened to stop the negotiations and 
cancel the summit. According to Clayton E. Swisher, Barak’s plan to hold on to these large 
settlements: “Would have functionally divided the Palestinian state into three 
noncontiguous sections, denying Palestinians the ability to exercise and enforce 
governmental and security functions, develop a coherent economic policy, or promote 
development opportunities” (1). 
 
In general, the negotiations about all the basic issues continued at Camp David without 
any progress. Reaching an agreement on the Palestinian rights recognized as legitimate by 
the international community. In particular, the UN Resolution 242 (the basic ground for 
Madrid Conference and the main factor behind reaching Oslo agreements), was not 
possible to be carried out because of the Israeli strong rejecting stance towards these 
issues. The Palestinians sought for the establishment of a Palestinian state based on their 
understanding of Resolution 242, while the Israelis, as mentioned above, and interpreted it 
differently. The decision about this particular issue was the basic disagreement between 
both sides. Barak was determined not to withdraw to 1967 borders, not to dismantle the 
Israeli settlements established within the 1967 borders, not to give up parts of Jerusalem, 
and to demilitarizing the West Bank and Gaza. Arafat insisted on the full Israeli 
withdrawal from the 1967 areas including East Jerusalem, and recognizing of the right of 
return for Palestinian refugees (2). 
 
 Clinton was always initiating “new ideas” but those ideas were very compatible with 
the Israeli proposals. Instead of being an honest broker, he was overly biased toward Israeli 
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demands and conditions. Arafat was offered from 90% to 96% of the West bank with the 
annexation of 1% to 3% in Israel territories; this would give the Palestinians the 
opportunity to establish their state on approximately 97% of the West Bank where Israel 
would be allowed to keep the main settlements with 80% of the Israeli settlers. This 
narrative contradicts the Palestinian claim of Israel annexing an extra 25% of the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories. 
 
However, Gamal Helal (special Middle East coordinator and Arabic language 
interpreter for Clinton) was interviewed by Clayton Swisher on July 17, 2002; Helal 
described that one of the ideas discussed in his presence was about the idea of swapping 
territories. He said: 
 
“Israel could annex areas where there are settlement blocks, and in exchange the Palestinians get 
some territories from Israel proper. Contiguity was an issue. But the Palestinians were willing to 
go around it conditional on Israeli flexibility- the land had to be equal in size and quality….The 
Palestinians showed flexibility that they would swap territories 1:1. However, the Israelis were 
not willing to go 1:1. They wanted a land grab of 1:6, 1:7, or 1:8” (1).  
 
As for Jerusalem, it would be under both the Israeli and Palestinian jurisdiction and the 
refugees would have several choices, their acceptance in Israel would be decided by the 
Israeli government. The U.S. role, according to Dennis Ross, was conciliating between the 
symbolic needs for the Palestinians and the practical needs for the Israelis; he indicated 
that the U.S. was adopting the strategy of meeting the symbolic needs for the Palestinians 
while taking into consideration the true and legitimate security concerns of Israel (2). 
 
 Therefore, Arafat was pressured by the U.S. administration, especially on the fate of 
Jerusalem. The U.S. administration asked the Palestinian leadership to accept the division 
of Jerusalem. The U.S. used the pretext of the so-called “Legal Responsibilities” of 
administering Al Aqsa Mosque in the holy city between the two sides. “As all the issues 
came into focus, the status of the Haram al-Sharif/ Temple Mount was identified as the 
most important, make-or-break point for both sides” (3). Gallia Golan agreed with Clayton 
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Swisher on this particular issue: she, too, concluded that the issue of Jerusalem was the 
main reason behind the failure of Camp David 2000: 
 
“In general, it could be said that the issue on which Camp David failed was (East) Jerusalem, 
and particularly the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. There was not necessarily agreement on all 
the other issues-refugees, borders, security-but two sides appeared to come quite close to 
agreement on these matters…with the Jerusalem issue was the one that prevented the drafting of 
a final agreement of any kind” (1).   
 
Clinton persuaded Arafat to agree on the presented ideas suggesting that Arafat’s dreams 
would finally be achieved. He even promised to stand beside Arafat while raising the new 
Palestinian flag considering that this would be a historic moment in Arafat’s life (2).  
According to Quandt, Clinton had pursued his last effort to convince Arafat to become more 
flexible; however, Arafat, after few hours, responded that he could not agree on the 
settlements proposed by Clinton. On Tuesday, July 25, 2000 Clinton officially declared the 
end of the Summit and explained that Barak was more flexible and serious in achieving the 
goals than his Palestinian partner. On July 28, interviewed by the Israeli media (television) 
Clinton reaffirmed his support for Barak, and warned Arafat against declaring the State of 
Palestine. He even threatened to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem before 
the end of the year (3). 
 
 The Palestinians witnessed a new painful reality on a policy of increased U.S. 
pressure. They were suspicious about the whole process since they had felt that the offered 
plan was the result of a joint coordination between the U.S. and the Israelis. According to 
Qurei, Arafat had suspected this plan in advance when before going to Camp David; he 
told the U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright that negotiations would explode in the 
President’s face. The only reason behind Arafat joining the Israelis and the Americans in 
the summit was to avoid U.S. anger and frustration. The Americans failed to build better 
relations between Arafat and Barak due to Barak’s refusal. Even though the U.S. team 
refused to accept the Israelis demand by attacking Arafat on the international level, they 
                                               
(1) Galia Golan. Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement. (New 
Jersey: Markus Weiner Publications, 2008), p.38. 
(2)  Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s Diaries 2003. 
(3) William Quandt. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, 
(California: Brookings Institution Press and the University of California Press, 2005). 
 
 
85 
finally abided to Barak’s demands (1). According to Swisher, when Barak was on the way 
home, returning from a short break visiting Antietam and Harper’s Ferry, he expressed his 
ideas to Albright about how the summit should continue: “He wanted the President to force 
Arafat to accept his ideas before negotiations resumed. He said we should tell the 
Palestinians that the United States would sever contacts with them if they did not yield” (2).  
 
 The final result was that there was no such “a generous offer” presented by the 
Israelis. The Israelis kept protracting the discussion the core issues by being several steps 
away from proposing a true genuine offer. The ideas that were offered at Camp David were 
not even presented in a written form; all Israeli ideas were transferred orally and presented 
in general as “American or Israeli ideas”. Barak himself refused to meet with Arafat in a 
basic meeting, to avoid Arafat’s pursuance of writing down the Israeli concessions. Both 
Clinton and Barak persisted on pushing Arafat to accept these unwritten ideas as a basic 
framework for the general negotiations before getting involved in more detailed 
negotiations. The Palestinians exerted their efforts to the utmost in order to prove their 
point that they were cooperative and willing to reach a final agreement, but they were 
always portrayed as the reason behind not cooperating with the Barak’s “enormous effort”. 
They could not manage to convince the U.S. administration of their position since they did 
not cope with the “American ideas” or even put forward a “counter offer”. This led to the 
frustration and anger of the U.S. President especially when Qurei refused to negotiate 
about the content of the Israeli maps. Qurei insisted that any agreements about the lands 
should be based on the 1967 borders  (3).  
 
Obviously, one can conclude that Camp David Summit in 2000 failed. The relations 
between the Palestinian leadership and Clinton’s administration deteriorated to a very low 
level. Both sides exchanged accusations and pointed fingers at each other for being the 
cause of failed results. Arafat justified such a failure by accusing the U.S. of not acting as a 
fair and neutral mediator. According to the Palestinian leadership, the U.S. acted as a 
strong supporter of Israel against the Palestinians instead of playing its natural role as an 
honest broker. 
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Chapter Six 
 Analysis and Conclusions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
To explore the differences between both case studies, this chapter divides this topic 
into two sections. The first section will offer a selective examination of what went wrong 
at Camp David 2000 and shed light on the Palestinian perspective to which Israelis and 
Westerners are not generally exposed. The second section compares the role of both 
American Presidents Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) and Bill Clinton (1993-2001), the U.S. 
objectives in the summits, and the experience, knowledge, skills, and behaviors of both 
presidents as mediators and direct brokers.    
 
 Clinton and his team failed to design an organized and comprehensive plan for the 
summit. The Palestinians were expecting from the U.S. a “surprising solution” for the 
conflict while the Americans were counting on Barak’s government to do “the honor”. 
Clinton was optimistic about pulling a final agreement off; however, his presidential term 
was close to end. It was inevitable for Clinton to seize this historic opportunity that could 
claim himself as the only American President able to solve this long-running conflict. 
Robert Malley described the U.S. behavior at the summit like the amusement ride bumper 
cars. When the Americans hit an obstacle, they would turn some other way and try 
something new and stay with their tactic for a couple days.   
  
6.2 Analysis 
 
Clinton did not act as professional and presidential mediator, and allowed his emotions 
to interfere with negotiations (1). Clinton failed to understand that the Palestinian 
negotiating team was not truly ready to make final decisions that might be fateful to their 
leadership; besides that, the timing set for final negotiations had not prepared both 
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Palestinians and Israelis for attaining the full willingness of both communities to conclude 
a final agreement. Also, Clinton could have started these negotiations much earlier instead 
of waiting until the last months of his two terms (8 years) of presidency. Moreover, Clinton 
was not fully equipped with the correct and accurate information about the nature of 
Arafat’s personality; he was not warned that cornering Arafat will produce an opposite 
result; if cornered, Arafat will commit actions against all the requirements of any 
successful negotiations. Clinton may have realized this fact, too late, when he witnessed 
Arafat’s reaction to the siege, imposed on him by the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, 
at his headquarters (Muqata’h) in Ramallah 2003.   
 
 As for Arafat, most Palestinians were proud of him for his steadfastness and “not 
giving in” to the pressure of the U.S. and Israel. On his arrival home to the Palestinian 
territories, Arafat was received by many Palestinians with a warm welcome and was 
praised as a true leader and a “genuine hero”. Barak failed to understand the Palestinian 
perspective that Arafat had made a severe painful concession by agreeing to accept only 
22% of all Palestine (Mandatory Palestine). The Palestinian leadership was abandoned by 
the regimes of Arab countries during the negotiations under the pretext of not having been 
consulted in the process of the decision making. Arafat was pressured by the fact that a 
decision about the fate of the Holy City of Jerusalem belongs to the “Moslem World”, not 
only to the Palestinian leadership. It was a very heavy burden on the Palestinian leadership 
to make sensitive and important decisions that deal with Moslem and Christian issues such 
as the Haram al-Sharif and the Armenian Quarters, both of which the Israelis demanded to 
be under their sovereignty. 
 
 The Palestinian leadership had no trust in Barak who refused to implement the third 
redeployment of Israeli military forces, and who clearly stated his rejection of the Oslo 
Agreement. Aaron Miller talked about Barak’s reaction when asked by Terje Larsen about 
his perspective towards “Oslo”:  
 
“The Norwegian peace intermediary Terje Larsen tells a story of being invited to the new prime 
minister’s house shortly after Barak’s election. “ What are you going to do on the peace 
process?” Larsen asked Barak. “I will do the opposite of Oslo” came the reply.” You see, Terje, 
we have a dog in front of us, and this dog is very ugly. Why is it ugly?” …because it has an ugly 
tail. If we take the tail away, the dog would be beautiful. You Oslo people would chop the tail 
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off like salami. I will chop it off”………………………   “I’ll make peace with Syria, Lebanon, 
the Palestinians,” Barak concluded. “I will have the end of conflict, totally in one go” (1).  
 
According to Qurei, the three parties involved (the U.S., Israel, Palestine) had not 
planned well for Camp David summit and were not fully prepared to engage in 
negotiations that would produce a permanent status agreement (PSA). Qurei explained that 
everybody liked to claim his role in successful agreements but no one admitted his role in 
causing the failure; therefore, it is naturally that the weaker party (Palestinians) would be 
blamed. He stated that U.S. leaders and Israelis relied on their traditional perception of the 
Palestinians; the Palestinian problem, according to them, is a product of violent and 
terrorist operations. This type of perception of the Palestinian community had contributed 
in setting Barak’s strategy of negotiating at Camp David. Since Barak refused to offer any 
written offers, the U.S. mediators were functioning as post office carriers, delivering 
messages between the two sides. The U.S. team was not acting as honest brokers; they 
claimed that many of the new ideas as their own proposals when they were, according to 
Qurei, Israeli ideas (2). 
 
 Qurei has concluded that the failure of the summit was due to the following factors: 
The Israelis believed their own lie of a “Generous Offer”, but actually had not offered any 
tangible concessions on any of the core issues (Jerusalem, land, security, and refugees). As 
for the land issue, the Palestinians accepted 22% of Mandate Palestine where the U.N. 
Resolution 181 had offered them 46%. Barak had a problem with the “Oslo Accords”; he 
rejected its concept of a multi-phased strategy. He stressed an “all or nothing” approach 
even though the time was not ripe for final settlement; the level of the confidence-building 
between the two sides was extremely low. This “all or nothing” approach could have 
succeeded at Camp David had it been accompanied with a supportive environment of trust 
and hope for the Palestinians and their leadership. Barak was unable to develop a warm 
personal relation with Arafat as Peres had done when he became the prime minister of 
Israel after Rabin assassination. Not only did Barak ignore the value of a close personal 
relationship with Arafat, but he also refused to hold a one-on-one meeting with him; this 
political behavior was an enough reason for Arafat not to trust Barak. According to Dr. 
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Pundak, Arafat was quoted as saying “Barak is worse than Netanyahu.” Barak also failed 
to build or even create a good relationship with Arafat’s deputy Mahmoud Abbas (Abu 
Mazen) as an alternative to creating “chemistry” with Arafat. In other words, there was no 
relationship created which could have helped in bridging over “the difficulties and distrust 
which arose during negotiations” (1).   
 
Furthermore, Barak encountered domestic difficulties. According to Dr. Ron Pundak, 
Barak’s domestic difficulties started after the elections when he did not establish an 
organized political team for the negotiations, professionals with enough experience, e.g. 
Shimon Peres; this move was made by Barak in order to build a coalition which he thought 
would support him in reaching a final agreement. 
“He essentially excluded the Labor party leadership from the process and alienated his partners. 
In the end, the government was assembled just two days before the 45-day limit, leaving 
everyone except for Barak – who remained smiling – angry, suspicious and exhausted. He 
ruptured his relations with Uzi Baram and Ra’anan Cohen (two pillars of his party); appointed 
Yossi Beilin and Shlomo Ben Ami to positions (Justice and Internal Security) which did not 
match their qualifications and appointed Haim Ramon as a Minister of little importance in the 
Prime Minister’s Office. He also attempted to keep Peres out of the government. After forming 
the government, however, he was obliged to create a special position for Peres as Minister for 
Regional Cooperation. He tried to bypass Avrum Burg by nominating someone for the position 
of Chairman of the Knesset who had little chancing of winning, and finally bestowed ministries 
of high socio-economic importance upon coalition partners instead of his own party. In response 
to problems that emerged from coalition negotiations, Barak replied that he could not be 
pressured or blackmailed. If he blinked now, he added, it would impair his ability to negotiate 
with President Assad. 
With the establishment of the government, his course of action did not change. He managed to 
turn supporters into adversaries. He failed to resolve internal problems, addressing them only 
when they had reached a point when they could barely be solved. He handled the strike of the 
physically disabled and the teachers’ strike in a similar manner. Towards the Israeli-Arabs, of 
whom 95% had voted for him, he was condescending from the onset, establishing no framework 
for cooperation with the Arab parties or the Arab leadership on the municipal, social and 
religious levels. The problem was not one of a lack of will, honesty or vision, but rather the fact 
that Barak was the poorest of managers” (2).  
 
                                               
(1)  Ron Pundak, “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?”   Survival: Vol.43.No.3, (Autumn 2001, pp:31-
45). 
(2) Ibid., p.11. 
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Barak wanted to annex another 8% out of the 22% for security measures which it 
would make it impossible for the Palestinians to have their viable contiguous independent 
state. Even though East Jerusalem is a part of the Palestinian lands occupied in 1967, 
Barak had offered a proposal that would annex all settlements surrounding the city, 
keeping the Jewish Quarter, the Wailing Wall, and part of the Armenian Quarter under the 
Israeli jurisdiction. The Western Wall and the underground of Haram el-Sharif / Temple 
Mount would stay under the Israeli jurisdiction. As for the issue of Palestinian refugees, 
Barak denied Israeli responsibility and rejected firmly their return to their homes. Finally, 
Barak made it impossible to reach a final agreement when he demanded significant 
restrictions on the movement of Palestinians within their own state. Under the pretext of 
security measures, Barak wanted to impose Israeli sovereignty over the borders, as well as 
establish Israeli security centers and stations in the West Bank (1). 
Both the Israeli Gilead Sher, who was expecting a stronger American intervention, and 
the Palestinian Yasesr Abed Rabbo, agreed with Agha and Malley (2001) and Qurie (2007) 
on this issue; Gilead reveals that:  
 
“There was no negotiations schedule. There was no timeline for the follow-up. There was no 
proposal or counter proposal, checking on the advancement or progress”, or the other words of 
Yasser Abed Rabbo from the other side: “It was a total chaos. Every day a different meeting, 
committee, and issue. We didn’t know what our aims were: to succeed, to fail, to escape” (2).  
 
Both Hussein Agha and Robert Malley agreed with Qurei (2007) that it was easier to 
put all the blame on Arafat. The pro-Israel American media and the enormous Israeli 
propaganda had led to the wide encouraged belief among the international community that 
Barak had offered an unprecedented offer but that Arafat, instead of seizing such a rare 
opportunity, had decided to remain with his uncompromising no’s (3). 
 
Finally, Clinton’s behavior  in Camp David 2000 was clearly in contradiction with the 
characteristics of the conflict resolution approaches suggested earlier (Chapter Two) by 
Schellenberg especially point (6). It says: “…..when agreement is not reached, no blame 
for this is cast upon either party.” Clinton has put all the blame on Yasser Arafat, to an 
                                               
(1) Ibid., pp.346-351. 
(2) Aaron Miller. Op.cit. pp:300-301. 
(3) Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors. (The New York Review of 
Books :Vol.48,No.13. August 9,2001). 
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extent that he announced, in several occasions, that Arafat is the only one to blame in 
failing to consummate an agreement. Clinton claimed that Arafat was the main obstacle 
(obstructionist) who precluded reaching a final political settlement with the Israelis. 
Clinton jumped the gun on Arafat more than once during the negotiations; Arafat was 
reminded once by Madeline Albright (Former Secretary of State) that he was talking to the 
President of “the number one country” in the whole world, but Arafat reminded her that 
she was talking to the “Dean” of international liberation movements all over the world (1). 
The dialogue between Clinton and Arafat deteriorated during the last few days of Camp 
David, where it seemed that the dispute had become between both Clinton vs. Arafat 
instead of Israelis vs. Palestinians. At the personal level, Clinton stopped conversations 
with Arafat accusing him of not being the “right leader” for the Palestinians. He severed 
contacts with Arafat and even tried to humiliate him when he had visited Israel by 
declaring publicly that he definitely would not visit Arafat. Arafat was at the time under 
siege in the Palestinian headquarters (Muqatta’h) in Ramallah; the above actions are not 
representative of a neutral mediator.   
 
 According to the Palestinian Diaries from Al-Hayat and Al- Ayyam news papers, 
Clinton and Arafat had more than once engaged in inappropriate discussions that would 
violate the usual protocol between two heads of states. 
 
“In the sixth meeting Clinton told Arafat, “You are gambling with the cause and the future. 
Barak presented proposals but you take and put in your pockets” Similar attacks came from 
National Security Advisor Sandy Burger and Secretary Albright” Arafat replied: “I came here 
representing Arabs, Muslims, and Christians around the world, I came to make peace and won’t 
accept you or anyone else to put me down in history as a traitor, I invite you to my funeral 
because I have accepted to be a martyr since the start of the revolution and if I am weak now, 
someone will come in two years or five years to liberate Jerusalem and if you think that as a 
superpower you can punish us with sanctions, your sanctions will not work because we are a 
people who are already under punishment.” That night, Arafat asked the team to pack their 
bags. He was leaving the summit. Clinton then came and asked Arafat to stay. In the absence of 
Clinton, the Israelis would not come to another negotiating session. When Clinton returned, he 
asked to see Arafat, it was July 24. "I am deeply sorry, it seems that the Summit has come to a 
sad end, my heart is broken and my hopes in the peace process have been shattered. You have 
lost many chances, first in 1948 and then in 1974 and now you are destroying yourselves in 
2000. You won’t have a Palestinian state and you won’t have friendships with any one you will 
                                               
(1) Arafat talked more than once about this incident on different TV news channels in 2000 and 2001. 
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be alone in the region that is … ……President Arafat interrupts, "Don't finish, I respect you 
very much and I realize that you are affected by the Israeli position, I have led my people's 
revolution and the siege of Beirut was easier on me than the siege of Camp David, the 
revolution is easier than peacemaking. We ask for peace but that peace won’t be without a 
price, there can be no agreement without Jerusalem” (1).  
 
According to the same Diaries, Clinton’s temper was bursting with other Palestinian 
leaders, too, such as Ahmed Qurie. When Qurie rejected an Israeli map outlining the 
borders, Clinton became very furious at Qurie and asked him to produce his own map. 
Qurie responded calmly that his map is the (June 04, 1967) borders. Shlomo Ben Ami, who 
was an Israeli top negotiator during the July Camp David 2000, disagreed with Clinton on 
the issue of Arafat being the reason behind the failure of the negotiations. He said that 
Arafat was not to blame for the failure as Clinton had claimed. When Ben- Ami was asked 
whether Arafat was to blame, he answered: 
 
Retrospectively, it is possible today to put things in perspective, and it would be a mistake to get 
into that box [of accusing Arafat for the failure]. [The failure was due to] an element that is 
much more rudimentary and it relates to the 1993 Oslo Agreement. When Arafat signed the 
Oslo Agreement in 1993, his understanding was that he would eventually get all of his demands. 
This is the whole story in a nutshell. But no one bothered to give us the heads up on this 
matter...why didn't they tell us beforehand: 'guys, its worthless to go for a summit since for us 
its either all or nothing'...my argument is that there is a problem with a mythological Palestinian 
leader and leadership that presupposes it has already made its concessions” (2).  
 
Finally, the timing, again, is a very crucial factor that must be taken into consideration 
when mediating in such a complicated case. When Clayton Swisher asked Jimmy Carter 
about what he would have told Clinton if his “advice had been sought”, Carter replied: 
 
“I think Clinton did the best he could after he had been in office seven years. My advice would 
have been to make major efforts the first six months, or first year, which he did finally at Camp 
David, instead of waiting seven years…I don’t say in critical way, because he had a lot of other 
things. I think he made a genuine effort, and I think he did the best he could” (3). 
                                               
(1) See: Palestinian Diaries, Al-Hayat and Al-Ayyam. Accessed on: December 10,2008 at: 
http://homepages.stmartin.edu/Fac_Staff/rlangill/PLS%20300/Camp%20David%20Diaries.htm. 
(2) See; Shlomo Ben-Ami Diaries, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/benamidiary.html . Accessed 
on: November 18, 2008. 
(3) Clayton E. Swisher, The Truth About Camp David. New (York: Nation Books, 2004), p.355. 
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The former American President Jimmy Carter practiced a very different approach from 
Clinton while mediating in Camp David 1979. He successfully brokered an agreement 
between Egypt and Israel, in which both sides were satisfied with the results of the summit. 
Egypt gained the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai, and Israel achieved security from 
one of its most powerful adversaries; it was a “win-win situation” for both countries.  The 
question remains: why? Why did the first summit succeed while the second one failed even 
though both were mediated by the same country (U.S.A.)? 
 
 The research shows that there are several factors that existed in the late 1970s, but 
were not present in the year 2000.These factors contributed to the success of Camp David 
1979. For instance, Israel needed to make peace with Egypt as a strategy to divide the 
Arabs unity regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; it obviously managed to do so. Israel 
tried to exclude one of the three hostile fronts surrounding its borders; by reaching a 
permanent peace agreement with Egypt, Israel secured its borders from the most 
threatening neighboring Arab country. The American President Jimmy Carter indicated 
that Israel became the big winner from this summit; he said: “With the bilateral treaty, 
Israel removed Egypt’s considerable strength from the military equation of the Middle East 
and thus it permitted itself renewed freedom to pursue the goals of a fervent and dedicated 
minority of its citizens to confiscate, settle, and fortify the occupied territories” (1).   
 
The Yom Kippur War (October War) was a major factor in changing the Israelis 
attitude towards dealing with Arab states especially with Egypt. On the other hand, the 
economy in Egypt was deteriorating; Sadat was looking for U.S. financial aid as a savior to 
his country’s weak economy. He felt that he should thaw his country’s relations with the 
U.S. after the long-running conflict between the two countries when Egypt was ruled by 
Nasser.  After getting engaged in previous negotiations that produced several agreements 
such as 101 Kilometer Agreement and the Forces Disengagement Plan, both sides realized 
that they can win more through peaceful negotiations than resorting to wars. The 
“willingness” of the parties to search for a peaceful solution suggested by William Zartman 
applies very well on both Israel and Egypt. Both countries, especially Israel, felt that they 
would be in a worse situation if a peaceful agreement did not take place. Time is often the 
essence of succeeding or failing in any negotiations between adversaries. The prerequisites 
                                               
(1) Jimmy Carter, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid,  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p.52. 
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and conditions, set by various political analysts, to any successful negotiation were about 
the focus on time. The third party has to identify the precise moment when he can change 
the situation from conflict to conciliation. The situation in the region in 1979 was ripe, and 
the U.S. took advantage of this opportunity to successfully broker a peace agreement 
between Israel and Egypt. It was different in the case of Camp David Summit in 2000, 
since Clinton forced the summit based on his timeline, not based on ripeness for peace. 
 
In addition, Jimmy Carter used more diplomatic methods with Sadat than Clinton with 
Arafat. Carter built a strong personal relationship with Sadat and they became good 
friends, while Clinton resorted to a form of bullying, colonialist diplomacy that most third 
parties, including Britain, had long ago out-grown” (1). In an interview with Aaron Miller, 
Carter expressed his personal feelings about his relationship with the late Sadat, Miller 
explained: 
 
“When I asked Carter about his relationship with Sadat, the flood gates opened: “Sadat had total 
trust in me. We were kind of like brothers.” After the official state dinner at the White House, 
Carter took Sadat to the residence, where his conversation convinced him that Sadat was 
“something of a soul mate. He and I began to develop a strategy.”…Sadat recalled that he found 
Carter to be a man who understood what he wanted, “a man impelled by the power of religions 
faith lofty values- a farmer like me.” Later Carter confides to his wife, Rosalynn, that his 
meeting with Sadat has been his “best day as President” (2).   
 
This kind of relationship and this level of trust between Carter and Sadat surely 
contributed to the success of the summit. Several researchers and political analysts have 
stressed the importance of the “Trust- Building” stage; Moore (2003), Carter (2006), 
Chomsky (2006), Lazo (1996), Hass (1990), Bush and Folger (1994), Fisher and Ury 
(1991), and Pappe (2006),  have all agreed that gaining the trust of the mediator is a basic 
factor in the success of any type of negotiations. The traditional history of the 
psychological and ideological attitude of the Arabs toward the U.S. positions has been, till 
today, full of paranoia and distrust. This can, relatively, be the same case with the Western 
countries towards the Arab and the Moslem world. Both Carter and Sadat, however, 
                                               
(1) Clayton E.Swisher.Op.cit.p.304. 
(2) Aaron Miller, The Too Much Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, (New 
York; Bantam, 2008) p.165. 
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proved the opposite by bonding so strongly, even though they come from two extremely 
different cultures and two different religions (Christianity /Islam). 
 
The level of trust between Carter and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was 
very low. However, this trust gap did not stop Begin from working with Carter; Carter 
thought of Begin as an honest person. According to Miller, Carter respected Begin even 
though he did not like him personally. Miller said that: 
 
“Jody Powell believed that there was “a little bit of Begin in Carter and Carter in Begin.” Sam 
Lewis, whose ambassadorial duties included the difficult task of explaining Begin to Carter, 
believed that the president saw in Begin an honest man rough around the edges. Stuart 
Eisenstadt added that Carter empathized with Begin’s Holocaust background and that his 
primarily generous treatment of the Israeli leader made Begin more flexible than advertised” (1).  
 
President Jimmy Carter acted as a mature and professional mediator. He realized the 
importance of the impact of Holocaust on the Israelis in general and on Begin, in 
particular, since Begin had lost fifteen members of his immediate family in the Holocaust. 
Carter managed to transfer this rigid, tough, and stubborn personality into a flexible, 
understanding, and compromising man. Even though, Carter felt that Begin manipulated 
both him and Sadat during the negotiations on the settlement issue, he was satisfied 
generally with the outcome of the summit. Carter had some difficult times during the 
negotiations, but he was very determined and persistent on consummating a final peace 
agreement between the two sides: 
 
“It seems extraordinary how many intense hours I spent cooped up in the small study at the end 
of the back hall at Aspen. Some of the most unpleasant experiences of my life occurred during 
these days. The drafting of the language to be used in the final agreement was one the problems 
that exhausted Carter running back and forth between the two parties adding and deleting some 
words based on their request. 
 At the last minute, however, there was a dispute over the language in which the Sinai issue was 
to be referred to the Kenesset. After hurriedly meeting with both sides on this, Carter formulated 
a final revision on this issue. He then sent it to both parties with the instructions: “This is the 
exact language to be used. Do not use any other language on or off the record”. This was 
                                               
(1) Ibid, p.177. 
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accepted by both sides, and Carter at last realized that the Camp David discussions had been a 
success” (1).  
 
By referring to the basic characteristics of the mediator, mentioned earlier (Chapters 
two), Carter acted as a “professional mediator” while Clinton lacked the most basic 
requirements for such a skill. Even though, Carter was very patient and caring listener to 
both sides, he eventually had to impose his judgment when he asked both Sadat and Begin, 
as mentioned above, not to change or use any other language. After all, the mediator 
cannot succeed if he does not become more assertive and constructive third party. It is 
interesting to note that Carter became the U.S. President after he had campaigned as a 
supporter of Israel. In his first visit to Israel, he expressed his deep sympathy as a religious 
Christian with the Jewish state. He publicly opposed, more than once, the establishment of 
an independent Palestinian state. He supported the campaign led by the pro-Israel 
lobbyists, who were fighting the Arab-boycott of Israel. Carter attained around 75% of the 
Jewish vote and more than 60% of the main Jewish donors and supporters for the 
Democratic Party in the U.S. election in 1976 (2). But, this did not change the fact that 
Carter became one of the prominent mediators, admired and respected for his honesty and 
objectivity. Aaron Miller expressed his admiration of Carter when he said: “Whatever his 
detractors say about him, he deserves enormous credit for what he accomplished then. The 
1979 Egyptian -Israeli peace treaty was an accomplishment that remains unmatched by his 
presidential successors” (3). 
 
In addition, Carter remained active as an honest and firm mediator even after the end of 
his term as an American president, particularly when Israel attacked Lebanon in 1982, and 
he contributed effectively to ending the war.  He said:  
 
“I informed Prime Minister Menahem Begin that if Israel forces in Lebanon, I would have to 
notify Congress, as required by the law, that U.S. weapons were being used illegally in 
Lebanon, which would automatically cut off all military aid to Israel. Also, I instructed the State 
Department to prepare a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israel’s attack. Israeli 
                                               
(1) James A. Schellenberg,  Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice, ( New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1996), p.181. 
(2) Janice Terry, U.S. Foreign policy in the Middle East, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2005), p.189. 
(3) Aaron Miller. The Too Much Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace. (New 
York; Bantam, 2008) p.190. 
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forces withdrew, and the United Nations troops came in to replace them in Southern Lebanon, 
adequate to restrain further PLO attacks on Israeli citizens” (1).   
 
On the other hand, Clinton did not exert the extra effort to pursue making peace 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis. On the contrary, he caused, indirectly, the hateful 
attitude by the Palestinians towards the U.S. and its biased positions. He strongly supported 
the Israeli government in blaming the Palestinian leadership, Arafat in particular, for 
obstructing both disputed parties from reaching a final agreement, despite having given 
Arafat an important promise: “I promise you that under no circumstances will I place the 
blame of failure on you”(2). Clinton broke this promise; this has left a deep psychological 
impact on the Palestinians, in which they felt that the U.S., represented by President 
Clinton, was an extremely dishonest broker. Clinton supported the stronger party (Israelis) 
against the weak party (Palestinians) without any justification; this is what Folger and 
Bush warn against(3). Nonetheless, the Palestinians are still hoping that the U.S. will 
eventually broker a deal that will settle their conflict by being more forceful toward Israel 
than it has in the past. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
(1) Jimmy Carter, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006) p.44. 
(2) Clayton E.Swisher, The Truth about Camp David   (New York: Nations Books, 2004)  p.226. 
(3) See chapter 2, p.24. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Study Analysis  
7.1 Introduction 
 
Based on this historic analytical study, and by comparing both case studies, the Arabs 
are partially blamed for failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arabs, in general, 
and the Palestinians in particular should have a more developed role in to change the long-
standing biased position taken by the U.S. while dealing with the conflict. This capter is 
divided into two sections: the first section is about Arab-American relations and their 
perception of the concepts “fair, honest, neutral, and impartial”, while the second section 
discusses the role of Palestinian scholars.  
 
As for American-Arab relations, Arabs can improve their diplomatic skills by building 
a better relationship with the United States. This will not be possible unless Arabs study 
the U.S. political system, and understand the structure, including its decision making 
process in the State Department. In an attempt to succeed in changing the U.S. hostile 
political trend towards the Arabs, Dr. Muhammad Rabie’ suggested that Arabs must do the 
following: 
1. Focus on the common interests and values and the role of the Arab- Moslem 
Civilization in contributing to the progress of U.S. Civilization. 
2. Become involved financially to contribute to the American election process, media, 
and cultural education. 
3. Establish a research and studies center (institute) in Washington which will focus 
on the situation of the Arabs and the Arab-American relationship. 
4. Educate and familiarize Americans about Arabs and the Moslems. This can be done 
through publishing books, producing documentary films, providing courses, giving 
lectures, having seminars for high school teachers and students, and reaching out to 
foreign press correspondents who work in the Western media. 
5. Strengthen the relationship with American universities through lectures, writing 
articles, and supporting American professors who are known to be moderate or 
objective.  
6. Provide incentives, such as financial rewards or partial scholarships, for students 
who conduct academic research that supports Arab culture and their cause. 
 
 
99 
7. Focus extensively on the media in general not only through publishing books but 
also through newspapers, magazines, internet, and television. 
8. Support American politicians who sympathize with the Arabs and who push for 
finding a just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, those politicians who are 
convinced of the fairness of the Arab demands who understand that leaving the 
conflict unsolved will harm long-term American national interest. 
9. Direct the Arab-American institutes and associations in U.S.A., and the Arab 
embassies in creating a system in which they will reward friends and punish 
adversaries (1). 
 
7.1.1. The Role of Palestinian “Scholars”: 
 
The Palestinian scholars should be asking for a “Declaration of Culture”, as the 
Founding Fathers framed in the Declaration of Independence of the U.S. (1776). They 
should write their own history, shape their own culture, and the researcher believes that 
Palestinian scholars are capable of accomplishing such a task. They need to liberate 
themselves from being followers and have the self-esteem and confidence of their ability to 
be creative rather than imitators. It is about time for the Palestinian scholars to start 
thinking of new ways in order to create their own culture with a different rhetoric; as Abu- 
Nimah had put it: “Thinking the Unthinkable” (2). 
 
It is the role of educators to not simply recreate the work of other intellectuals but to 
initiate new ideas and progressive debate. An innovative thinker is a scholar who initiates new 
theories which will contribute to social and scientific development. The role he may take and 
the method he may adopt (make into an argument) while functioning as a thinker among his 
society is what really matters.  There are many scholars who prefer to do the right thing, as 
opposed to just being merely a tool used by the powerful people; it's the scholar's 
responsibility to chose between being a parrot or a leader who may direct his people toward 
the right path. 
 
                                               
(1) Muhammed A. Rabie’, Sunu’ el-Siyasa al-Amriekiyyeh wal-Arab [The Making of American Policy and 
the Arabs] (Amman: Dar el-Kaemel Press, 1990), pp: 227-228. 
(2) Ali Abunimah, One Country,  A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse, (New York: 
Metropolitan Books. 2006)  p.161.  
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Thus, there should be an evolutionary development of Palestinian ways of thinking; the 
Palestinian community direly needs to adapt a mechanism of self-criticism. Self-criticism is 
valid and an important concept for any developing civilization; when one is unsatisfied with 
himself, it is the beginning of self-betterment and the search for alternatives. It is the 
transitional period of growth and evolution into new knowledge, and it is the beginning of 
knocking upon the doors of freedom (1). 
 
7.2 Concluding Remarks 
 
This study attempted to examine the U.S role as a mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. The neutrality and the honesty of the U.S. were the main issues discussed. The 
study attempted to examine the successes and failures of the U.S. in applying the basic 
characteristics of a genuine mediator. Also, the study focused on peaceful approaches 
adopted by the international community for conflict resolution, according to Article 33 in 
the United Nations Charter. The goal behind focusing on these different approaches was to 
address the question about the efficiency of the mediation approach without combining it 
with other approaches, such as arbitration. The study discovered that mediation alone does 
not function efficiently in complicated cases such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; 
however, it argued that if mediation was combined with arbitration, it will have greater 
chance for success, as in the case of the Qatar-Bahrain borders dispute. 
 
 After the analytical and historical studies of the U.S. history of mediation in the 
Middle-East, and after pointing out the main U.S. strategists and foreign policy decision 
makers, the study discovered that many significant policy makers who have shaped U.S. 
policy toward the Middle East, were either pro-Israel or sympathize with the Jewish 
community’s concerns, while ignoring the Palestinians’ perspectives. The study analyzed 
historically the role of the American presidents, starting from Woodrow Wilson till the 
former president George W. Bush, and argued that the U.S. relationship with the Arab and 
Moslem world has not, with slight variation, changed. 
 
                                               
(1) The researcher thinks that Sari Nussaibeh, Edawrd Said, Rashid El Khaldi, Hanan Asrawi, Ziad Asali, 
and Mohammad S. Dajani are among the creative Palestinian scholars. 
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 After analyzing the role of U.S. domestic pressure groups, mainly AIPAC, the study 
found that the unequivocal financial and military support for Israel did not only come as a 
result of this group’s pressure, but also because of the U.S. national interests. It would not 
be accurate to give too much significance to the role of AIPAC; if this group actually 
dominated U.S. foreign policy, there would not be any dispute between AIPAC and U.S. 
administrations. In short, the role of AIPAC should not be exaggerated, regardless of its 
significant influence on the decision makers of the U.S. Foreign policy. 
 
The U.S. built its own perspective of the two disputed sides based on its long-term 
national interests; the U.S. has perceived the Palestinians as a minority living under the 
jurisdiction of Israeli governments. All U.S. presidents, since Harry Truman presidency 
term, until George W. Bush, have not recognized the Palestinians’ right of self-
determination and their right to have an independent state. The majority of former U.S. 
presidents considered the Palestinian problem simply as a refugees’ problem. Because of 
this, the U.S. asked the international community to be responsible for finding a 
humanitarian and just solution to this situation. However, even though Jimmy Carter, when 
he was the American president, did not recognize the Palestinian right to enjoy their 
independent state, he was the first American president who dealt with the Palestinians as a 
nation with inalienable rights. One can say that it was Jimmy Carter who changed the 
vocabulary of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the United States. 
 
The strategic alliance between Israel and the U.S. is very strong and the bond between 
the two countries cannot be easily broken. There are several bases for this strategic 
alliance, such as the economic and geographic factors; the U.S. is more concerned about its 
long-term national interests, which cannot be well-protected unless it has Israel as one of 
its best allies in the Middle East region. This particular concern of the U.S. is more 
important than solving the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Further, the study found 
that the U.S. has not acted as an honest, neutral, and objective mediator while dealing with 
the Palestinian- Israeli conflict; instead it has acted to the benefit of their national interest. 
 
The two summits of Camp David 2000 and 1979 have several features in common but 
the main one is that both of them were held under the U.S. patronage as a mediator. 
However, they differ completely in their results; Camp David 1979 agreement was 
successfully brokered where Camp David 2000 was a terrible failure as a result of 
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inexperienced and biased mediators; a failure of the mediation process that was practiced 
by the Clinton administration. In Camp David 1979 Jimmy Carter was described by some 
of  both Israelis and Palestinians as a true facilitator where Bill Clinton in Camp David 
2000 was described as a “lousy manager”; a mediator who lacked for the skill, knowledge, 
and experience of mediating efficiently in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1).   
 
 As for the Camp David 1979 agreement, Israel benefited largely because it removed 
the danger of war against a probable pan-Arab coalition and because the Sinai was 
transformed into a demilitarized buffer zone. Israel wants to maintain the military 
superiority over Egypt by monitoring the American military assistance to Egypt and by 
receiving more U.S. aid than any other country in the region. Israel also uses Egypt to 
influence the political decisions of the Palestinian leadership; it specifically approaches 
Egypt at time of crises, such as asking Egypt to use its influence while negotiating the 
release of the kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.   
 
Egypt disagrees and, sometimes, tries to challenge Israel’s military superiority by 
protesting to the UN about Israel’s possessions of nuclear weapons. However, this type of 
disagreement between the two countries does not exceed the boundaries of what is called 
global “Power Games”; such disputes can occur between China and the U.S. or Japan and 
South Korea. No one can deny the fact that the Camp David agreement of 1979 has 
successfully survived, even though it has encountered several difficult challenges, 
particularly the two wars in Lebanon (1982, 2006), the two Gulf Wars (1990, 2003), and 
the two Palestinian Intifadas (1987, 2000).This Accord could be used as an inspiring 
lesson for people who want to devote themselves to a genuine and a solid peace agreement.  
 
As for both Presidents (Carter and Clinton), Jimmy Carter’s administration did not 
have as many American Jewish staff members in his government as Bill Clinton did. 
Furthermore, several political agreements had preceded Camp David 1979 and they 
contributed to preparing the environment for brokerage of a successful treaty. The Rogers 
Plans, Kissinger’s policy (Step-by-Step), the  Kilometer 101 Agreement, the opening of the 
                                               
(1) Gilad Sher in his speech at the ceremony held in Tel Aviv ( November,2007) for publishing  Galia 
Golan’s book ( Israel and Palestine).The researcher attended this ceremony in company with Professor 
Muhammad S. Dajani. 
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Swiss Canal, and Sadat’s famous sentence “No More War”,  all contributed in establishing 
the concept of making peace between Egypt and Israel.   
 
 In conclusion, and by comparing and analyzing the two case studies (Camp David 
summits 1979 and 2000), the following summarizes the results of this study: 
1. The U.S. has not played a neutral role while dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict; it has not acted as an honest mediator (broker). 
2. Jimmy Carter was a very successful mediator, while Bill Clinton was not familiar 
with the conditions set by researchers and scholars for the successful mediation 
process. 
3. The 1979 summit was held in a different time from Camp David 2000 (21 years 
apart), therefore, the circumstances differed in terms of the military and economic 
power of both the Israelis and the Arabs. 
4. The role of AIPAC as a “pressure group” has been exaggerated. 
5. The national interests of the U.S. are the State Department’s main priority, so the 
decisions of its foreign policy are based on what benefits the U.S. long-term 
national interests.  
 
7.3 Recommendations 
 
After studying the role of the U.S. as the main mediator (broker) in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in the specific two case studies of Camp David I and Camp David II, 
and after analyzing the real factors that lie behind the deterioration of Arab-American 
relations, the researcher recommends the following: 
 
1. Political criticism of U.S. policies should be selective; it must focus on explaining 
the issues that may harm America’s national interests in the long-run. Most Americans are 
convinced of their political and social system; therefore, the criticism should come from 
within the system and not from the outside (internal and not external). The Americans are 
very sensitive about criticism from outsiders.  
2.The Palestinians should unite to employ experienced people familiar with the culture, 
mentality, values, and ways of thinking of the American society, they should hire a team 
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whose members are educated and knowledgeable about the tools and the requirements of 
the decision making process in American foreign policy. 
3. The Palestinian leaders should always consult with Palestinian experts on American 
affairs before engaging in negotiations with the Americans; such experts have the skill of 
using the proper language and style while communicating with the Americans. Professors 
Muhammed S. Dajani, Professor Munther S. Dajani, Professor Sari Nusseibeh, Dr. Rashid 
El-Khaldi, Dr.Hanan Ashrawi, and Dr. Ziad Asali, would be best example for representing 
the Palestinians for such a mission. 
4. It is necessary to offer assistance in organizing the Palestinian-American community 
in U.S.A. and to teach them the required information about the conflict in order to 
strengthen their ability to influence U.S. policy toward the Middle East.  
5. Provide help for the Arab lobbies by facilitating meetings with American officials 
through their embassies, and move beyond internal quarrels to create a financial avenue for 
the support of the Arab lobbies, which frequently suffer from financial shortages.  
6. Educate and prepare new generations to contribute actively in the voting process and 
political issues in the United States. Palestinian-American scholars, such as Dr. Rashid El-
Khaldi, are counting on the young Arab and Moslem generation to make the actual change 
of the U.S. foreign policy. The possibility of the Palestinians being successful in 
strengthening their relationship with the West, in general, and the United States in 
particular would be better if  the whole issue is investigated differently from what many 
analysts have done so far.  
7. Coordinate the Arabs’ political agenda and present a collective and united Arabian 
political position when addressing the United States and American politicians.  
8. The Palestinians should learn how to give up the “Blaming Game” and start looking 
for more useful ways to present their case. This can be done by staying away from the 
constant negative criticism of the American political system and its foreign policy, 
regardless of its biased position with Israel and its hostile attitude towards the Palestinians. 
Attacking the Americans and their political values creates an instant hate reaction against 
the Palestinians, which benefits Israel.  
9. The U.S. theatre and cinema have played a very important role in affecting and 
shaping the American perceptions of Arabs. Hollywood has always portrayed the Arabs as 
barbarians and savages, where it has shown the Israelis as victims who are surrounded by 
aggressive nations who will “toss them one day in the sea”. Arabs should not 
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underestimate the influence of the cinema, and therefore, they must focus on this type of 
media to work in favor of the Arabs and their cause.   
10. Focus on the moral violations of Israel and relate them to the American constitution 
and their Declaration of Independence (1776). 
11. Send e-mails to both the senators and the house representatives on Capitol Hill 
explaining to them about the conflict from the Arabs’ perspective, or complaining to them 
about the unfair positions that some of them take against the Arabs.   
 
Finally, the Palestinians must cope with the fact that the U.S. has been and will 
continue to be the most influential mediator in the Middle East peace process. Palestinians 
should approach this conflict through the lens of the U.S. national interest. As such, 
Palestinians must adapt their mode of thinking and action to facilitate greater U.S. support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
Bibliography 
 
I- Books:  
1. Abunimah, A. (2006). One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-
Palestinian Impasse.  New York: Metropolitan Books. 
2. Albright, M. (2005). Madam Secretary: A Memoir. New York: Miramax Books. 
3. Bush, R. and Folger, J.  (1994).The Promise of Mediation: Responding to 
Conflict through Empowerment and Recognition. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers. 
4. Bennis, PH. (2007).Understanding the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. 
Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press. 
5. Berry, J., Goldman .J. & others. (1992).The Challenge of Democracy. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company. 
6. Burnes, J. (1965). The deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America. 
N.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
7. Carter, J. (2006). Palestine Peace Not Apartheid. New York: Simon& Scchuster, 
Inc. 
8. Cohen, N. (2003). The Americanization of Zionism 1897-1948.New England: 
Brandeis University Press. 
9. Chomsky, N. (1991).Media Control. New York; Seven Stories Press. 
10. Chomsky, N. (1997). Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of 
Propaganda. New York: Seven Stories Press. 
11. Chomsky, N. (1999).  Fateful Triangle: U.S.A., Israel, and the Palestinians. 
Boston, MA: South End Press. 
12.  Chomsky, N. (2002).  9-11. New York: Seven Stories Press. 
13.  Chomsky, N. (2006).Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on 
Democracy. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC. 
14.  Christison, K. (1999). Perceptions of Palestine:  Their Influence on U.S. Middle 
East Policy. California: University of Californian Press.  
15.  Clinton, B. (2004).My Life. New York: Random House Inc. 
16.  Deutsch, M. (2000). The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice. 
San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
 
107 
17.  Donovan, R. (1977).Conflict and Crises: The presidency of Harry Truman, 
1945-1948.New York: W. Norton. 
18.  Enderlin. (2003). Shattered Dreams: Failure of the Peace process in the Middle 
East, 1995-2002. New York: Other Press. 
19.  Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1991). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without 
Giving In. New York: Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 
20.  Freedman, R. (1991). The Intifada: It’s Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and 
the Superpowers. Miami: Florida International University Press. 
21.  Golan, G. (2008). Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to 
Disengagement. NewJersey: Markus Weiner Publishers.  
22.  Geer, J. (1996). From Tea leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory of Democratic 
Leadership. New York: Columbia University Press. 
23.  Hamid, M. (2007). The Reluctant Fundamentalist. Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Inc. 
24.  Hass, R. (1990). Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
25.  Huntington, S. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order. 
26.  Khalidi, R. (2006). The Iron Cage. Boston: Beacon Press. 
27.  Kissinger, H. (1995). Henry Kissinger: The Diplomacy from the Called War till 
Present. Amman: Al Ahliyyah for Distributing and Edition. 
28.  Kissinger, H. (2001).Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy 
for the 21st Century.  New York: Simon & Schuster. 
29.  Lazo, C. (1996) Jimmy Carter: on the Road to Peace. NJ, Parsippany: Dillon 
Press 
30.  Miller, A. (2008). The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for 
Arab-Israeli Peace. New York: Bantam Dell, a division of Random House, Inc. 
31. Moore, Ch. (2003).  The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving 
Conflict. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc.: Jossy-Bass Publisher. 
32.  Nusseibeh, S. (2007). Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life. New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
33.  Pappe, I. (2006). A History of Modern Palestine. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
34.  Pappe, I. (2006). The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oxford: One World 
Publications Limited. 
 
 
108 
35.  Peleg, I. (1998). The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. 
Albany: State University of New York. 
36.  Petras, J. (2006). The Power of Israel in the United States. Atlanta: Clarity Press. 
37. Potter, B. (1996). From Conflict To Cooperation: How To Mediate A Dispute. 
California: Ronin Publishing, Inc.  
38.  Quandt, W. (2005). Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict since 1967. California: Brookings Institution Press and the University of 
California Press. 
39.  Ross, D. (2004). The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle 
East Peace. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
40.  Rubenberg, Ch. (1989). Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical 
Examination. Illinois: University of Illinois Press. 
41.  Rubin, J. (2005). Yasir Arafat:A Political Bigraphy. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
42.  Sakran, F. (1976).Palestine, Still a Dilemma. Pennsylvania: Whitmore Pub. Co. 
43.  Schellenberg, J. (1996).Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice. New 
York: State University of New York Press.  
44.  Shamir,Sh. and Maddy-Weitzman, B.(2005).The Camp David    Summit-What 
Went Wrong? Great Britain: Sussex Academic Press. 
45. Sharabi, N. (1990). London: Riad El-Rayyes books Ltd. 
46.  Slaikeu, K. (1996). When Push Comes To Shove: A Practical Guide to Mediating 
Disputes. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc.: Jossy-Bass Publisher. 
47. Swisher, C. (2004). The Truth about Camp David. New York: Nations Books. 
48.  Terry. J. (2005). U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East. London: Pluto Press. 
49.  Tessler, Mark. (1994).A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Indiana: 
Indiana University Press. 
50.  Tindall, G., and Shi,D.(1984). America: A Narrative History.3rd Ed.  Vol.II New 
York:  W.W.Norton. 
51.  Urofsky, M. (1994). Basic Readings in U.S. Democracy. Washington: United 
States Information Agency. 
52.  Ury, W. (1993).  Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation to 
Cooperation. New York: Bantam Books. 
53.  Winslade, J., and Monk, G. (2001).  Narrative Mediation: A New Approach to 
Conflict Resolution. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons Inc.: Jonny-Bass Publisher. 
 
 
109 
54.  Zartman, W. (1985). Ripe for Resolution. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
II- Articles and Papers 
 
1. Agha, Hussein and Malley, Robert. Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors. The New 
York Review of Books: Vol. 48, No. 13. August 9, 2001. 
2. Agha, Hussein and Malley, Robert. Camp David and After: An Exchange (2.A 
Reply to Ehud Barak). The New York Review of Books: Vol.49, No.10. June 13, 
2002. 
3. Barak, Ehud and Morris, Benny. Camp David and After-Continued.  The New York 
Review of Books: Vol.49, No.11.June 27, 2002. 
4. Dr. Ron Pundak. “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” Survival: 
Vol.43.No.3, autumn 2001. 
5. Grinstein, Gidi and Ross, Dennis. Camp David: An Exchange. The New York 
Review of Books: Vol.48. No.14.September 20, 2001. 
6. Haaretz: Hillary Clinton. Thu. December 11, 2008 Kislev 14, 5769. 
7. Haaretz: “Did Abraham Lincoln support the creation of a Jewish State?” Article 
by Tom Segev, last update-02/27/2009. 
8.  Haaretz: Article by Barak Ravid. “Clinton: Israel's demolition of East Jerusalem 
homes harms peace efforts” March 4, 2009. 
9. Morris, Benny .Camp David and After: An Exchange (An Interview with Ehud 
Barak). The New York Review of Books:  V.49, No. 10. June 13,2002 
10. Israel Military Operation in Lebanon. Washington Post, June 16, 1982 
11. AIPAC: A Major Force in Washington. Article by Shipler, David K. New York 
Times, July 06, 1987. 
III- Internet 
 
·  How Israel brought Gaza to the brink of humanitarian catastrophe, Avi 
Shlaim, Oxford professor of international relations 
http://www.guardian.co.uk:80/world/2009/jan/07/gaza-israel-palestine (March 25, 
2009). 
 
 
110 
· Shlomo Ben-Ami Diaries 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/benamidiary.html  (February 19, 
2007). 
 
· The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace 
http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=7355 
     (New York Times: September 13, 2004). 
 
· Secretary of State Madeline Albright Diaries 
http://search.loc.gov:8765/query.html?st=101&charset=utf-8&col=loc&qt=secretaries 
(May 13, 2008). 
 
· 1979 The Camp David Accords of 1979 
http://www.jerusalemites.org/facts_documents/camp_david.htm  (May 30, 2008). 
 
· The Meaning of Resolution 242 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/meaning_of_242.html (Sep.19, 
2007). 
 
· Conflict Resolution: How to stop Fighting 
(www.beyondintractability.org  (February 7, 2008). 
· The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute: The World Court Decision: Part 2 
(April 6, 2001). 
www.theestimate.com (October 10, 2007). 
 
· The Arab-Israeli Conflict   
http://middleeast.about.com/od/arabisraeliconflict/f/me081115e.htm 
(October 17, 2008) 
 
· (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. 
September 13, 1993) 
(http://www.historycentral.com/Israel/Documents/Oslo.html.  
(September 25, 2007).  
 
 
111 
· Kilometer 101 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908222,00.html  (April 08, 
2009). 
· USAID Boycott of Target 
http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0205aidboycott_body.html  (December 
19, 2008). 
· Rogers Plan 
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_rogers_1969.php 
(April, 22, 2008) 
· U.S. Asked Saudis to Aid Palestinians 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/29/world/us-asked-saudis-to-aid-palestinians.html (By 
Steven A. Holmes, Published: Thursday, April 29, 1993).    
IV- Reports 
1. Blechmann, B. Protecting America's Future: the Role of Foreign Assistance. 
Washington: The Alliance for international Economic Development. (March 20, 2005). 
2. Correspondent Report: Transcript (This transcript is from Correspondents Report, 
Sunday, 15 October, 2006). 
 3. Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy. Address by 
Richard M. Nixon, Francisco, (July 29, 1967). 
4. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreements in the International Law Perspective. 
Amman: Dar el-Jalil. (1984). 
· Arabic References 
1. Eriqat, S. (2008). Al Hayat Mufawatdat. Palestine, Nablus: Jama’t Al-Najah al-
Wataniyyeh. 
2. Rabie, M. (1990) Sunu’ el-Siyasa al-Amriekiyyeh wal-Arab. Jordan,Amman: Dar el-
Kaemel Press. 
3. Sharabi, N. (1990). Amirika wa-al-Arab: Al-siyasah al-Amerikiyah fi al-watan 
Arabi al-qarn al-ishrin London: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr. 
 
 
112 
4. Qurei, A. (2005). Mufawatdat Oslo 1993. Lebanon, Beirut: Mu’assasat el-Derasat el- 
Falestieniyyeh. 
                       
5. Qurei, A. ((2007). Mufawatdat Camp David (Taba and Stockholm) 1995-2000. 
Lebanon, Beirut: Mu’assasat el-Derasat el- Falestieniyyeh. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
Appendix 
 
"I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private 
international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in 
the public view.  
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in 
peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international 
action for the enforcement of international covenants. 
III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of 
an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and 
associating themselves for its maintenance. 
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to 
the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, 
based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of 
sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the 
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. 
VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions 
affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the 
world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the 
independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure 
her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own 
choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and 
may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to 
come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as 
distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.  
VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any 
attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. 
No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in 
the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their 
relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of 
international law is forever impaired.  
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VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the 
wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has 
unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace 
may once more be made secure in the interest of all.  
IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly 
recognizable lines of nationality. 
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see 
safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous 
development.  
XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories 
restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several 
Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established 
lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and 
economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be 
entered into.  
XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure 
sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured 
an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous 
development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the 
ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.  
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories 
inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure 
access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity 
should be guaranteed by international covenant.  
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the 
purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to 
great and small states alike."  
Source: http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/president_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points. 
